"Developing Countries and the Emerging World Order: Security and Institutions"

Amitav Acharya

Department of Political Science
York University, Toronto, Canada

Paper presented to the MacArthur Project at Oxford University Conference on "The Developing Countries and the End of the Cold War", Exeter College, Oxford University, 30 September-1 October 1994
Introduction

This paper is a reflection on the relevance and role of "the Third World" (used interchangeably with "developing countries" and "South") in the emerging world order. More specifically, it examines the extent to which the end of the Cold War affects the insecurity and vulnerability of the Third World countries and the state of the North-South divide as it relates to the prospects for global cooperation and order-maintenance in the post-Cold War era.

During the Cold War, two fundamental and common factors shaped the Third World's predicament and role within the international system. The first relates to the relative abundance of violent conflicts within its boundaries. These conflicts - intra-state, inter-state and regional - vastly outnumbered those occurring in the developed segments of the international system. One study by Evan Luard estimates that of the 127 "significant wars" occurring between 1945 and 1986, all but two took place in the Third World (Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia). The Third World also accounted for the vast majority of the over 20 million war-related deaths during this period. Thus, at a time when nuclear weapons had rendered war among the industrialised nations a highly unlikely prospect, the Third World came to be viewed by the First and the Second World as the principal source of insecurity, violence and disorder within the established international system.

Apart from its security predicament, the Third World category during the Cold War period was made distinctive by its political posture. This posture incorporated not only a quest for enhanced status, but also for economic justice in the face of a shared condition of acute poverty, underdevelopment and dependence. While coping with insecurity within a rigidly bipolar structure, the Third World also worked, self-consciously and collectively, to alter its vastly inferior position vis-a-vis the developed countries of the North. Using Hedley Bull's expression, this process might be viewed as a "revolt" against the North's (particularly the West's) superior economic and military power, intellectual and cultural authority and its hold over the rules and institutions governing international society. Despite its immense diversity, the Third World came to exhibit a remarkable unity of purpose.


in its struggle, as Bull put it, "to destroy the old international order and establish a new one, to shake off the rules and institutions devised by the old established forces (in Sukarno's phrase) and create new rules and institutions that will express the aspirations of the new emerging forces."

To what extent will the combination of acute instability and self-conscious radicalism, which led the Third World to be labelled variously as an "intruder" element within the established international system, an "international social protest movement", and, somewhat pejoratively, as the source of a "new international disorder", survive the end of the Cold War? What are the implications of the end of the Cold War for Third World insecurity and the North-South conflict? Will a multipolar international system aggravate Third World instability? Will the end of the East-West rivalry also dampen the North-South conflict? Seeking answers to these questions is important not only for assessing the position and role of the Third World in the emerging world order, but also in evaluating whether the North's preferred reordering of international relations will succeed.

The discussion that follows is divided into three parts. The first looks at the question of whether the end of the Cold War will increase or dampen instability and conflict in the Third World. This is followed by an assessment of emerging areas of North-South tension over world order issues, especially those which are associated with the North's ill-defined vision of a "New World Order". The third part will examine the changing role of Third World's platforms and institutions, both global and regional, in addressing the political, security and economic concerns of the developing countries.

**Third World Insecurity: A "Decompression" Effect?**

As statistical evidence suggests, the Cold War was hardly a period of

---


stability in the Third World. But some commentators have predicted that the post-Cold War era might prove even more destabilising for the Third World, with the emergence and/or reemergence of conflicts that were "overlayed" by superpower rivalry. Thus, Jose Cintra argues that the Cold War had suppressed "many potential third-world conflicts", and while its end has led to superpower withdrawal from some regional conflicts, "other conflicts will very probably arise from decompression and from a loosening of the controls and self-controls" exercised by the superpowers. Robert Jervis believes that the Cold War "In the net...generally dampened conflict [in the Third World] and we can therefore expect more rather than less of it in future".

Several potential and actual implications of the end of the Cold War justify such concerns. First, superpower retrenchment has led to a shift in the balance of power in many Third World regions, which in turn has created opportunities for locally-dominant actors to step into the "vacuum" with managerial ambitions that

8. For an assessment of the role of the Cold War in aggravating Third World conflict, see: Amitav Acharya, Third World Conflicts and International Order After the Cold War. Working Paper no.134 (Canberra: Australian National University, Peace Research Centre, 1993)

9. This scenario conforms to the neo-Realist (Waltzian) argument that multipolar international systems are less stable that bipolar ones. Applying this perspective to post-Cold War Europe, John Mearsheimer argues that "a Europe without the superpowers...would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the past 45 years," despite the constraining impact of economic interdependence, political and functional institutions such as the CSCE and EC, and the pluralist domestic structure of European nations. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", International Security, vol. 15, no.1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-55. Responses to Mearsheimer can be found in three subsequent issues of International Security. Although no forceful and predictive commentary about Third World security has yet been made, Mearshemier's thesis appears to have found an echo in a number of recent scholarly writings on the subject.


could fuel regional conflict. Second, many Third World regimes (such as those in Cuba, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Cambodia, Somalia, Ethiopia and North Korea) which had survived domestic challenges to their legitimacy with the help of superpower patronage, have now either collapsed or are faced with such a prospect. In a related vein, the example set by the implosion of the former Soviet Union, itself linked to the end of the Cold War, has fuelled demands for self-determination in Third World societies. Thus, the emergence of ethnic conflicts in the "new" Third World, e.g., the Balkans and Eastern Europe, which has been linked by some to the removal of superpower control, is also evident in parts of the "old" Third World, particularly Africa. Fourth, the end of superpower protection creates pressures on their former clients to achieve greater military self-reliance. As one analyst puts it, the withdrawal of the superpowers from Third World regions "entails merely that the Third World will do more of its own fighting." Such a trend is already evident in East Asia, where a competitive arms race appears to be in progress.

Finally, the end of the Cold War also raises the prospects for greater inter-state conflict. While the vast majority of Third World conflicts in the Cold war period were intra-state (anti-regime insurrections, civil wars, tribal conflicts etc), some observers now foresee the prospects for a rise in inter-state territorial conflicts. Thus, Barry Buzan argues that "If the territorial jigsaw can be extensively reshaped in the First and Second Worlds, it will become harder to resist the pressures to try to find more sensible and congenial territorial arrangements in the ex-Third World".


15. A number of surveys confirm this. One by Istvan Kende found that of the 120 wars during the 1945-76 period, 102 were internal wars (including anti-regime wars and tribal conflicts); while another study by Kirdon and Segal found that during the period 1973-86, there were 66 internal wars as opposed to 30 border wars. Cited in Caroline Thomas, "New Directions in Thinking about Security in the Third World", in Ken Booth, ed., New Thinking about Strategy and International Security (London: HarperCollins Academic, 1991), p.269

Such a scenario applies particularly to Africa whose established regional norms against violation of the postcolonial territorial status quo seem to be under considerable stress (especially with the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia). In Southeast Asia, the dispute over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, as well as numerous other maritime boundary disputes attest to the potential of territorial issues to threaten regional stability.

But concerns about greater incidence of instability in the post-Cold War Third World could be overstated. To be sure, the vast majority of wars in the post-Cold War era continue to be fought in the "old" Third World. A recent survey by the Economist shows that 28 out of 32 current wars - including, insurgency, civil strife and inter-state wars - are taking place here. The numbers would rise if, as some have suggested, one extends the Third World to include the Balkans and the former republics of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the consequences of the end of the Cold War for Third World stability have not been entirely negative. Among other things, the political settlement of conflicts in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Southern Africa and Central America was possible due to the cooperation between the US and the Soviet Union/Russia. The end of the Cold War has also contributed to the end of the apartheid regime in Southern Africa (which fuelled regional strife during the Cold War) and the dramatic turnaround in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, the collapse of authoritarian regimes in the Third World has not always led to violence. In Latin America, the loss of Soviet support for leftist regimes as well as the end of American backing for right-wing authoritarian regimes have actually contributed to a largely peaceful process of democratisation. Africa has seen several cases of


19. It may be argued that at least some of the "new" states of Eastern Europe and Central Asia may be considered part of the Third World, given that their security predicament bears considerable resemblance to that of the traditional Third World states. This includes low levels of socio-political cohesion and a strong element of state-nation dichotomy. If this criteria is applied, the Balkan states and the new states of Central Asia may be regarded as part of the Third World, since their security predicament is likely to centre on problems of internal stability and regime legitimation

The spread of democracy in the Third World might also eventually create better prospects for regional stability. Whether democracies tend not to fight with each other may be a debatable proposition in the West, but in the Third World, there has always been a strong correlation between authoritarian rule and regional conflict, largely due to the tendency of internally insecure regimes to "succumb to the temptation to consolidate their domestic position at the expense of their neighbours by cultivating external frictions or conflicts." Thus, by leading to the removal of the non-performing and repressive rulers and their replacement by regimes enjoying greater political legitimacy, the end of the Cold War might create improved conditions for domestic political stability and regional security, although the transition to democracy could be destabilising in the short-term.

There are two other ways in which the end of the Cold War improves the security outlook of the Third World. First, with the end of the US-Soviet rivalry, the North is becoming more selective in its engagement in the Third World. In a bipolar world, as Kenneth Waltz argued, "with two powers capable of acting on a world scale, anything that happen[ed] anywhere [was] potentially of concern to both of them." With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the only power capable of global

---


22. For an interesting debate on the link between war and democracy in the context of the post-Cold War era, see the response published in three subsequent issues of International Security to John Measheimer's article on "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", International Security, vol. 15, no.1 (Summer 1990), pp.5-55

23. Buzan, "People, States and Fear", p.32

power projection, the US is likely to limit its areas of engagement to a few areas such as the Middle East and East Asia and Central America.\textsuperscript{25} While this means many Third World regions face the prospect of "marginalisation",\textsuperscript{26} where bloody conflicts might go unnoticed by the Great Powers and left to managerial action by local powers and regional security arrangements, it would also prevent the internationalisation of local wars and localisation of systemic tensions that was a marked feature of the Cold War period. During the Cold War, the maintenance of the stability of the central strategic balance rendered a great deal of Third World conflicts necessary, as the superpowers viewed these conflicts "as a way of letting off steam which helps to cool the temperature around the core issues which are directly relevant and considered vital to the central balance and, therefore, to the international system."\textsuperscript{27} The end of superpower rivalry extricates the Third World from this unhappy predicament.

Secondly, with the end of the Cold War, regional powers (including "regional policemen" such as Iran under the Nixon Doctrine, or regional proxies such as Vietnam and Cuba for the Soviet Union) can no longer "count on foreign patrons to support them reflexively, supply them with arms, or salvage for them an honourable peace".\textsuperscript{28} Without massive superpower backing, even the most powerful among Third World states may find it more difficult to sustain military adventures,\textsuperscript{29} and may be deterred from seeking to fulfill their external ambitions through military means. The Iraqi experience during the Gulf War is illustrative of the predicament of

\footnotesize{25. See for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Selective Global Commitment", Foreign Affairs, vol.70, no.4 (Fall 1991), pp.1-20. Testifying to the selectivity is the the North's delayed and initially muted response to the unfolding humanitarian disasters in Rwanda and Somalia, which was pointed out by the UN Secretary General himself (who contrasted the Northern response to African crises with its preoccupation with the Balkans conflict)


29. Yezid Sayigh, Confronting the 1990s, Security in the Developing Countries, Adelphi Papers no. 251 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990), p.64}
regional powers deprived of an opportunity to exploit the superpower rivalry.\textsuperscript{30}

Those who argue that the end of the Cold War would be destabilising for the Third World ignore the fact that the Cold War itself was hardly a period of tranquility or order in the Third World, as evident from bloody and prolonged regional conflicts from Angola to Afghanistan. Moreover, many of the current or potential inter-state conflict situations, as in Southern Asia and the Korean peninsula, were conceived during the Cold War and cannot be used as examples of post-Cold War instability. While it is tempting to view the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, thus far the major conflict of the post-Cold War period, as an act of Iraqi opportunist in the face of declining superpower involvement in the region, the seeds of this conflict were planted during the Cold War period, when Iraq received large-scale military hardware and economic support from the Northern nations.

It also needs to be emphasized that the end of bipolarity does not by itself alter the fundamental sources of Third World insecurity. As Halliday puts it, "since the causes of third world upheaval [were] to a considerable extent independent of Soviet-US rivalry they will continue irrespective of relations between Washington and Moscow".\textsuperscript{31} The causes of Third World conflict, as highlighted by Ayoob, Buzan, Azar and Moon, and Sayigh,\textsuperscript{32} continue to lie in weak state-society

\textsuperscript{30} Lawrence Freedman argues that the US victory over Iraq would discourage Third World regional powers from mounting a frontal assault on Western interests. "The Gulf War and the New World Order", \textit{Survival}, vol.33, no.3 (May/June 1991), p. 203

\textsuperscript{31} Fred Halliday, \textit{Cold War, Third World} (London: Hutchinson, 1994), p.162

cohesion, problems of national integration, economic underdevelopment and the lack of legitimacy of regimes. As in the past, these factors are likely to ensure that domestic conflicts along with their regional ramifications, rather than inter-state territorial conflicts, will remain the main sources of Third World instability in the post-Cold War period.

Thus, in Africa many recent outbreaks of conflict have been linked to ethno-national cleavages within weak state structures as well as instability caused by a deepening economic crisis linked to structural adjustment policies imposed by international financial institutions. 33 In Asia, a host of ethnic insurgencies and separatist movements, all dating back to the Cold War period, remain the principal threat to stability. These include ethnic separatism in India (Assam, Kashmir and the Punjab), Pakistan (demands for autonomy in the Sindh province), Sri Lanka (Tamil separatism), 34 Indonesia (Aceh, East Timor, Irian Jaya), Myanmar (Karen and Shan guerrillas), and the Philippines (Muslim insurgency in Mindanao). In the economically more developed parts of the Third World, the primary security concerns of the ruling regimes have to do with what Chubin calls the "stresses and strains of economic development, political integration, legitimation and institutionalization." 35 In the Persian Gulf, rapid modernisation has eroded the traditional legitimising role of religion, tribe and family, 36 and contributed to the rise of fundamentalist challenges to regime survival. Similarly, in the affluent societies of East Asia, the emergence of a large middle class population has contributed to demands for political openness and democratisation. None of these problems can be realistically described as the result of a systemic shift from


33. "Africa's Tribal Wars", The Economist, 13 October 1990, pp. 50-51;


To be sure, the end of the Cold War does not have a single or uniform effect on Third World insecurity. In some parts of the Third World, such as in sub-Saharan Africa, the end of the Cold War has been accompanied by greater domestic disorder, while in Southeast Asia it has seen increased domestic tranquility and regional order (with the end of communist insurgencies and settlement of the Cambodia conflict). In the Middle East, the demise of superpower rivalry has enhanced prospects for greater inter-state cooperation, especially in the Arab-Israeli sector. In Africa, the end of the Cold War has contributed to a sharp decline in arms imports, while in East Asia, it has created fears of a major arms race. Furthermore, the impact of the end of the Cold War varies according to the type of conflict. Increased domestic strife in Africa contrasts sharply with the settlement of its long-standing regional conflicts (especially in Southern Africa), while in Southeast Asia, the end of the Cold War has led to greater internal stability while increasing inter-state tensions. Regional hegemonism is a distinct possibility in East Asia with China's massive economic growth and military build-up, but elsewhere, it is the regional powers, India, Vietnam and Iraq included, which have felt the squeeze by being denied privileged access to arms and aid from their superpower patrons.

The North-South Divide in the New World Order

In the euphoria that accompanied the end of the East-West conflict, some Northern leaders (as well as the Liberal perspective on international relations) were quick to raise hopes for a reduction of North-South tensions as well. As the former US President, George Bush, put it, the New World Order would be "an historic period of cooperation...an era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony." A more sober analysis, however, reveals that North-South divisions are not disappearing from the agenda of world politics. Specifically, one could point to four areas of North-South tension in the emerging world order.

The first relates to global environmental change. At first glance, this should be somewhat less political and ideological than other issues of contention in the North-South agenda. Environmental degradation affects the well-being both the North and the South and can only be addressed through their mutual cooperation. Yet, the global environment has become a focal point for a North-South policy divide in the post-Cold War era. Marc Williams has identified four aspects of the South's position which forms the basis of this divide: (1) that the industrialised


38. Mitsuru Yamamoto, "Redefining the North-South Problem", Japan Review of International Affairs, vol.7, no.2 (Fall 1993), p.272

39. Marc Williams, "Re-articulating the Third World Coalition: the
countries bear the primary responsibility for the global environmental crisis; (2) that these countries should bear the major costs of environmental protection; (3) that the industrialised countries should ensure free transfer of technology to the South so that the latter can reduce its dependence on technologies damaging to the environment; and (4) that the industrialised countries should transfer additional resources to fund efforts by developing countries to ensure greater environmental protection.

The more extreme opinion within the developing world sees the North's interest in global environmental negotiations as a kind of "eco-imperialism", motivated by a desire "to protect its wasteful lifestyle by exporting the environmental burden to the South, and...to increase its political leverage by putting environmental conditionalities on the South." The North's expectation that the developing countries should adopt strict environmental standards is seen as self-serving and unfair. An editorial in the Times of London described the Southern position in the following terms: "The rich who consume four-fifths of the world's resources and account for most of its industrial emissions are asking the poor to invest in the conservation of natural resources, and to adopt more environmentally friendly policies than the rich world employed at comparable stages in its growth."  

While critical of the North's push for global environmental protection, the South clearly recognises the potential of the issue to extract concessions from the North and thus help its efforts at reforming the global economic order. As the North becomes increasingly concerned with the South's growing share of global greenhouse emissions and the increased outflow of Southern "environmental refugees", the South senses a window of opportunity that the issue of environmental degradation can be used to press the North over a broad range of issues that have traditionally been of concern to the South, such as underdevelopment, technology transfers and development assistance. As Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed put it, "Fear by the North of environmental degradation provides the South the leverage that did not exist before. It is justified for us to approach it this way."  

A second issue of North-South conflict in the post-Cold War era concerns the emerging frameworks for peace and security championed by the North. US President George Bush's vision of a New World Order promised a return to


41. "A Bargain Not a Whinge", The Times, June 1, 1992, p.15

multilateralism and the revival of the UN’s collective security framework. But the first major test of this New World Order, the US-led response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, prompted widespread misgivings in the South. Although the UN resolutions against Iraq were supported by most Third World states, this was accompanied by considerable resentment of the US domination of the UN decision-making process. The US’s military actions against Iraq were seen as having exceeded the mandate of UN resolutions, and the US claims about collective security was greeted with skepticism. Many in the South would perhaps agree with Zbigniew Brzezinski’s remark that "...once the symbolism of collective action was stripped away...[the war against Iraq] was largely an American decision and relied primarily on American military power". The Gulf War fed Southern apprehension that in the "unipolar moment", the US, along with like-minded Western powers, would use the pretext of multilateralism to pursue essentially unilateral objectives in post-Cold War conflicts. Conflicts in those areas deemed to be "vitally" important to the Western powers will be especially susceptible for Northern unilateralism.

From a Southern perspective, the ambiguities of the New World Order prevailing at the time of its birth (the Gulf War) have since been compounded by the North’s championing of armed intervention in support of humanitarian objectives. Ostensibly, the concept of "humanitarian intervention" calls for military action

43. During the Gulf war, the US pressure on the UN gave the impression that the world body was being manipulated for the narrow strategic purpose of a superpower. Although the US sought to inject a degree of legitimacy to its actions by seeking UN endorsement, in the final analysis, the US would have pursued its strategic options irrespective of the UN mandate. Richard Falk observed that "...behind this formal mandate from the United Nations [to the US approach to the Gulf crisis] lie extremely serious questions about whether the UN has been true to its own Charter, and to the larger purposes of peace and justice that it was established to serve. And beyond these concerns is the disturbing impression that the United Nations has been converted into a virtual tool of US foreign policy, thus compromising its future credibility, regardless of how the Gulf crisis turns out". Richard Falk, 'UN being made a tool of US foreign policy", Guardian Weekly, 27 January 1991, p.12. See also, "The Use and Abuse of the UN in the Gulf Crisis", Middle East Report, no.169 (March-April 1991). For a more positive assessment of the UN's role see: Sir Anthony Parsons, "The United Nations After the Gulf War", The Round Table, no.319 (July 1991), pp. 265-274

44. "New World Order: An Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski", SAIS Review, vol.11, no.2 (Summer-Fall 1991), p.2

45. The concept of humanitarian intervention, though by no means
against regimes which are too weak to provide for the well-being of their subjects (Somalia) or which are classic predatory rulers that prey upon their own citizens (Iraq). But this has caused genuine misgivings and apprehensions in the South. Scheffer captures some of these misgivings:

...there is a strong current of opinion among the nations of the developing world and particularly China that upholds the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states as their only bulwark against the intrusive designs of the West's "New World Order". These governments view humanitarian intervention as a pretext for military intervention to achieve political or economic objectives. Any effort to broaden the legitimacy of either nonforcible or forcible humanitarian intervention must therefore balance the political concerns of these governments with the humanitarian needs of their peoples. 46

Mohammed Ayoob has offered a similar critique:

Recourse to humanitarian justifications for international intervention, as in the case of the Kurds in Iraq following the Gulf War, would be greatly resented by Third World states, above all because the logic of humanitarian intervention runs directly counter to the imperatives of state-making...the primary political enterprise in which Third World countries are currently novel, was highlighted in the wake of the US-led UN intervention in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds in 1991. In supporting the international community's "right to intervene" in humanitarian cases, the then UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, spoke of "an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents." He added that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does "implicitly call into question this inviolable notion of sovereignty" and consequently a "balance" has been established "between the right of States, as confirmed by the Charter, and the rights of the individual, as confirmed by the Universal Declaration". Cited in Richard N. Gardner, "International Law and the Use of Force", in Three Views on the Issue of Humanitarian Intervention Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1992, p.2

engaged. The dominant powers could persist in collective enforcement and international intervention selectively, despite the opposition of the majority of Third World states (a majority of the membership of the international system). However, such actions, even if ostensibly termed "collective security", would lose much of their legitimacy and could, in fact, seriously erode the idea of international society itself."

Southern fears about a new and expanded framework of Western interventionism in the South are reinforced by the impact of the end of the Cold War in removing certain constraints on such intervention. Hedley Bull had identified four major constraints on Western intervention in the Third World during the later stages of the Cold War period: (1) "a remarkable growth in Third World countries of the will and capacity to resist intervention"; (2) "a weakening in the Western world of the will to intervene, by comparison with earlier periods, or at least of the will to do so forcibly, directly and openly"; (3) the growing Soviet capacity to project power, which "facilitated Third World resistance to Western intervention"; and (4) "the emergence of a global equilibrium of power unfavourable to intervention" in the sense that "there has emerged a balance among the interveners which has worked to the advantage of the intervened against". Of these, the collapse of the Soviet Union undermined the global "power projection balance" and deprives Third World states of a source of support against Western intervention. Moreover, with the end of bipolarity, the Third World states could no longer exploit Great Power rivalry to build immunity from intervention. While the capacity of Third World countries to resist military intervention has increased, so have the capabilities of the interveners to project power. In the 1980s, the projection forces of major Western Powers were substantially enhanced in response to growing Soviet capabilities and to secure access to Middle Eastern oil. In the post-Cold War era, forces previously deployed in Europe are being earmarked for Third World contingency missions.


same time, despite the proliferation indigenous defence industries in the Third World, the North-South military technology balance remains overwhelmingly favourable to the former. The advent of smart weapons makes it "possible for an intervening power to inflict severe damage on a developing nation without its having to incur commensurate costs". The experience of the US intervention in Iraq suggests that not even the most heavily-armed Third World power can offer effective resistance to the superior interventionist technology of Western powers.

A third area of North-South tension concerns the Northern approach to arms control and non-proliferation. Some of the key regional powers of the South, particularly India, object to the anti-proliferation measures developed by the North, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which are essentially supplier clubs that impose restrictions on export of military or dual-use technology. Their misgivings, which were highlighted during the process leading to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and which are likely to persist despite the extension, focus on their selective application and discriminatory nature. As Chubin argues, in the case of nuclear weapons, the North's anti-proliferation campaign "frankly discriminates between friendly and unfriendly states, focussing on signatories (and potential cheats) like Iran but ignoring actual proliferators like Israel. It is perforce more intelligible in the North than in the South." In a more blunt tone, the Indian scholar K. Subrahmanyam charges that: First, export controls are by definition discriminatory - they embody a fundamental double standard whereby nuclear weapons and missiles are deemed essential for the security of industrialised countries but dangerous in the hands of developing nations...Above all export controls divide the world into North and South, project a racist bias, and have proved to be inefficient instruments for pursuing global non-proliferation objectives.

Southern critics of the supply-side regimes also argue that the North's aggressive campaign against the weapons of mass destruction is not matched by a corresponding interest in restricting the flow of conventional weapons to the South. On the contrary, the post-Cold War era has seen unprecedented competition among the major Northern manufacturers to supply conventional arms to the more affluent


segments of the South. Despite their ostensible interest in restricting conventional arms transfers, Northern governments (both Western and members of the former Soviet bloc), as their Southern critics see it, have encouraged such transfers in a desperate bid to save jobs at home.\footnote{53. S.D. Muni, "The Post-Cold War Third World: Uncertain Peace and Elusive Development", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol.23, No.1 (1992), pp.93-102} To a significant extent, the current military build-up in East Asia is driven by supplier competition in making available large quantities of sophisticated arms at bargain basement prices.\footnote{54. Desmond J. Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region", International Security, vol.18, no.3 (Winter 1993\94), pp.78-112; Amitav Acharya, An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control, Pacific Strategic Papers no. 8 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994)}

A fourth area of North-South tension in the post-Cold War era relates to the West's advocacy of human rights and democracy as the basis for a new global political order. The leaders of the West see the "enlargement" of democracy as a logical corollary to the successful "containment" and defeat of communism. The Western agenda on human rights is being promoted through a variety of means, including aid conditionality (linking development assistance with human rights records of aid recipients), support for self-determination of persecuted minorities and, as in the case of Haiti, direct military intervention. All these instruments affect the political and economic interests of Third World states, many of which see these as a threat to their sovereignty and economic well-being.\footnote{55. "NAM Warns West to Stop Exploiting Human-Rights Issue", The Straits Times (Singapore), 13 August 1992, p.16}

Speaking at the 10th Non-Aligned summit conference in Jakarta in 1992, Egypt's foreign minister warned the West against "interference in a nation's internal affairs on the pretext of defending human rights."\footnote{56. FBIS-EAS-92-173-S, 4 September 1992, p.25} Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed goes further; he sees the West's human rights campaign as a device to perpetuate the condition of dependency of the South. Citing the example of the former communist states of Eastern Europe, Mahathir contends that the campaign of human rights and democracy is a prescription for disruption and chaos in weaker countries, a campaign which makes the target ever more dependent on the donor nations of the West. Other critics of the South accuse the West of hypocrisy and selectivism in applying its human rights standards. The Foreign Minister of Singapore finds that "Concern for human rights [in the West] has always been
balanced against other national interests." To support this argument, Singapore's policy-makers contrast the US support for absolutist regimes in the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula with its response to the recent crisis in Algeria in which Western governments acquiesced with a military coup which overthrew a duly elected government with a strongly Islamic orientation.

The position of the South on the issue of human rights is marked by significant regional variations; the attitude of the Latin American nations contrast sharply with those in East Asia, and even within the latter, differences exist between South Korea and Taiwan on the one hand and the ASEAN countries and China on the other. Moreover, the projection of a North-South divide on human rights is a state-centric understanding, as there is little disagreement between Northern and Southern non-governmental organisations over the issue of human rights. But there are a number of general areas in which the views of many Southern governments seem to converge. These include a belief that the issue of human rights must be related to the specific historical, political and cultural circumstances of each nation. Governments in East Asia have added their voice to this "cultural relativist" position by rejecting the individualist conception of human rights in the West, arguing instead for a "communitarian" perspective that recognises the priority of the "society over the self". The developing countries in general have stressed that economic rights, especially the right to development, be given precedence over purely political ones in the global human rights agenda.

Insecurity, Inequality and Institutions

Any discussion of the South's role in the emerging world order must examine the role of institutions through which it could articulate its demands and mobilise its resources and response. During the Cold War, the major Third World platform, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), spearheaded the South's conscious and collective challenge to the dominant international order. To this end, NAM pursued a broad agenda that included demands for a speedy completion of the decolonisation


process, superpower non-interference in the Third World, global disarmament and strengthening of global and regional mechanisms for conflict-resolution. NAM's record in realising these objectives has attracted much criticism, but its achievements cannot be dismissed. Despite the diversity within its membership, NAM was able to provide a collective psychological framework for Third World states to strengthen their independence and to play an active role in international affairs. Membership in NAM provided many Third World states with some room to manoeuvre in their relationship with the superpowers and to resist pressures for alliances and alignment. NAM led the global condemnation of apartheid and pursued the liberation of Rhodesia and Namibia with considerable energy and dedication. While NAM had no influence over the superpower arms control process, it did succeed in raising the level of ethical concern against the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Through the UN Disarmament conferences which it helped to initiate, NAM members highlighted the pernicious effects of the arms race and articulated the linkage between disarmament and development.

Yet, NAM's efforts to reshape the prevailing international order were seriously constrained. The allowance of too much diversity within NAM with respect to external security guarantees (only states which were members of "a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts" were ineligible to join NAM; close bilateral relationships with superpowers were not an impediment) undermined the group's unity. It also made NAM susceptible to intra-mural tensions as evident over Cuba's unsuccessful efforts during the 1979 Havana summit to gain recognition for the Soviet Union as the "natural ally" of


61. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "NAM and Security", Strategic Studies (Islamabad), vol.xiv, no.3 (Spring 1991), p.15

NAM. NAM's credibility suffered further from its poor record in international conflict-resolution. While focusing on the larger issues of global disarmament and superpower rivalry, it was unable to develop institutions and mechanisms for addressing local and regional conflicts such as those in the Gulf, Lebanon, Cambodia, Afghanistan and Southern Africa. According to one observer, "During the last three decades, many non-aligned countries were involved in some kind of conflict, directly or indirectly, either with a fellow non-aligned country, or with great powers, or with some aligned countries. It is not difficult to comprehend the inability of NAM to prevent conflict within the group initially, and later, to resolve it quickly if the conflict had surfaced for one reason or the other."

With the end of the Cold War, NAM faces distinct risks of further marginalisation in global peace and security affairs. The collapse of the bipolar structure has prompted inevitable questions regarding the movement's continued relevance. Despite a growing membership (now at 108), the NAM's post-Cold War direction remains unclear. Some members, such as India (perhaps reflecting its desire for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council), see the "central" role of NAM as being "to push for democratisation of the UN". Others, especially Malaysia, would like to use NAM to counter "this so-called New World Order propagated by a big power [US]". Indonesia, the current Chair of NAM, seeks to shift the priorities of NAM from the political to the economic arena: "We have to address the new concerns of the world - environment and development, human rights and democratisation, refugees and massive migration." Indonesia has also led efforts to strike a moderate and pragmatic tone for NAM in global North-South negotiations. In Jakarta's view, while the end of the Cold War did not "in any way diminish...the relevance and the validity of the basic principles and objectives of the

63. Cheema, "NAM and Security", op.cit., p.18

64. Peter Lyon, "Marginalization of the Third World", Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, vol.11, no.3 (September 1989), p.65


67. "Jakarta Wants NAM to Focus on Pressing Economic and Human Problems", The Straits Times, 4 August 1992, p.17

68. Goodbye Nehru, Hello Suharto", The Economist, 119 September 1992, p.32
Non-Aligned Movement," it "like everybody else must adapt itself in a dynamic way...to the new political and economic realities in the world," 69 realities which call for a posture of cooperation, rather than confrontation.

Although NAM emerged primarily as a political institution, its agenda was broadened to the economic arena in the 1960s and 1970s. As Tim Shaw points out, while "in its first decade it was a reaction to... international bipolarity; in its second decade, it has been a critical reaction to international inequality." 70 The most important example of this is NAM's strong advocacy of the idea of a New International Economic Order first voiced at the Fourth NAM summit in Algiers in 1973.

The concept of NIEO embraced a number of demands such as the creation of a new structure to regulate world trade in primary commodities, improved conditions for the transfer of Northern technology to the South, better market access for the export of Southern manufactured goods to the North, negotiating codes of conduct for multinational corporations, reform of the international monetary system to ensure greater flow of financial resources (both concessional and non-concessional) and the resolution of the debt problem and promotion of collective self-reliance through South-South cooperation in trade, finance and infrastructure. 72 But the process of North-South negotiations aimed at the realisation of these objectives has run its course without producing any significant breakthroughs for the South as a whole. The economic progress of the South has been disjointed. The list of achievements includes the ability of OPEC to raise the

69. "Jakarta Wants NAM to Focus on Pressing Economic and Human Problems", The Straits Times, 4 August 1992, p.17


72. Helen O'Neill, "The North-South Dialogue and the Concept of Mini-NIEO", in Kimmo Kiljunen, ed., Region-to-Region Cooperation Between Developed and Developing Countries (Aldershot: Avebury, 1990), p.4
oil revenues of its members, the signing of the three Lome conventions by 64
African, Caribbean, and Pacific states and the rise of the Newly Industrialised
Countries of East Asia. But the collective institutional framework of the South has
not contributed to, or been strengthened by, these developments; instead, some of
these regional successes have lessened the relevance and solidarity of the larger
Third World platforms.

Among the major reasons for the failure of North-South negotiations one
must count the special hostility of conservative Western regimes (particularly
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher) in the late Cold War period. The Reagan
administration viewed the North-South dialogue as an "annoying distraction to the
administration's goal of restoring American global influence." Under US
leadership, western governments downgraded the North-South dialogue by ignoring
the South's established negotiating channels (such as the Group of 77) at the UN
in favour of direct talks with Third World capitals. The handling of the debt crisis
provided further evidence of this "divide and rule" strategy pursued by the North, as
the latter conducted debt-restructuring negotiations on a country-by-country basis
by offering incentives to those who accepted bilateral deals. Despite constant
urging by Third World leaders for greater South-South cooperation on the debt
issue, the South was unable to develop institutional platforms to enter into collective
negotiations with the North on the issue.

Overall, as the Cold War drew to a close, Southern institutions seemed
incapable of advancing their quest for economic justice for the world's poorer
nations. The South's economic position has indeed worsened. The net flow of

---

73. Halliday and Molyneux, "Olof Palme and the Legacy of Bandung", op.cit., p.158


resources from the North to the South was reversed from a positive flow of US$43 billion to a negative flow of US$33 billion in 1988.\textsuperscript{78} Moreover, the net value of development assistance from the North remained more or less stagnant during the 1980s. According to the then French President Francois Mitterand, the actual level of annual aid from the G-7 countries is $130 billion short of the set target based on 0.7% of their gross domestic product.\textsuperscript{79} To compound matters, the end of the Cold War presents new economic challenges for the South. The collapse of the Soviet bloc not only increases the pressure on the South to integrate more closely into the world capitalist order, but the South also faces the prospects of a redirection of Western aid and finance to Eastern Europe. (This fear might be overstated, however.)\textsuperscript{80}

While NAM and issue-specific ad hoc coalitions in the South have found it possible to develop substantial unity on the issues of environment and development, this has not translated into concrete achievements in support of the South's demands. At the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio in 1992, the coalition of Third World states had to give up their demand for the North to double its aid to the poor countries by the year 2000.\textsuperscript{81} While the North wants a Southern commitment to sustainable development, it is unwilling to make any specific pledge of financial aid beyond "new and additional resources". The cost of meeting the goals outlined in UNCED's "Agenda 21" document is estimated at some $125 billion a year, far short of the approximately US$55 billion the South now receives in aid each year.\textsuperscript{82}

Will regional institutions fare better in addressing the security as well as economic and environmental concerns of the South in the post-Cold War period? The Third World's interest in regionalism is not new. In the post-World War II period, several regional organisations emerged in the Third World with the


\textsuperscript{79} Francois Mitterand, "Let North and South Set a Global Contract", \textit{International Herald Tribune}, 2-3 July 1994, p.4


\textsuperscript{81} Paul Lewis, "Negotiators In Rio Agree to Increase Aid to Third World", \textit{New York Times}, 14 June 1992, p.1

objectives of pursuing conflict resolution and economic integration. But the promise of regionalism remained largely unfulfilled during the Cold War. Superpowers were seen as ignoring, bypassing and manipulating indigenous security arrangements in the Third World geared to pacific settlement of disputes, and encouraging balance-of-power arrangements that often aggravated ideological polarisations within Third World regions. As with security, during the Cold War, the South's experiment with regional integration bore limited results. Although several such experiments were inspired by the success of the European Economic Community, regional economic integration in the Third World proved to be "much more rudimentary than in Europe, more obscure in purpose and uncertain in content".83 Overall, regional integration in Africa and Latin America "foundered on the reefs of distrust, noncooperation and parochial nationalism".84

In the post-Cold War period, regional security frameworks have found a new appeal partly in response to the perceived limitations of the UN's peace and security role. Some Southern policy-makers see regional organisations as a way of ensuring the democratisation and decentralisation of the global peace and security framework. While the Cold War was marked by a competition between global and regional security frameworks,85 the UN authorities now see regional action as a necessary means of relieving an overburdened UN. Moreover, the end of the Cold War has lessened the polarising impact of many "successful" regional organisations in the Cold War period, whose origins and role were closely linked to the ideological interests of the superpowers.86


86. Thomas Perry Thornton, "Regional Organizations in Conflict-Management", Annals of the American Academy of Political and
As recent experience has shown, Third World regional arrangements could perform a range of peace and security functions. The role of ASEAN in the Cambodia conflict and the "Contadora" and Esquipulus groups in the Central American conflict demonstrate that regional multilateral action can contribute to the management and resolution of local/regional conflicts.\(^{87}\) In recent years, several other regional groups have developed mechanisms for a similar role, including the ECOWAS' creation of a standing committee for dispute mediation in 1990 and the decision of the OAU summit in June 1993 to create a mechanism for preventing, managing and resolving African conflicts.\(^{88}\) Action by the Economic Community of West African States in deploying a 11,000-strong peacekeeping force in the Liberian civil war attests to the role of regional organisations in peacekeeping.\(^{89}\) The OAS' role in assisting the UN in investigating the human rights situation in Latin America suggests a potential for regional multilateral action in addressing internal conflicts (although the OAS could not preempt the US military intervention in Haiti). In Asia, ASEAN is assuming a significant role in regional preventing diplomacy. The ASEAN Regional Forum seeks to develop confidence-building and transparency measures that would reduce the prospects for regional conflict and the threat of Great Power intervention.\(^{90}\)

But the effectiveness of Third World regional security arrangements is subject to distinct limitations. The first major conflict of the

---


88. Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1993), p.31


post-Cold War period saw the virtual collapse of the Arab League and dealt a severe blow to the Gulf Cooperation Council (whose much-heralded collective security system failed to offer any resistance to the Iraqi invasion). In many of the Third World regional conflicts whose settlement was helped by US-Soviet/Russian cooperation, (e.g. Afghanistan, Angola), the UN played a far more significant role than the relevant regional organisation. Despite their apprehensions about external meddling, Third World regional groups have not been able to provide an indigenous regional mechanism to deal with humanitarian crises and thereby preempt external intervention. In Somalia, the UN Secretary-General sought to involve three regional groups - the OAU, the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Conference - but regional action by the OAU "proved largely irrelevant" in dealing with the humanitarian and political aspects of the crisis.91

In general, Third World regional organisations continue to lack resources and organizational capacity to conduct major peace and security operations and are dependent on external support. Moreover, the role of a regionally-dominant actor is problematic for regional peace and security operations. Some regionally-dominant powers, such as India (in the case of SAARC) and China (in the case of the ARF), have been unsupportive of regional security arrangements for the fear that multilateral norms might offset their relative power and influence over lesser regional actors. Others, such as Nigeria (in the case of the ECOWAS) and Saudi Arabia (in the case of the GCC) are seen by their lesser neighbours as using regional security arrangements as a tool to further their own strategic interests and ambitions. In either situation, regionalism is subordinated to the interests of a dominant actor and regional peace and security operations may not be perceived to be neutral or beneficial in a conflict situation. A case in point is the problems encountered by the ECOWAS in the Liberian civil war. Not only has this operation been hampered by a scarcity of financial and organisational resources, but also a perceived lack of neutrality on the part of Nigeria and resentment against its dominant role in the peacekeeping force on the part of other ECOWAS members.92

Finally, regional security arrangements in areas that are deemed to engage the "vital interests" of the Great Powers have limited autonomy in managing local conflicts. In these areas, the dependence of local states on external security guarantees, hence frequent Great Power intervention in local conflicts, will continue


92. Amitav Acharya, "Regional Organizations and UN Peacekeeping", in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, eds., UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, forthcoming)
to thwart prospects for regional solutions to regional problems. In the Gulf, for example, Kuwaiti security agreements with the US came into conflict with regional security arrangements involving the GCC after the Iraqi defeat. Similarly, most developing nations of East Asia prefer bilateral arrangements with the US as a more realistic security option than indigenous multilateral approaches.

As in the field of security, Third World countries see regional cooperation as a necessary means for responding to pressures from a changing world economy. During the Cold War, the economic role of Southern regional organisations focussed primarily on regional trade liberalisation. Little attention was paid to addressing the wider range of economic and ecological security issues. In recent years, regionalism in the South has been increasingly concerned with issues such as protectionism, low export commodity prices, essential raw material supply disruptions and the debt burden. While regional cooperation is unlikely to resolve these problems, it might be useful in articulating areas of common interest and developing common negotiating positions. In Asia, collective bargaining by ASEAN members with their Western "dialogue partners" has already produced benefits such as better market access for their exports and the stabilisation of the prices of their main primary commodity exports.

The 1990s is also witnessing a revival of Southern interest in regional trade liberalisation. Recent examples include ASEAN's decision in 1992 to create a regional free trade area, the OAU's signing of an African Economic Community Treaty in 1991, and the emergence of two new trade groupings in South America (the Mercosur group including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, created in 1991, and the Group of Three including Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia.


95. Sayigh, Confronting the 1990s, op. cit, pp.66-67.

established in 1994). The South's renewed interest in economic regionalism stemmed partly from doubts about the future of GATT (since dispelled) as well as fears about the emergence of protectionist regional trading blocs in Europe and North America. But old problems associated with regional integration in the South remain, especially the difficulty of ensuring an equitable distribution of benefits. The materialisation of the proposed African Economic Community Treaty has a 34-year time frame, and the ASEAN framework is bogged down by inter-state suspicions over "who gains most?". This problem also affects the "market-driven" alternative to state-centric regional integration efforts, better known in East Asia as subregional economic zones or "growth triangles". In general, regional economic integration among developing countries will remain hostage to political and security concerns of the participating countries and their prior interest in fuller integration with the global economy through inter-regional trade and investment linkages.

The weaknesses of intra-South regional trade arrangements might be offset by the emergence of a North-South variety. The intended southward extension of NAFTA and Malaysia's proposal for an East Asian grouping under Japanese leadership are important developments in this regard. Such regional trading groups will expand market opportunities for the participating developing countries and alleviate their fear of protectionism in global markets. But they also pose a new set of dangers, such as the transfer of polluting industries to the developing countries and the dumping of unsafe and inferior Northern products in Southern markets. Buzan warns that the advent of regional trade blocs involving a North-South membership will increase the risk of "exploitation of the periphery by the centre" unless there emerges a sense of genuine regionalism binding the hegemon and the less developed actors. Moreover, such trade blocs will aggravate economic inequality within the South, since the opportunity to participate in such regional trading blocs is open only to those developing countries which have achieved relatively higher levels of economic success. While developing countries in Asia and Latin America can enjoy the benefits of closer integration with their developed neighbours, those excluded from such blocs (such as the African nations) will risk further marginalisation in an increasingly regionalised global economy.

Conclusion

Both Realist and Liberal theorists analysing post-Cold War international

97. "NAFTA is Not Alone", The Economist, 18th July 1994, p.47


relations appear to have come to the conclusion (albeit for different reasons) that the end of the Cold War also means the end of the Third World. 100 This view rests largely on the increasing diversity and differentiation within Third World economies and the obsolescence of its political and economic platforms. In particular, the adherants to this view point to the non-realisation of the New International Economic Order and question the relevance of Non-Alignment within a non-bipolar international system structure. While Realists point to the decline of the South's bargaining power (to compound its perpetual lack of structural power) as heralding the demise of the Third Worldism, Liberal theorists suggest a significant dampening of North-South polarisation emerging from to their growing economic interdependence 101 as well as the spread of democratic governance in the Third World. The latter perspective is buoyed by the collapse of Marxism, the rise of the newly industrialising countries (both developments contributing to the further discrediting of the Dependencia school).

Yet, this paper finds that the "end of the Third World" may be somewhat simplistic and misleading. It is based on a narrow conception of the Third World's interests, position and role within the international system. While it is easy to question the relevance of a Third World in the absence of the Second, several elements of the Third World's security predicament within, and political predisposition towards, the established international order has survived the end of the Cold War and bipolarity.

In the post-Cold War era, Southern instability has not disappeared, but it has become more localised. Several parts of the Third World remain highly unstable despite the fact that the end of superpower rivalry has lessened the prospects for internationalisation and escalation of its regional conflicts. (This does not mean the end of bipolarity is having a decompression effect; the fundamental sources of Third World instability remain independent of the structure of the international system.) The persistence of Southern regional instability contrasts with the situation involving the major Northern powers who, as some analysts see it, appear to be developing into a "security community" with minimal prospects for the use of force.

100. See, for example, Richard E. Bissell, "Who Killed the Third World", The Washington Quarterly, vol.13, no.4 (Autumn 1990), pp.23-32

101. A recent survey by The Economist reveals the extent of North-South economic interdependence. The Third World and the countries of the former Soviet bloc is the destination of 42% of America's 20% Western Europe's (47% if intra-European Union trade is excluded) and 48% of Japan's exports. On the import side, the magazine reports that America's imports of manufactured goods from the Third World rose from 5% of the value of its manufacturing output in 1978 to 11% in 1990. "A Survey of the Global Economy", The Economist 1st September 1994, p.13 and 16
in inter-state relations.  

The end of the Third World does not mean the disappearance of the North-South divide, it only means changes in the way in which the divide is being managed. As with insecurity within the South, the division between the North and the South survives the end of the Cold War. North-South tensions encompass political, economic, ecological and security issues although the members of the South do not and cannot always agree on how best to address them. Greater economic differentiation within the South does not obscure the convergence of a critical interest among many developing countries in relation to a host of world order issues such as environmental degradation, disarmament and intervention. Even a few of the NICs, considered by some to be graduates out of the Third World category, continue to harbour essentially "Third Worldish" aspirations when it comes to the environment, human rights and democracy.

To be sure, the post-Cold War South faces simultaneous pressures for rebellion and adaptation within the established international system. The experience of the past decades has shown the futility of the South's confrontational approach vis-a-vis the North and induced a greater degree of pragmatism on its part in global negotiations. The major institutions of the Third World, their unity and credibility diminished, have accordingly adopted a more moderate attitude in pressing for the reform of the global economic and security order. But as the leading formal institutions like the NAM and the Group of 77 appear to be in a state of terminal decline, they are being replaced by more informal and ad hoc coalitions (as evident in the recent UN meetings on the environment and human rights) in articulating and advancing the South's interests in global North-South negotiations. Regional organisations can also play a useful role in accommodating the growing diversity of the South while projecting a basic and common outlook on political and distributive issues. But the absence of transregional and continuing institutions makes it difficult to speak of a Third World with a collective agenda to challenge the existing international system, an agenda that was a central element of the Third World's identity during the Cold War period.

Yet, even without its traditional institutions for articulating a common strategy and mobilising resources, the North-South divide, as Indonesia's president Suharto put it, "remains the central unresolved issue of our time". While the Third World or South, never a cohesive and homogenous political entity, has become even less so in the post-Cold War era, many of the features of the international system which originally fuelled its political and economic demands and aspirations remain. Proclaiming an end to the Third World may seem to be a


103. "NAM: Call for More Active Global Role", The Straits Times, 2 September 1992, p.1
logical corollary to the West's "victory" in the East-West Cold War. But it obscures the persistence of the South's acute insecurity, vulnerability and consequent sense of inequality in the emerging world order. These cannot simply be "wished away" in any Northern construction of a New World Order, since the Southern predicament of instability and inequality does affect the economic and political well-being of the North itself, and since the major elements of any world order, including its ecological, human rights and conflict-resolution aspects, cannot be realised without Southern participation and cooperation. What is important in the new agenda of North-South is not whether either of these are homogenous categories, For a genuine New World Order to emerge, the concerns and aspirations of the South and its reservations about aspects of the Northern approach to order-maintenance, must be recognised and addressed in the new agenda of global politics.
NOTES
Unfortunately, developing countries have still not gained the status or voice proportionate to their strength and the momentum of their economic growth in the international economic system. One reason is that emerging powers are facing the dilemma of "double identity" as large but developing countries. All in all, the redistribution of interests, obligations, and power entailed by the rise of developing countries will have an explosive impact on the international order. The question as to whether or not to accept and manage the rise of developing countries is key to deciding whether the current...