Chapter 3

The Progressive Era GOP: Destroyed by Factionalism

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Originally Prepared for the Woodrow Wilson National Symposium, August 2004

Slightly Revised August 2005
The partisan alignment that emerged after 1896, in which the Democratic Party was increasingly confined to the South and the Republican Party dominated a bloc of states in the North and Midwest, reduced inter-party competition and increased intra-party strife. The Progressive Era produced powerful networks of elites inside the Republican Party that sought to transform the party’s identity, policy preferences, and affiliations. On the major issues of the day—tariff reform, business regulation, conservation, party reform, and the trusts—significant cleavages existed inside the GOP. Conservatives emerged at the end of the nineteenth century to block the advance of populism within the party and maintain Republicans links to the business community. A decade later, progressives surfaced to demand new economic regulation and social welfare policies. These divisions came to a head in the election of 1912, pitting conservatives against progressives. The result was Woodrow Wilson’s election to the presidency and the decline of progressivism inside the GOP.

Both of these elite-networks are examples of national intra-party “factions.” A faction, as defined here, is a party sub-unit that has enough ideological consistency, organizational capacity, and temporal durability to sustain intra-party conflict with implications for the party’s self-conception, and policy-making, and the party’s power.¹ Factions exist when some party members share a common identity, are conscious of differences that separate them from other party members, and are collectively engaged to overcome resistance within the party.² Factions acquire names, create organizations, and articulate different ideational positions from the rest of their party. They are the “parties” behind the parties, struggling to determine a party’s identity, affiliations, and self-conception. More precisely, intra-party factions are engines of preference formation, agenda setting, and coalition building. The most serious challenge occurs when a faction tries to takeover the party and make it’s own.
This chapter provides a systematic account of the role of Republican national intra-party factions from 1896 through the 1912 election. It investigates these factions’ effects on the Republican Party’s public image, policymaking, and presidential-congressional relations. The analysis details each faction’s properties, strategic choices, and the ideational dimensions along which it challenged the rest of the party. The incentives and ideational factors underpinning the strategic and tactical decisions factions made—and the larger party’s response—are at the center of the analysis.

This chapter makes three interrelated arguments. First, Republican Party factions emerged from a complex mix of material and ideological interests that were compounded by presidential-congressional dynamics. Second, I argue that the progressive faction failed to transform the public image of the Republican Party; and third, that it was factional friction inside the Republican Party (given disarray of the Democratic Party) that infused presidential-congressional relations with much of its vigor between 1904 and 1912. The study of Republican intra-party factions also offers the classic American example of how a faction becomes a splinter party, namely, the Progressive Party in 1912.

**ANALYSIS OF FACTIONS**

Factions are “proto-parties,” so to speak, in the original Burkean meaning of “party”: an aggregation of people that associate to advance a notion of the public good. Within the larger party, factions are important sources of energy and ideas. Consequently, I examine factions’ objectives and the strategies they employ to advance them. There are two basic types of factions: promoters of change and defenders of the status quo. In both cases, a faction has four strategic options: it can try to takeover the party, cooperate, veto other party members’ initiatives or otherwise subvert them, or splinter into a third party. The rest of the party has three options:
ignore the faction, co-opt it, or take concerted action to defeat it, such by purging it. The choices of the rest of the party expose the balance of forces inside the party. Factions seek to gain control of national governing institutions to show that their views represent a national majority. Ultimately, factions seek the authority to put their stamp on the party, and, if conditions permit, the nation.

Intra-party factions are studied here by analyzing (1) the organizational or structural properties of factions; (2) what brings factions into being; and (3) what factions do. To tackle the first of this set of questions, the anatomy of factions can be explored along three dimensions: organizational, motivational, and ideological. The organizational dimension is from the weak boundary of a faction taking on a name to a strong boundary where a faction has enough institutional strength to become a splinter party. The motivational dimension runs from a faction based strictly on power seeking to one based on principle. The ideological dimension moves from fanaticism to pragmatism. In addition to placing factions on these dimensions, factions built around a single leader and those constructed out of coalitions can be distinguished. The stability and durability of factions, over time and across issue domains, can differentiate between personalist and coalitional factions.

Factions come into being because they stand for something. In this sense, they arise for the same reasons as John Aldrich argues that parties do: to represent and advance the material interests and ideological goals of politicians. Once in existence, factions attempt to shift or maintain party policy preferences through a variety of means. Broadly speaking, there are at least four ways members of factions work to change policy preferences: (1) policymaking, (2) investigating, (3) taking public stands, and (4) organizing. In the House and the Senate, faction members use their rhetorical, coalition building, and parliamentary skills to advance their goals.
Faction members in the press and in Congress can investigate policy areas to challenge the mainstream view of the party. Faction members take stands in the press, on the floor of the House and Senate, on the campaign trial, and in presidential nominating conventions. These public actions are essential to re-framing issues as factional affiliates try to implant certain considerations in the public’s mind. Lastly, faction members organize. They create new institutions and practices and attempt to co-opt older ones.

**SOURCES OF GOP FACTIONALISM**

In popular parlance, “faction” connotes illegitimacy, if not pathology. Factions are at times considered to be indicators of party weakness and corruption, and herald strife and violence. Alternatively, they are often seen as ephemeral phenomena—dysfunctional aberrations in times of discord. Eighteenth century authors and statesmen did not clearly distinguish parties from factions and often used the terms interchangeably—although faction was considered the more sinister version of party. Both were considered to be, at bottom, evil. In the Founders view, factions and parties were the sources of fanatical passions, treasonable divisiveness, and violence. By the end of the 1830s, parties were more accepted, becoming recognized organizations for political competition with positive roles to play in the political system. In the process, however, the terms “party” and “faction” were transformed. “Party” came to mean a large organization designed for electoral competition, while “faction” suggested a nefarious clique motivated by ideology or interest, which could reside within a party. It is this later conception of faction that I have adopted.

In the contemporary scholarship on the Republican Party of the Progressive Era, Howard L. Reiter has shown that persistent factions existed within the party by studying the national nominating conventions. Two factions developed inside the GOP from 1897 to 1915. There
were four primary sources for their emergence. The first was geographical: the increasing divide in material interests between the Middle West and the East. In the 19th century, the Republican Party was united in its commitment to the protective tariff and internal improvements. But by the 1890s this policy choice increasingly appeared to favor Eastern industry, particularly the railroads, at the expense of the Western farmer. The result was differences over the party’s position and agenda on tariff schedules, business regulation, and monetary policy.

The second pertained to the party’s image. Differences over what the Republican Party should stand for separated conservatives and progressives rather than any basic difference in the social or economic background of Republicans. To be sure, there were social and economic differences between these two factions, which gave them their distinctive character. Richard Hofstadter has most forcefully advanced the view of progressivism as the result of a status revolution. But when the conservatives and the progressive Republicans are compared, they did not have radically different social and economic backgrounds. Indeed, it is therefore safer to conclude that it was political experience and different constituencies that differentiated these two factions. Each preferred that the party’s image reflect their section to assist their electoral prospects.

In response to the threat of diverging regional material interests, conservatives seized control of a newly centralized power structure in the Senate to enforce party unity. In part a reaction to populism and the Silver Republican defections of 1896, this was also a preemptive action, to hold the line against new policy ideas that threatened traditional Republican ideals and policies. Consequently, progressives in the Eastern cities and the Western states had to confront a disciplined partisan, who were the beneficiaries of conservative policy choices. To combat
them, progressives had to develop new ideas and policy alternatives as well as establish a network of like-minded individuals committed to their goals.

The third source of factionalism was presidential-congressional conflict. Theodore Roosevelt, by working with the conservatives but pushing them in a progressive direction when he could, managed to downplay party cleavages. The result was such legislative accomplishments as the Hepburn Act and the Pure Food and Drugs Act. But, when cooperation proved elusive, Roosevelt shifted increasingly toward the progressives and provided them with a coherent set of policy goals in his congressional messages. Taft’s rejection of progressives proved to be a catalyst in solidifying the identity of a militant faction within the party. The president’s role as party leader helped to divide the party into opposing factions.

A final possible source of factionalism was the absence of foreign policy as a critical issue between 1907 and 1914. The election of 1912 was focused almost exclusively on domestic affairs. A serious foreign policy issue might have muted intra-party cleavages by creating overlapping coalitions among the factions—without one they were brought to the fore. Insofar as the coalitions for isolationism and internationalism would not map onto existing factional divisions, the presence of foreign policy on the national agenda might have reduced Republican factionalism. Without one, the party was left to concentrate on its domestic differences.

**THE CONSERVATIVES**

The “conservative” faction was the first to emerge in the late 1890s. Historians and contemporaries have called this group a variety of names, “standpatters,” “regulars,” or the “Old Guard.” I adopt the term “conservative” because it is both the clearest analytically and it is how some faction members referred to themselves.
The conservatives had their institutional base in the Senate, organized initially around the “Senate Four”—Nelson Aldrich (R-RI), William Allison (R-IA), Orville Platt (R-CT), and John Spooner (R-WI). From the Senate, they exercised control over both the House of Representatives and state Republican parties. Later, when under threat from the progressive faction, the conservatives tried to extend their organizational network to state clubs in support of conservative office seekers in the elections of 1910 and 1912. Curiously, the conservative faction grew out of the unusual degree of party unity on major policy issues facing the country after the elections of 1894 and 1896.

Increasing consensus on policy matters by the majority party led the party to delegate more power to the leadership, which in turn began to develop its own interests. This development offers evidence in support of the “conditional party government” model advanced by David Rhode, among others. In this view, strong legislative party organizations emerge when the policy preferences of members of Congress are homogeneous. As members’ preferences become more alike, they delegate power to party leaders to secure common goals. By themselves, like minds and large numbers do not yield desired results. Leadership and organization are necessary to translate common goals into preferred outcomes. Party leaders are cast as enablers: they help members realize shared policy preferences but do not shape those preferences. Historians, on the other hand, have suggested that this faction developed simply out of an “overinterpretation of an mandate,” much like the congressional Republicans of 1994. In 1897, Allison became chairman of the GOP Caucus and Steering Committee. The committee assignment process and other levers of Senate power were soon largely in the hands of Allison, Aldrich, and their allies. As Albert Beveridge (R-IN) observed at the time, “These men and their disciples rule the Senate through the packing of important committees with their creatures.”
either case, Eric Schickler argues that Republicans’ partisan interests were responsible for the development of centralized leadership under the “Allison and Aldrich faction.” Republicans sought to enact conservative policies, block Populist inspired reforms, and appear an effective majority governing party.

The objective of the conservative takeover of the Senate was party control. This meant control over the party’s public image, policy preferences and priorities, and structures of power in government. After the “Silver Republicans” from the Midwest bolted the party in 1896 to vote for Bryan, the Republican leadership sought to close ranks against populist tendencies within the party. Control of the Senate was the ideal institution to exercise this kind of power. Before the direct election of senators, each senator wielded extensive influence over his state party to ensure his reelection by the state legislature. Patronage ensured control over party members in their home states. Domination of the committee assignment process, as well as the powerful rules and finance committees, allowed the Senate Four to exercise control over the chamber in general and Republican senators in particular. In addition, the Senate Four worked to install David Henderson (R-IA) as Speaker of the House upon Thomas Reed’s retirement in 1899, to give themselves expanded influence in the House. When Joseph Cannon (R-IL) became Speaker and consolidated power in the House in 1903, he eventually aligned himself with the conservative faction.

Republican senators of the period may also have been more willing to accept centralization of leadership because many of the younger generation were “machine” senators whose state politics experience taught them the advantages of party loyalty. These senators were concerned primarily about local issues and inclined to leave the direction of national policy to the conservative faction as long as their needs were satisfied. Moreover, greater centralization
of power in the senate leadership meant that the institution would be a more disciplined and effective governing body vis-à-vis the House and the White House. Strong leadership would dispel concern over the crippling effects of filibusters or that the increasingly complicated legislative agenda created by industrialization would render the Senate incapable of effective governance.

The immediate impact of granting the Senate Four control over national policy through the parliamentary levels of Senate power was an increase in party discipline. The centralization of power in the Senate formed an “interlocking directorate.” Decisions were made and disagreements worked out in the Republican Party Caucus rather than on the unpredictable Senate floor. Beginning in 1897, a series of Allison’s allies chaired the Committee on Committees, and Allison himself took over the chairmanship of the Appropriations Committee and was a high-ranking member of the Finance Committee. Aldrich became chairman of the Finance Committee in 1899 and served on rules and interstate commerce. Platt and Spooner served together on finance and judiciary, and Spooner became chairman of rules in 1899. Aldrich also extended his influence into campaign finance, where he made his influence with Wall Street contributors known to other senators. In sum, the conservative faction leaders monopolized the major committees and directed scarce campaign resources.

The basis of the conservative faction was largely geographical, deriving from the industrial regions of the country. Most of the leaders were from the Northeast (especially New England) and Middle West (with some exceptions). The image of the conservatives, however, remained largely pragmatic until Allison’s death in 1908. Unlike Aldrich, who was too closely associated with Eastern financial interests, Allison’s Iowa origins and Ohio legal training helped him maintain a certain balance between the Eastern and Western bases of the party. The
dignified and unassuming Allison earned a reputation as a conciliator and political moderate. Although ideologically predisposed to the conservative Easterners, Allison was sensitive enough to Western concerns to mute dissent—a “Western man, with Eastern principles.” After 1908, the conservatives slowly lost many of their most experienced leaders and with them their ability to control dissent, which emboldened progressives between 1910 and 1912.

Ideologically, the conservatives were skeptical of mass democracy and preferred a sort of individualist, Darwinian philosophy that posited slow organic change. They were pessimistic about mass democracy, concerned about mob passions, and more interested in perfecting the elite than bettering the masses. One historian describes them as “pure Hamiltonian,” insofar as they believed wealth should rule the country. Not surprisingly, they preferred party loyalty and senatorial discretion to direct democracy and its techniques of primaries, initiative, referendum, and recall. And their theory of governance favored the least democratic institutions in the American political system, the judiciary and the Senate.

The policy objectives of the conservative faction inside the GOP was to block progressive and populist reforms emanating from the Western and Southern agricultural states and to support Eastern manufacturing through the maintenance of higher tariffs. They exercised both a policymaking function and a veto power over legislation with which they disagreed. Their domination of the party lasted at least until the second half of Theodore Roosevelt’s second term. Roosevelt understood that unless he cooperated with Aldrich and his allies, little if any legislation could be passed in his first term. Moreover, an open contest with the conservative Senate leadership would have jeopardized Roosevelt’s nomination and reelection prospects in 1904. In policy terms, this kept the delicate and potentially explosive tariff issue off the table, and Aldrich blocked Roosevelt’s regulatory legislation proposals. Roosevelt’s
cooperation with the conservatives led one historian to conclude that they formed, for a brief period, a “Conservative Party” inside the GOP.\textsuperscript{23}

During Roosevelt’s second term the conservative faction hardened as the progressive faction emerged, which increased friction between the president and the Senate leadership. Despite the largest GOP electoral victory since the Civil War, the 1904 elections solidified the fault lines between progressives, the president, and the conservatives. The elections of 1904 and 1906 brought some of the most famous progressives into the House and Senate. In December of 1905, Roosevelt delivered a series of bold reform messages to the Congress. He called for change in railroad rates; an end to overcapitalization of corporations; supervision of interstate insurance transactions; prohibition of corporate campaign contributions; a halt to interstate shipment of adulterated and misbranded goods; and to top it off, indictments of judges for the misuse of injunctions. This message challenged the three traditional powers of the business community sternly defended by GOP conservatives: the freedom to set their own prices, to keep their books in secrecy, and to negotiate labor contracts without interference.

The conservative response was to hold their ground. The legislative histories of the period show that conservatives were willing to accept business regulation, as long as it could be made to accommodate rather than directly confront the interests of business. Conservatives were thus hostile to all federal regulatory expansion in principle but only to the forms offered by Democrats and progressive Republicans.\textsuperscript{24}

The legislative histories of the Hepburn and Pure Food and Drugs Acts bear this out. In the Senate, conservatives killed one railroad reform bill (Esch-Townshend) in the 1904 congressional session.\textsuperscript{25} In 1905, when the Hepburn bill was reported nearly unanimously out of the House, Aldrich’s parliamentary tactics offended progressives—in particular, he deprived
progressive Jonathan Dolliver (R-Iowa) of the opportunity to claim credit for introducing the bill. Instead, Aldrich selected Benjamin Tillman (D-SC), a Democrat, as the bill’s sponsor. When it finally made it out of committee and onto the floor, Aldrich and his allies refused to support it and tried to amend it to death. The primary sticking point was the extent of the courts’ power to review decisions taken by the commission to regulate rates. The conservatives favored a broad court review power, while progressives favored a narrowly tailored one. When the bill stalled in Congress, garnering support primarily from Democrats, Roosevelt was forced to return to Allison to craft a compromise. This was enough to pass the bill in the Senate in 1906, with only radical progressives (LaFollette) and extreme conservatives (Joseph Foraker (R-OH)) opposing the measure. The result was the Hepburn Act.

After being dragged along on the pure food bill and the meat inspection act, the conservatives took a harder line after 1906. Roosevelt lashed out in 1908 at the “ruling clique” in the Senate. To maintain control over party policy preferences in the face of Roosevelt’s rhetorical onslaught, the conservatives looked forward to the 1908 Republican National Convention. Since William Howard Taft’s nomination was largely a forgone conclusion, conservatives sought to write the party platform to their specifications. Aldrich, along with Winthrop Crane (R-MA) and James Van Cleave (President of the American Manufacturers Association) rewrote the controversial labor injunction and tariff planks. Instead of limiting injunctions the way the original platform did, which had been approved by Roosevelt and Taft, the party pledged to “uphold at all times the authority and integrity of the courts.” And the platform only said that tariff reform was in order, not that the tariff should be revised downward as Taft requested.
Taft’s presidential leadership was a key factor in solidifying the factional composition of the GOP. Although Roosevelt had broken with the conservative faction by 1908 and named Taft as a successor to carry out “[his] policies,” conservatives gained a friend in the White House. Taft was more intellectually conservative than Roosevelt. A student of William Graham Sumner at Yale, Taft did not share Roosevelt’s confidence in the efficacy of state action, and doubted the speed with which social change could be affected. Nor did he share Roosevelt’s expansive view of executive power; Taft thought the president should be more an executor of law than a policy initiator. Moreover, Taft was suspicious about the rights of organized labor and disposed to respect judicial injunctions, derived as they were from a legal process he revered. Socially, Taft remained a strictly establishment figure, who “scarcely corresponded or… mingled with a person of… progressive tendencies.” He preferred the company of men like Senator Crane (R-MA), a strict organization many who distrusted reformers, especially those in his own party. Indeed, Taft personally disliked or distrusted many reformers and progressives.

Taft’s tilt toward the conservative faction began during the run up to the 1908 election, when he learned man progressives had urged Roosevelt to run again. He feared that many might vote for Bryan as the heir to Roosevelt, and would not support his administration. Taft even encouraged Elihu Root to work for the selection of conservative senators. Because Taft was forced to campaign against the progressive sounding Bryan, he naturally appeared even more conservative. The conservative faction interpreted Taft’s electoral victory as a repudiation of Roosevelt or at a least signal to slow the pursuit of his goals. Once in office, Taft quickly alienated progressives, deepening factional divisions within the party. As one historian put it, “Taft’s relations with the progressive faction began badly, deteriorated rapidly, and reached open hostility within a year of his inauguration.”
Taft’s handling of five separate but overlapping issues solidified the perception among progressives that he was opposed to them and strengthened the conservatives. First, his appointment policies, especially the hastily formed cabinet, left progressives without patronage. And the presence of five corporate lawyers in the cabinet did not assure progressives of Taft’s reformist tendencies. The president also decided not to reappoint Roosevelt’s progressive friends, James R. Garfield and Luke E. Wright.

Second, Taft’s maladroit handling of the progressive insurgency against the Old Guard Speaker Joseph Cannon (R-IL) further disappointed progressives. Under threat, Cannon became increasingly aggressive in his parliamentary tactics, blocking progressive and Democratic measures in the last two years of the Roosevelt administration. The frustration of progressive Republicans, and some Democrats, culminated in a rebellion against Cannon’s leadership in 1909-1910. Progressives sought to expand the Rules Committee, remove the Speaker from that committee, and take away his control of committee assignments. Taft initially encouraged the movement against the Speaker, until Cannon, Aldrich, and Sereno Payne (R-NY) (Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee) informed him that tariff revision would be off the table unless he supported the Speaker. Rather than imperil his legislative program, Taft sided with Cannon and the conservatives against the progressive faction.

Third, by seeking tariff reform, Taft opened the most divisive issue for the GOP. Taft’s series of meetings with Aldrich and Cannon during the tariff battle made it seem to progressives that he had deserted them. The final bill irritated progressives because while it reduced tariffs on certain products, it increased them on others, and the net effect was not a bill that substantially reduced tariffs. Taft’s excessive praise of the Payne-Aldrich tariff further offended progressives, who assailed Taft for not supporting further reductions and the personal income tax.
Progressives also attacked Cannon and Aldrich as being the personal representatives of big business and negatively impacting the Republican Party’s public image. The entire process soured Taft on progressives and reformers in general.

Fourth, in the Ballinger-Pinchot affair Taft once again managed to offend Roosevelt and the progressives. A complex bureaucratic struggle came to symbolize the struggle between progressive and conservative factions for the image of the GOP. By siding with his Secretary of the Interior, Richard Ballinger, against Roosevelt’s friend, Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot, Taft appeared to be siding with the Old Guard. When Roosevelt learned of Pinchot’s firing, the crack in the friendship between the two men widened into a chasm.

Fifth, Taft coordinated with the conservative faction in the Senate and House an active campaign against progressives in primary election in the Midwest. In January 1910, the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, headed by Old Guard congressman William B. McKinley, announced that it would oppose progressives in the fall elections. Taft agreed to an Aldrich proposal to establish a fund to elect “orthodox Republicans,” and personally called a meeting of Iowa regulars to strategize. The administration and the conservatives carried out similar operations in Kansas, Nebraska, Washington, Wisconsin, and California. In each state networks of “Taft Republican Clubs” were formed to support “regular” Republicans against progressives in the primaries. The election results made grim reading for Republicans, Democrats won the House of Representatives for the first time since 1894, cut the GOP majority in the Senate to ten seats, and elected governors in New York, New Jersey, Indiana, Massachusetts, and Ohio. While Republicans maintained control of the Senate, progressives now held the balance of power between conservatives and Democrats.
In the last two years of Taft’s presidency, he undertook more progressive measures on railroads and the trusts, but this did little to repair factional divisions within the party, or shift the image of the GOP. The progressives’ perception of Taft as aligned with the conservatives was already fixed. Yet, Taft had many advantages going into the 1912 election: the GOP had not denied an incumbent renomination in thirty years, his accomplishments of the previous three years were impressive, especially on trusts and social legislation, and there were no international crises to disturb a growing domestic economy. Although Taft had alienated progressives, he might have regained his position and healed the wounds within the party, even as late as 1911. But he then lost the confidence of conservatives by vigorously pursuing anti-trust action, particularly against U.S. Steel—which inflamed Roosevelt—and by supporting Canadian reciprocity. The result was a badly divided party, where one faction opposed the president and the other supported him only as the best choice among bad alternatives.

**THE PROGRESSIVES**

The progressive faction emerged at the national level after the elections of 1904 and began to organize coherently in 1906. At the turn of the century, politicians who would later comprise the progressive faction were cutting their teeth in state politics. In the Midwest and West, La Follette was elected governor of Wisconsin in 1901; Albert Cummins became governor of Iowa the same year; and nascent Republican reform movements surfaced in California, Minnesota, Illinois, and Kansas. In the East, at the local level, progressives gained experience in the Social Gospel movement, as muckraking journalists, and in city politics. These inroads at the state and local level laid the foundation for a distinct progressive faction within the GOP.

There were, however, two distinct currents inside the progressive movement. One was, in Russel Nye’s words, the “Eastern Hamiltonian, urban” progressivism, which was forward
looking, nationalistic, and pursued a moralistic kind of state reform; the other was the
Midwestern “fear of bigness, of concentration and control,” which was backward looking,
individualistic, agrarian, and sought a return to the world of frontier equality. The former, as
James Sundquist has pointed out, had its roots in the Liberal Republican and Mugwump factions
of the 1870s and 1880s, while the latter were rooted in the populist movements of the 1890s. In
terms of electoral strength, it was the Midwestern strain that came to dominate the progressive
faction at the national level.

Most of the major figures of the national progressive faction arrived in the Senate in
1906. This group included, La Follette, Jonathan Dolliver (R-Iowa), Albert Cummins (R-Iowa),
Joseph Bristow (R-KN), Albert Beveridge (R-IN), and Moses Clapp (R-MN), Norris Brown (R-
NE), Elmer Burkett (R-NE), Knute Nelson (R-MN), Coe Crawford (R-SD), and William Borah
(R-ID). As a group, they displayed remarkable similarities. Not one was educated in an Eastern
university (most had attended institutions in their home states), almost all were from states
devoted to agriculture and extractive industries, many had won their Senate seats over the
opposition of the regular Republican organization in their state, and all were slightly parochial
and provincial in their outlook. Generational differences were also important: most of the
progressives were younger than their Old Guard opposition. Some were wealthy self-made men,
but most were of the new college educated middle class. Their policy aims were to reduce
tariffs, provide more extensive railroad regulation, and break up the trusts.

Initially, the composition of the progressive faction was coalitionist, with a varied
leadership in Congress. As the election of 1912 approached, however, the faction began to orbit
around two leaders: first Robert La Follette, then Theodore Roosevelt. Progressives’ motivation
was a complicated mix of power seeking and intellectual promotion. Their theory of governance
sought to transfer greater power to administrative agencies and directly to the people through the use of recall, referendum and initiative. To enact their policy preferences and redistribute power among governing institutions, their objectives changed over time: first, they sought cooperation and compromise; when that failed, they tried to take over the party; and finally, having exhausted all other options, they formed a splinter party.

The first major pieces of legislation that highlighted the progressives’ policy differences with conservatives were the Esch-Townshed bill (which died in Senate) and the Hepburn Act. Railroad regulation was an important issue to the Midwestern states and therefore combined constituent interest and ideological principle. Similarly, the contest with conservatives over the court review clauses of the Hepburn Act highlighted the progressives’ distinct theory of governance, which sought to limit the power of courts in favor of administrative agencies.

President Roosevelt was a catalyst in solidifying the policy goals of the progressive faction. His vigorous rhetoric between 1907 and his departure from office laid the foundation for the progressive legislative program. In these two years, the president’s requests for reform legislation increased, which shifted the party’s image in a progressive direction. In August 1907, Roosevelt, lambasted the “malefactors of great wealth.” In his December 1907 and January 1908 messages to Congress, Roosevelt proposed nearly every reform measure that was to be made during the Taft and Wilson administrations. He called for an increase in federal regulatory power, inheritance and income taxes, greater regulation of the railroads, the establishment of a postal savings bank, limitation on labor injunctions, and the extension of the eight-hour day. Contrary to the view that Roosevelt’s policy platform of 1912 was inspired by Herbert Croly’s *The Promise of American Life*, his congressional messages of 1907 and 1908 suggest that he had already developed the contours of his progressive program before Croly’s book appeared in
1909. Indeed, by the time Roosevelt left the White House his rhetoric had done much to unify and underwrite the rising progressive reformers.

In the same way in which Roosevelt expounded what progressives were for, Taft clarified what they were against. Taft’s cabinet, his handling of the move against Speak Cannon, his intervention into tariff reform, and the Ballinger-Pinchot affair united the progressive faction. As Arthur S. Link points out, “in order to prevent the disruption of the Republican Party, Taft had to facilitate the shift in party control from the Old Guard to the Insurgents—but instead aligned himself with the reactionaries,” guaranteeing a party split. The campaign of 1910 finalized the factional separation between the conservatives and the Taft administration on one side and the progressives, who now openly opposed Taft’s renomination in 1912, on the other.

Because progressives’ policy goals were to some degree sectionally oriented, they spearheaded the insurgency in the House against Speaker Cannon in 1909-10. Decentralizing power in the House would offer more legislative opportunities for younger progressive congressmen to advance their goals. According to Schickler, “Subverting Cannon’s power as Speaker… united members [of the House] pursuing a mix of ideological, power base, and… partisan objectives.” Led by progressives George Norris (R-NB) and John Nelson (R-WI), the insurgents formally organized in December of 1908. Initially, the progressive faction would have preferred to replace Cannon with a new Speaker committed to progressive policies from within the GOP caucus, but such an outcome was unacceptable to Republicans and Democrats who favored decentralization of power in the House but not progressive policy goals, and whose cooperation was necessary for any move against Cannon. Therefore, progressives shifted the focus to changes in the House rules rather than the policy views of any incoming Speaker. This
held the coalition together to make changes to the Rules Committee in 1909 and finally defeat Cannon in 1910.

The legislative battle over the Payne-Aldrich tariff revisions in the Senate also demonstrated increased coordination among progressive faction members. Progressive Republicans revolted against the Aldrich amendments (which raised tariffs on a number of goods) to the Payne tariff bill adopted by the House. Beginning with their opposition to the tariff, by April 1909, progressives in the Senate, such as La Follette, Dolliver, Cummins, Bristow, Beveridge, and Clapp, had agreed to a common opposition to the Republican Party’s leadership in the Senate and the White House. By the spring of 1909, many of these faction members began calling themselves Progressive Republicans to draw a line between themselves and the regular party organization.

The elections of 1910 expanded the organizational capacities of the progressive faction in the Midwest. This was in reaction to the aggressive tactics of the conservative faction, aided by President Taft. In January 1910, the conservative dominated Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, announced that it would officially oppose progressives in the summer primary elections and advocate the election of “straight” or “loyal” Republicans. In the spring, Taft joined the Old Guard in a “well planned and generously financed campaign to root insurgency out of the party by defeating progressive representatives for renomination in primaries in the Middle West.” This anti-progressive campaign entailed the ruthless use of federal patronage and the sending of standpat orators to the region. In response, the insurgents set up “Progressive Republican Clubs” to campaign for their candidates and layout a strategy for taking over the party at the national level. The intra-party bitterness was so great that at some of the Republican state conventions there were riotous brawls, with fistfights common.
The election results of 1910 favored the progressives. In primary battles between progressive and conservative Republicans, the conservatives lost almost every contest. Forty incumbent conservative Republicans had been defeated, most of them by avowed progressives. Furthermore, all of the progressive Senators who had been challenged by the conservative forces had been reelected. Taft and the conservatives’ effort to purge the party of insurgents failed badly. The results gave progressives reason to believe their attempt to take over the Republican Party was succeeding. In addition, the erosion of the conservative faction’s leadership, through death, resignation, or defeat—by the end of 1910 all of the Senate Four were gone and Speaker Cannon had been replaced—made the progressive cause appear to be on the rise. The conservatives in Congress now lacked leadership and experience, while the major progressive leaders were known throughout the country.

Events that portended a party split came quickly after the 1910 elections. What had been a faction was fast becoming a proto-third party. In the immediate aftermath of the elections, 47 progressive Republican members of Congress declared themselves unbound by the positions of the Republican caucus and 13 Senators demanded recognition as a separate minority of the Republican Party entitled to their fair share of committee assignments. In December 1910, La Follette and others formed the National Progressive Republican League (NPRL) to indicate his intention to wrest the nomination from Taft. By the spring of 1911, one of the weaknesses of the NPRL had become apparent: its decidedly Western character. The League was largely unsuccessful at recruiting more than a handful of Eastern progressives. Many members quickly realized that co-opting Roosevelt to their cause could alleviate this problem and give the faction a national character. Roosevelt held his cards close to the vest throughout the summer of 1911,
conferring with moderates and progressives at his home in Oyster Bay and writing a few articles
in praise of La Follette in the *Outlook*.

The wildcard in the summer of 1910 was Roosevelt, who had just returned from Africa. Taft sought the former president’s endorsement, but Roosevelt avoided a direct commitment to
the renomination of Taft in 1912. During a speaking tour in the late summer, Roosevelt
proposed ideas—such as increased government regulation of corporations, restriction on child
labor, workmen’s compensation, as well as income and inheritance taxes—which came to be
know at the “New Nationalism.” While Roosevelt tempered his rhetoric in the East,
conservatives reacted with outrage and progressives with pleasure, clearly putting Roosevelt on
the side of the progressives. In December 1911, Roosevelt privately allowed friends to begin a
campaign organization for the Republican presidential nomination. After La Follette gave a poor
speech in February of 1912, and Roosevelt stated publicly that he would seek the nomination,
many of La Follette’s supporters quickly switched allegiances. This effectively ended La
Follette’s bid for the nomination and the bitter Senator accused Roosevelt of dividing the
progressive faction. He would later refuse to release his delegates to Roosevelt at the Republican
National Convention, eliminating the last possibility of a Roosevelt *coup* from within the party.

The new device of primaries to elect convention delegates, adopted in 15 states by 1912,
allowed Roosevelt to tap into his popularity with the public. Roosevelt’s strategy was to win
enough popular support so that some Republican regulars would switch from Taft to him.
Although he was likely to lose in the general election if renominated, Taft pursued his candidacy
against all odds and prevented any compromise candidates from emerging.\(^4^3\) Even in early 1911,
it was apparent that if Roosevelt won the nomination, it be of questionable value after a
debilitating intra-party struggle with Taft. On the other hand, if Taft won, it was highly unlikely that Roosevelt would endorse him, and would most likely split the party by running on his own.\textsuperscript{44}

The course of events that was foreseeable eighteen months before the election, a party split and a Wilson victory, ultimately came to pass. Roosevelt’s support for the recall of judicial decisions, what A. James Reichley calls, “the one genuinely radical cause he embraced in the course of his career,” alienated many moderate conservatives, who threw their support to Taft.\textsuperscript{45} Taft captured Southern Republican convention delegates by organizing state conventions before Roosevelt’s forces were prepared. The best that Roosevelt’s lieutenants could do was challenge the delegates’ legitimacy at the convention. Thus despite Roosevelt’s primary victories, Taft controlled a bitter convention, and the nomination.

When it became apparent that Taft would win the nomination, many Roosevelt delegates left the convention hall and met at the Congressional Hotel in Chicago. Hiram Johnson, the California progressive, declared that the Progressive Party would be formed the next day. Roosevelt later announced that he would lead the new party. The party platform that emerged from the convention in August called for the direct election of Senators, income taxes, prohibition of child labor, a minimum wage, and recall of judicial decisions. But the new party faced all of the traditional biases of the American political system against third parties, making its campaign a difficult one.\textsuperscript{46} As the prospects for a Progressive Party victory dimmed with Wilson’s nomination by the Democrats, many Republicans—such as the eight governors who had written Roosevelt encouraging him to seek the Republican nomination—remained in the Republican fold. Indeed, most incumbent Republican politicians who had supported Roosevelt up to the convention did not follow him into the Progressive Party. This led the Progressive Party, and Roosevelt himself, to become more radical during the campaign.
The national campaign that ensued was in many respects anticlimactic after the vigorous battles inside the GOP. The progressive faction that became a splinter party assured the election of Woodrow Wilson and aided the Democrats in securing majorities in both houses of Congress. To a substantial extent the election of 1912 spelled the end of progressivism as a political and ideological movement inside the Republican Party. It also meant the long-term victory of a conservative party image. Wilson co-opted some of the Progressive Party’s platform and was supported by some Republican progressives until World War I.

**CONSEQUENCES OF GOP FACATIONALISM**

Factionalism within the GOP was a source of energy and innovation from 1896 to 1912. The Republican case suggests that in the American Congress, factions are often the subtle driving forces behind courses of action, as they can open or close the opportunity for different choices. The conservatives emerged to provide the discipline, direction, and priorities of the McKinley Era. They could claim credit for significant policy achievements—from the Dingley tariff to victory in the Spanish-American War—as well as keeping certain items, such as currency reform, off the agenda. Extending their reach, they could claim credit for having guided the country out of the depression of the early 1890s and into a new era of prosperity. A decade later, progressives could claim credit for having altered the party’s legislative priorities, expanded federal economic regulation through such laws as the Pure Food and Drug Act (1906) and the Hepburn Act (1905). Because national markets were involved, progressive politicians could improve consumer welfare, claim credit, and garner votes by adopting regulatory protections. Progressives also sparked a major debate on the policy preferences, agenda priorities, and overall meaning of Republicanism.
Intra-party factionalism had a significant effect on the GOP’s image and policymaking. The defeat of the progressives in 1912 solidified the GOP as the conservative party. The party consolidated its image as the elite standard-bearers of national identity—an identity in which Yankee Protestantism really joined with capitalism—evincing the ideals of state service, business acumen, and militarism. The conservative faction maintained the party’s image as the defender of markets, which were an arena of moral activity, not simply self-interest. They also maintained the image of Republicans as the party of order, which they tried to tie the party’s image to the defense of law and preservation of the Constitution.47

The progressives were a minority faction that failed to takeover the party and shift its policy preferences and image. Progressives were unable to reshape the party’s image to make it less elitist, less associated with law, order, and constitutionalism, and more in favor of popular democracy, as embodied in such institutional reforms as the primary, initiative, and referendum. In the end, they could not make the Republican Party a vehicle of the popular will. Nor could progressives refocus the Republican Party’s agenda onto redistribution rather than economic growth. The GOP could not be made more egalitarian. Conservatives rejected progressive social welfare laws and the facilitation of unionism, which they argued would hurt business and the economy.

Despite progressives’ optimism after the election of 1910, their bid to take over the GOP failed two years later. The constraints of the two-party system meant that once they lost the bid for the Republican nomination, the incentives involved in forming a splinter party dictated that only the most die-hard progressives would bolt the party. Those who remained in the Republican Party were weakened and forced to cooperate with the existing party structure. Those who left the party had either to find a new home or accept the party’s conditions for
reentry. Moreover, Wilson’s adoption of much of the progressive program gave Democrats a new, if short-lived, coherence and took the edge off progressives’ strident calls for reform.

The effect of intra-party factionalism on the GOP demonstrates the importance of party unity. Besides getting reelected and increasing their power, legislators have multiple objectives. They are likely to care about what they believe to be good public policy, which is informed by ideology, factional affiliations, experience, and factors other than their home constituencies. They are also likely to value the preservation of partisan unity, because it lowers the costs of building coalitions on specific issues where some members have a stake in a particular outcome but other do not; this is the essential basis for “log-rolling” across issues. On controversial issues, partisan unity can also provide political cover because there is safety in numbers—this is a strong antidote to the charge that a member of Congress’s position is extreme or out of touch with his or her constituents. The partisan expectation is mutual deference: members “go along to get along,” unless there is something specific about their constituency that prevents them from doing so. Party unity can also help foster the public image and reality of a party’s capacity to govern effectively, which can be helpful in winning elections.

The value of party unity for governance is demonstrated by the conservatives’ domination of the Republican Party from 1897 until 1905. Their ability to control the agenda, set legislative priorities, and act decisively helped maintain the image of effective governance and aided Republican candidates at the polls. On the other hand, the emergence of the progressive challenge undermined party unity. The result was increased acrimony between the conservative congressional leadership between 1906 and 1908; and, conversely, between progressive Republicans and the Taft administration between 1909 and 1912. The Republican
Party was unable during this six-year period to present a unified image to the nation. The result was the loss of all three national electoral institutions by 1912.

The importance of party unity highlights the complex ways in which factionalism can structure presidential-congressional relations. Partisan control of the presidency and Congress is a primary factor in determining the context in which policymaking will take place. Factions add an additional layer of complexity to the traditional analysis of divided government, which takes as its starting point the question whether there unified (one party controls all three elected institutions), divided (one party controls the presidency the other the House and Senate), or mixed (one party controls the presidency and one chamber of Congress but the other party commands the other chamber) control of the major elective institutions. Factional networks may exist inside the House, the Senate, or connect the two. Their presence can alter individual and partisan calculations of policymakers as they seek a course of action on a given issue. Factions can thus facilitate or complicate presidential initiatives, regardless of whether they share a partisan affiliation.

Roosevelt ran into the veto power of the conservative faction in the last two years of his presidency. His calls for reform fell upon deaf ears in the senate. As Roosevelt moved away from the center of his party, he placed himself in an increasingly exposed and difficult position. Taft, on the other hand, found himself under fire from progressives for his appointments and efforts to reform the tariff. Progressives complicated Taft’s legislative program by increasing the possibility the president would be blamed for certain policy outcomes. Indeed, the Taft presidency was often more concerned with managing GOP factions that dealing with Democrats. Thus the peculiar mix of cooperation and confrontation between the presidency and Congress from 1897 to 1912 had more to do with relations between the president factions within his own
party than simply institutional combat between the president and Congress or the president and the opposing party.


I have modified a schema for analyzing sub-party units developed by Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, Vol. 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). See Appendix 1 for the analytical checklist that breaks down factions along these dimensions that I used to analyze GOP factions.


I owe this insight to John M. Cooper.


Taft even studied with William Graham Sumner, a leading social Darwinist, at Harvard University.


Aldrich’s Interstate Commerce Committee held it up in hearings—mostly listening to testimony of railroad executives—long enough to render impossible consideration of the bill before the summer recess.


Mowry, p. 236.

Taft to Root, August 15, 1908.


39 Schickler, *Disjointed Pluralism*, p. 75.
44 Ibid.
45 Reichley, p. 164.
46 These include the constitutional constraints imposed by the electoral system of single-member-district plurality system, and the Electoral College which multiplies this problem; ballot access restrictions in all states, meaning a series of different bureaucratic hurdles; the lack of campaign resources: money, activists, volunteers, organization, elite support, and especially other officeholders reluctant to risk their position for an uncertain future. See, Rosenstone et al.