

# Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia: A Comparative Perspective \*

*Aurel Croissant*

## Introduction

This volume collects empirical studies of elections and electoral politics in seven Asian countries. Unlike many election studies, the chapters were not concerned with explaining who won, when and why. Rather, the studies were concerned with the role that competitive 'democratic' elections play in various societies in giving citizens influence over policymakers, the causes and dynamics of electoral politics, and the problems of democratic development insofar as they are related to elections and electoral politics. For these reasons all the authors examined elections as instruments of democratic development and analysed the functionality of this instrument.

While there is a wide variety of different understandings of democracy – ranging from participatory democracy to minimal democracy in a Schumpeterian sense, with liberal and representative democracy somewhere in between the two poles – this volume is explicitly driven by a normative assumption: democracy, understood here as a form of political order in which the people participate in policy making and have the ultimate say in which policies are adopted (Dahl, 1989), is the best of all political worlds. This basic agreement does not draw any conclusions about the institutional design, the relation between individual and community, the rights and duties of citizens, or the institutional mechanisms through which people exercise their rights. Every society must decide these questions for itself according to its historical, cultural, societal and economic conditions. The debate on 'Confucian democracy' or 'Asian-style democracy', for example, is a debate that takes place after one has already accepted the idea of democracy as valid.<sup>1</sup> Only once the basic decision in favour of democracy has been made can the debate on different institutional, normative or ideological modes of democracy start.

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1. For an overview see Hahm et al., 2000; Foot, 1997; Fox, 1997.

For the purpose of this book it is sufficient to note that in modern states government by the people has to be indirect for the most part (Sartori, 1987; 1997). That is, citizens participate primarily by choosing political authorities in competitive elections (Powell, 2000: 3). This understanding of democracy holds an instrumental view of elections. Elections are not the only instruments for democracy and there is a widespread consensus among scholars that democracy is more than elections. However, elections are necessary and crucial for democracy. For, being an instrument for democracy, elections have to be more than mere symbolic rituals; they must be meaningful, that is, open, correct and effective (see Hadenius, 1992).

The aim of this book is to discuss three overarching questions. First, which electoral systems are found in Southeast and East Asia? Second, do elections and electoral systems contribute to democratic development? And third, how can institutional reforms strengthen sustainable democratic development? These three questions form the backdrop of the seven case studies collected in this volume and from them are derived several more specific questions. The authors' discussions of institutional reforms and their specific reform proposals differ too, depending on the problems of electoral politics with regard to democratic development in each country. While authors dealing with systems with a low degree of electoral quality focus on ways of improving the correctness of the electoral process and the fairness of the electoral system, others discuss the subject of political reform with particular attention to more general questions of institutional reform.

This last chapter concentrates on the second set of questions and puts a comparative perspective on it. In the first section, the history, genesis and forms of electoral systems in Southeast and East Asia are summarized, while in the second section, the performance of electoral systems with regard to the functional imperatives of representation, integration and governability is discussed. The third section then elaborates on questions of political reform, focusing on three aspects: (1) institutional reforms to improve the representativeness and inclusiveness of elected parliaments; (2) reforms of party politics; and (3) government reforms. The final section provides some tentative conclusions on the future possibilities for political reforms in the field of electoral politics.

## History, Genesis and Types of Electoral Systems

From a comparative perspective, elections and electoral systems have had a remarkably long history in Southeast and East Asia. The countries considered here have held altogether 125 direct presidential and legislative elections between 1907 and 2001.

Although these data indicate a long history of elections, we have to differentiate

between periods in which elections were an instrument of democracy and periods when elections served as an instrument of political ritualism. Only a small percentage of the total 125 elections proved to be instruments for democracy, that is, people were given the chance to choose their political representatives in free and fair elections. In Cambodia, for instance, only the 1993 election met this criterion, whereas the 1998 general election was semi-competitive at best. In Indonesia, for the time being, only two out of eight legislative elections have been free and fair. Before democratization in 1987, only two elections in Korea, that is the 1948 and 1960 general elections, could be classified as free and fair. In Thailand, until September 1992, most of the elections were held under military tutelage and had only limited meaningfulness, for the government was not chosen by the parliament but de facto by the military (Wyatt, 1984; Morell and Chai-anan, 1981; Murashima and Mektrairat, 1991; Pasuk and Baker, 1999). In Singapore and Malaysia, elections may qualify as free but not as fair.<sup>2</sup> Only in the Philippines do free and fair elections have a long record, going back at least to the 1946 elections. This tradition was interrupted between 1973 and 1986, but revived in the 1987 general elections. However, the Philippines are a perfect example that free and fair elections are not necessarily 'clean' elections. The Philippines also has a long history of electoral anomalies. Although elections are free and fair, election laws 'have proven to be ineffective in addressing offences because of the preponderance of "dead-letter" provisions that have proven unrealistic or difficult to enforce' (Teehankee, this volume). Deficits of electoral quality also mark elections in Thailand and Cambodia these days.<sup>3</sup>

Table 1: Direct Elections in East and Southeast Asia

Country	Presidential Elections	Legislative Elections
Cambodia (1947-98)	1	10
Korea (South) (1948-2000)	9 <sup>a</sup>	16
Indonesia (1949-99)	—	8
Malaysia (1955-99)	—	11
Philippines (1907-2001)	13	27
Singapore (1968-99)	1	8
Thailand (1933-2001)	—	21 <sup>b</sup>
Total	24	101

a. Including the nullified April 1960 elections.

b. Including the 2000 Senate elections.

Sources: Compilation by the author based on information in the chapters in this book and Rueland, 2001: 83-129; Hartmann, 2001: 53-83.

2. See the chapter by Lim Hong Hai in this volume. Also Li and Elklit, 1999.

3. See the chapter by Orathai Kokpol in this volume. Also Croissant and Dosch, 2001; *Thai Rath*, 10 February 2002: 2.

For the most part, the long history of elections in Southeast and East Asia is a history of electoral ritualism, electoral anomalies and abuse. From a comparative perspective, we can identify three instrumental variants of elections in the region's past:

1. Elections as political ritualism and as an instrument for political mobilization: Cambodia before 1993; Indonesia between 1955 and 1999; the Philippines in the 1970s and early 1980s.
2. Elections as restricted competition and as an instrument for political integration: Korea from 1963 to 1987; Malaysia since the 1970s; Singapore.
3. Elections as democratic competition and as an instrument for political participation: Korea and Thailand in the 1990s; the Philippines from 1946 to 1971 and again from 1987 onwards; Indonesia in 1999; Cambodia in 1993.

Only in the last ten years or so has electoral quality improved in some countries, such as Korea and Thailand. In both these countries, institutional reforms to combat fraud and irregularities and to uphold the integrity of the electoral process turned out to be relatively successful, whereas in other countries, such as Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines, low electoral quality is still a root cause of cronyism and corruption as well as a reason for the lack of professionalism and ethics in parliamentary politics (see Teehankee, Sulistyono and Kokpol in this volume).

Unsurprisingly, the modes of introduction of electoral systems in East and Southeast Asia correlate with the instrumental variants. During times of autocratic rule, electoral rules are unilaterally written by the powerholders themselves. Only when democratization takes place do electoral rules emerge out of the free debates of several political and social groups. But again, we must differentiate. In Korea, Thailand and the Philippines, electoral reform was the by-product of a larger process of constitutional reform. In Thailand and the Philippines, the basic type of electoral system was already laid down in detail in the constitution; the constitution was drafted by a state organ, and the process of constitution-making was guided by vibrant public debates in which numerous civil society groups and intellectuals took part.<sup>4</sup> Later, election laws were drafted and adopted in parliament. In South Korea, the constitution of the Sixth Republic stipulates no specific type of electoral system. The election law was drafted in a parliament, the members of which had been elected in the semi-competitive 1985 elections and, therefore, did not have any democratic legitimacy. The debate was dominated by the political parties in parliament; the election law which came out of this was a mere reflection of the political will of the ruling party. In Thailand, due to the process of constitution-making, the constitutional provisions as well the electoral law gained procedural legitimacy in being drafted and ratified by a democratically elected parliament,

4. See the chapter on Thailand by Orathai Kokpol. For a comparative examination, see Croissant, 2002a.

while in the Philippines, although the constitution was finally adopted by referendum, it had been drafted by a presidential constitutional commission.

In Cambodia, electoral rules were first drafted by an external agency (United Nations); later, before the 1998 elections, the draft was modified according to the interests and strategic calculations of domestic agents. In Malaysia and Singapore, electoral rules emerged out of the process of gaining independence. Later, changes to the electoral rules were unilaterally decided upon by the ruling parties. In Indonesia, the electoral law was finally drafted by the parliament whose members were elected in 1997, that is, by a state organ without democratic legitimacy. However, contrary to South Korea, the whole process was accompanied by strong public debates. As Hermawan Sulistyio argues in his chapter on Indonesia, several academics and civil society groups made proposals. External organizations were also a source of input. Although the electoral law was drafted by a state organ without any democratic mandate, the process was highly consensus-oriented and inclusive, whereas in South Korea it was conflict-ridden and exclusive.

Interestingly, most electoral systems seem to have remained true to their historical roots. In cases where a young democracy could draw from earlier democratic experiences, it reinstated an older system with small modifications, as happened in the Philippines. South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand between 1992 and 1998 retained the electoral system they had inherited from their authoritarian past with only minor modifications (in the case of Korea and Indonesia) or even unmodified (in the case of Thailand). Malaysia and Singapore (before 1988) adopted the British colonial electoral system. Cambodia is an exception because the proportional representation system stipulated in the United Nations (UN) election law established a sharp break with the country's tradition of plurality and majority systems. Interestingly, the Cambodian parties preferred some variety of majority systems, whereas in the Paris Agreement (1991) the basic provisions of the electoral system were already laid down in favour of a proportional representation system. Hartmann (2001: 59) explains that the decision to lay down the proportional representation system in Cambodia – contrary to the country's institutional tradition – was strongly influenced by the UN and the model of the Namibian Electoral Proclamation that had been prepared by the UN for the 1989 Constitutional Assembly elections in Namibia.

Except for Cambodia, there is a clear institutional path dependency of electoral systems. Notwithstanding the high contingency of political action in the process of transition from dictatorship towards democracy, in most cases agents did not make use of the situation of regulative uncertainty to deviate from institutional decisions made several decades before under different conditions or by different agents. Only in the wake of major constitutional reforms in 1998, did Thailand desert this path. The country's electoral reforms, adopted in 1997

and 1998, had far-reaching implications for electoral politics, introduced the first-ever direct elections to the Senate, established new electoral rules for the House of Representatives, and put in place a segmented system. This shows, for example, that the path dependency of institutions does not establish an institutional destiny which binds political decision makers forever. However, it is obviously very difficult and mostly not desirable for political agents to leave the paths former generations of policy makers already have established.

This trend is clearly visible when current electoral systems are compared to the systems used by the countries in the past. Table 2 shows that five out of seven countries only have experience with several forms of the plurality system (including segmented systems) but have never employed proportional representation systems.

Table 2: Historical Development Path of Electoral Systems in East and Southeast Asia

Country	Current System		Other Systems Employed in the Past	
	Type <sup>a</sup>	Introduced	Type <sup>a</sup>	Years
Cambodia	PR system and minor component of plurality system in SMCs	1993	plurality system in SMCs or MMCs	1947-81
Korea	segmented system	1963	plurality system in SMCs	1948-60
Indonesia	PR system	1955	—	—
Malaysia	plurality system	1955	—	—
Philippines	segmented system	1987	plurality system in SMCs or MMCs	1907-86
Singapore	plurality system	1968	—	—
Thailand	segmented system	1998	plurality system in SMCs or MMCs	1937-97

a. Levels of seat allocation and electoral formula differ in proportional representation systems and plurality systems respectively. For details see Table 3.

PR - proportional representation; SMC - single-member constituency; MMC - multi-member constituency  
Source: Author's compilation based on information from Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann, 2001: 1-45.

Of the total seven cases, only Cambodia and Indonesia employ a proportional representation system. This dominance of the majority principle is not specific to the countries selected in this study – plurality or majority systems are widely used in Pacific Asia, a region consisting of the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, North and South Korea, and in the countries of Southeast Asia.<sup>5</sup>

5. According to the definition of Faust, 2001: 18.

**Table 3: Types of Electoral System in Pacific Asia (First or Only Chamber of Parliament) <sup>a</sup>**

<b>Country</b>	<b>First or Only Chamber</b>	<b>Electoral System</b>	<b>Electoral Formula</b>
Brunei	No elections	—	—
Cambodia	National Assembly	PR system in MMCs; plurality system in SMCs	Hare quota; d'Hondt and plurality
Indonesia	People's Representative Body	PR system	Hare quota, largest remainder
Laos	Supreme National Assembly	plurality system in MMCs	plurality
Malaysia	House of Representatives	plurality system in SMCs	plurality
Singapore	Parliament	plurality system in SMCs and small and medium MMCs	plurality
Vietnam	National Assembly	absolute majority system in small MMCs	absolute majority
PR China	No direct elections at the national level	—	—
Philippines	House of Representatives	segmented system	plurality and 2% of total votes for party-list system
Thailand	House of Representatives	segmented system	plurality and 5% of total valid votes
Japan	Lower House	segmented system	plurality and one sixth of total valid votes for the party list
N. Korea	Supreme People's Assembly	absolute majority system in SMCs	absolute majority
S. Korea	National Assembly	segmented system	plurality and 5% or 3-5% of total votes/ seats for party lists; Hare quota; largest remainder
Taiwan	Legislative Yuan	SNTV and additional national list	plurality and 5% of total valid votes; Hare-Niemeyer

a. Electoral provisions as of 2001.  
PR - proportional representation; SMC - single-member constituency; MMC - multi-member constituency;  
SNTV - single non-transferable vote  
Source: See Table 2; additional information from the chapters of this book.

With the exception of Cambodia and Indonesia, all electoral systems in the region used in legislative elections (first or only chamber) can be classified as plurality systems. Laos, Vietnam and North Korea practise absolute majority systems in multi-member constituencies and single-member constituencies, respectively, which seems to reflect the pseudo-democratic claim of their communist ideology. Malaysia and Singapore use the plurality system in single-member constituencies, the 'mother' of all electoral systems. Singapore, however, deviated from the system in 1988 when the parliament passed an amendment to the electoral law that introduced additional block voting in Group Representative Constituencies.<sup>6</sup> The constitution of the Philippines lays down a plurality system with a proportional list that has no compensatory effect. This system was not practised before the general elections in 1998 (see Teehanke, this volume). Between 1992 and 1996, Thailand practised a plurality system in small multi-member constituencies (one to three seats) with multiple voting. In 1997/98, during the process of major constitutional reform, a plurality system with a proportional list (segmented system) was adopted and practised for the first time in April 2001. The electoral system in Taiwan combines the single non-transferable vote system with an additional list for a national constituency and a second and third list for aboriginal members of the Overseas Chinese Communities as well. The Japanese electoral system, until the elections of 1993, was a single non-transferable vote system. In the mid-1990s the Japanese Diet introduced a segmented system composed of 300 seats distributed in single-member constituencies and 200 (1996)/180 (2000) seats distributed by proportional representation with closed party lists.

## The Political Consequences of Electoral Systems

As already argued in the introduction to this book, similar electoral systems can produce dissimilar political consequences. Therefore it is necessary to examine their political effects more closely. The important question is: in what ways do electoral systems obstruct or promote the representativeness and inclusiveness of democratic institutions, the integration of citizens into political parties and the formation of parliaments and governments able to legislate and to govern? Three functional demands can be discerned – representation, integration and decision:

- First, elections ought to represent the people, i.e. the political will of the voters. Therefore it is necessary that the electoral system is sufficiently proportional to achieve an adequate conversion of the wide range of pluralistic social interests into political mandates. The question is: do electoral systems promote the representativeness of the elected institutions?
- Second, elections ought to integrate the people. An electoral system which accomplishes successful integration is one that stimulates the emergence of

6. For details see the chapter by Yeo Lay Hwee in this volume.



cohesive parties. It then contributes to integration in parliament and does not merely produce individual and isolated representatives. The question is: do electoral systems promote the development of a well institutionalized party system?

- Third, elections have to generate majorities large enough to ensure the stability of government and its ability to govern. The question is: do electoral systems promote the governability of the democratic system?

### 1. Representativeness

The degree to which electoral systems promote the democratic representativeness of democratic institutions depends on their degree of (dis)proportionality. Disproportionality refers to the deviation of parties' seat shares from their vote shares (Blais and Maiscott, 1996: 67-72; Lijphart, 1994: 57-77; Taagepara and Shugart, 1989). One of the most widely used indicators to measure the electoral disproportionality was introduced by Arend Lijphart. His *index of disproportionality* is the average vote-seat share deviation of the two largest parties in each election (first or only chamber of parliament; Lijphart, 1984: 163). For a wider comparative examination, measures are also provided for some other democratic systems in Asia, i.e. Japan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Taiwan.

Table 4: Degree of Electoral Disproportionality (First or Only Chamber)

Country	Elections Held (No.)	Elections Included (No.)	Degree of Disproportionality (%)	
			Average	Latest Election
Cambodia (1993-98)	2	2	5.42	7.30 (1998)
Indonesia (1999)	1	1	2.25	2.25 (1999)
Korea (1988-2000)	4	4	7.00	8.25 (2000)
Malaysia (1955-99)	11	11	14.75	10.25 (1999)
Philippines (1987-2001)	5	4 (1987-98) <sup>a</sup>	4.46 <sup>b</sup>	2.60 (1998)
Singapore (1955-97)	11	7 (1968-97) <sup>c</sup>	22.44	22.80 (1997)
Thailand (1992-2001)	4	4	2.70	6.04 (2001)
Taiwan (1992-2001) <sup>d</sup>	4	4	4.20	4.30 (2001)
Bangladesh (1991-96)	2	2	8.40	8.20 (1996)
Nepal (1991-99)	3	3	9.00	9.80 (1999)
Japan (1947-2000)	20	20	4.80	7.60 (2000)
Median	—	—	7.06	7.60
Standard deviation	—	—	4.98	5.28

Note: Only political parties/alliances gaining 1 per cent of the total valid votes are counted.

a. The Election Commission of the Philippines (COMELEC) does not provide complete data for the 2001 elections.

b. Excluding the party-list system.

c. Only available for elections after independence.

d. Legislative Yuan elections.

Sources: Teehankee, this volume; Croissant, this volume (South Korea chapter); Croissant, 2002c; Hartmann, 2001; Rieger, 2001; Rueland, 2001; Tan, 2001.

The fourth column of Table 4 shows that the average degree of disproportionality ranges from a low 2.25 per cent in Indonesia to a high 22.44 per cent in Singapore. There is a clear borderline between plurality and proportional representation systems concerning electoral disproportionality, although we can find a few outliers. The proportional representation systems of Cambodia (with a minor plurality element) and Indonesia should be given high marks for their representativeness; the same, however, is true for Japan, with its single non-transferable vote system until 1996 and its segmented system since 1996, as well as for Thailand's plurality system in multi-member constituencies used before 2001. But the remaining plurality systems are clearly inferior to the proportional representation systems in terms of the degree of proportionality. Segmented systems in South Korea (since 1988) and Thailand (2001), and the plurality system in single-member constituencies applied in Bangladesh and Nepal have produced significantly higher disproportionalities; the low representative character of Malaysia and Singapore's plurality systems is remarkable.

**Table 5: Clusters of Electoral Systems According to the Degree of Electoral Disproportionality**

	<b>Average</b>	<b>Latest Election</b>
Low disproportionality	Indonesia Philippines Thailand Taiwan	Indonesia Philippines Taiwan
Intermediate	Bangladesh Cambodia Japan Korea Nepal	Bangladesh Cambodia Japan Korea Thailand
High disproportionality	Malaysia Singapore	Malaysia Nepal Singapore

Note: Standard deviation for average electoral disproportionality is 4.98 and 5.28 for the latest election; median is 7.1 and 7.6. Scores of more than 0.5 standard deviation above or below the median indicate strong positions, scores in between indicate intermediate positions.

According to their degrees of disproportionality, Asia's electoral systems cluster into three groups. The first group includes systems with low disproportionality, resulting in an adequate conversion of the wide range of pluralistic social interests into political mandates and a high representativeness of the parliament. This group consists mainly of proportional representation systems and segmented systems. The second group includes intermediate cases, lying somewhere around the median, showing a mean record of reflecting social demands and conflicts and translating voters' decisions into seats in parliament. Finally, the third group consists of electoral systems that produce a high or

very high degree of electoral disproportionality, having therefore a poor record in representativeness.

The change in vote-seat deviation in the wake of electoral reforms is remarkable. Ironically, this is the case for Thailand's segmented system where the degree of electoral disproportionality rose significantly *after* components of the proportional representation system were introduced. The same is true for the Philippines's party-list system, used for the first-time ever in 1998 and again in 2001. Both times the system produced a tremendous disproportional effect, as Julio Teehankee shows in his analysis in this volume. But the most drastic changes occurred in Singapore and Malaysia. In Singapore, electoral disproportionality sky-rocketed from 22.05 per cent in 1984 to 26.15 per cent in 1988 after the parliament adopted a bill to create so-called Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs) in which 'the voters select among closed and blocked team lists, and the winning list retains all seats' (Rieger, 2001: 243). Obviously, only the ruling party benefited from this; further amendments extending the number and size of GRCs secured the system's disproportionality in favour of the ruling party. In Malaysia there has been a tremendous increase in electoral disproportionality since the 1974 general elections, the first elections after the ethnic conflicts of the late 1960s and early 1970s. While the average disproportionality for the four elections conducted before 1974 was 8.98 per cent, it was 15.69 per cent for the three decades from 1974 to 1999. As Lim Hong Hai shows in his analysis, mal-apportionment benefiting *bumiputra* parties with strongholds in rural districts with predominantly Malay constituencies is the key variable for explaining high disproportionality in Malaysia. In both cases, the electoral system, characterized by very high disproportionality has proven beneficial for one specific political party – the ruling majority party or, as in Malaysia, the ruling alliance. The electoral system also discourages the representation of opposition parties.

Another measure is Timm Beichelt's disproportionality index,  $E_{rep}$  (for ELECTION<sub>Representativeness</sub>), which is computed in the following manner: the differences between the seat percentages and vote percentages for each party are summed up; this total is divided by 2 (to balance over- and under-representation); and finally the value is subtracted from 100 (1998: 611). The closer the score is to 100, the more proportional the electoral system is. The *majoritarian effect* of electoral systems can be measured in a second step. In order to do so, Beichelt formulates a second index,  $E_{rep1}$  (ELECTION<sub>Representativeness + 1st strongest party</sub>). It is computed similar to  $E_{rep}$ : the difference between the seat percentages and vote percentages of the strongest party are summed up; the total is divided by 2; then the value of  $E_{rep}$  is subtracted from  $E_{rep1}$ . The difference of  $E_{rep1} - E_{rep}$  shows the seat bonus for the strongest party, which indicates the majoritarian effects of an electoral system (Beichelt, 1998: 611). The higher  $E_{rep1} - E_{rep}$  is, the more the electoral system over-represents strong parties and the more it helps therefore to produce political majorities in parliament. Table 6 shows to

what extent electoral systems help to produce political majorities in parliament by over-representing the strongest parties, or, in Malaysia, over-representing the leading parties' alliance – the Alliance from 1955 to 1969 and, later, the Barisan Nasional (BN - National Front).<sup>7</sup>

Table 6: Representativeness

	Average $E_{rep}$	Average $E_{rep1}$	Average $E_{rep1} - E_{rep}$	$E_{rep1} - E_{rep}$ Latest Election
Cambodia (1993-98)	91.35	96.52	5.17	3.35
Indonesia (1999)	95.30	98.50	3.20	3.20
Korea (1988-2000)	88.16	94.97	6.81	6.40
Malaysia (1955-99)	77.77	89.42	11.65	10.05
Philippines (1987-98)	86.20	97.05	10.60	4.00
Singapore (1968-97)	73.01	85.85	13.01	15.16
Thailand (1992-2001)	91.42	94.79	3.37	6.34
Nepal (1991-99)	82.88	92.98	10.10	10.60
Bangladesh (1991-96)	86.50	93.20	6.70	9.20
Japan (1947-2000)	91.77	96.17	4.40	6.86
Taiwan (1992-2001)	95.51	96.78	1.27	2.84
Median	88.16	94.97	6.70	—
Standard deviation	6.75	3.54	3.70	—

Sources: See Table 4.

Table 7: Clusters of Representativeness

$E_{rep}$	$E_{rep1} - E_{rep}$	High Over-representation	Intermediate	Low Over-representation
Low Proportionality		Malaysia Nepal Singapore		
Intermediate		Philippines	Bangladesh Cambodia Korea	Thailand
High Proportionality				Indonesia Japan Taiwan

Note: Standard deviation for average  $E_{rep}$  is 6.75 and 3.70 for average  $E_{rep1} - E_{rep}$ ; median is 88.16 and 6.7, respectively. Scores of more than 0.5 standard deviation above or below the median indicate strong positions, scores in between indicate intermediate positions. High values for the average  $E_{rep}$  indicate high proportionality; high values for the average  $E_{rep1} - E_{rep}$  indicate high over-representation.

7. Three communal parties formed the Alliance before the 1955 elections. The National Front (BN) became the successor of the Alliance in 1974. In the 1999 elections, the BN consisted of 14 political parties; see Lim Hong Hai in this volume.

Not surprisingly there is a strong correlation between disproportionality and over-representation of the strongest party. The electoral systems in Singapore, Malaysia and Nepal combine poor records of representativeness with strong majoritarian effects, that is, over-representation of the strongest party or an alliance. At the other extreme are Indonesia, Japan and Taiwan. In these systems a high proportionality goes together with a low majoritarian effect. Finally, the electoral systems of Korea, Bangladesh and Cambodia connect a moderate degree of electoral disproportionality with a moderate seat bonus for the largest party. Thailand and the Philippines are outliers. While Thailand's electoral system is less majoritarian than its intermediate degree of disproportionality predicts, the Philippines' system is marked by a high over-representation of the strongest party, although the system's degree of disproportionality is mean.

## *2. Party System Fragmentation*

The electoral system affects not only the representativeness of democratic institutions, but also the structure of the national party system. A well-known proposition in comparative politics is Maurice Duverger's so-called 'sociological law': plurality method favours two-party systems; conversely, proportional representation and two-ballot systems encourage multi-partism (1964: 217-226). Duverger explains these differential effects in terms of 'mechanical' and 'psychological' factors. The mechanical effect of plurality rule is that all but the two strongest parties are severely under-represented because they tend to lose in each district. The psychological factor reinforces the mechanical one, because voters soon realize that their votes are wasted if they continue to opt for third parties. Therefore, they tend to transfer their vote to one of the two strongest parties. The psychological factor operates also at the 'support'-side: politicians do not want to waste their political capital by running as non-performing third-party candidates; instead they will join larger parties to improve their chances for candidature.

A useful method to unearth the effects of Duverger's mechanical factor is to compare effective numbers of parties. Again, for a better comparative examination of electoral outcomes, relevant measures are also provided for Japan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Taiwan. A comparison between the effective number of parties (based on vote shares) and the effective number of parties in parliament (based on seat shares) shows that all electoral systems concentrate party systems. This creates a lower effective number of parliamentary parties compared to the effective number of electoral parties. Duverger's mechanical effect is empirically detectable to the extent that plurality systems tend to produce a smaller effective number of parliamentary parties than proportional representation systems. The difference is highest in Nepal, Bangladesh, South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia; it is lowest in Indonesia, Taiwan, Cambodia, Japan and Thailand.

Table 8: Effective Number of Parties and Indices of Non-representation <sup>a</sup>

Country	Effective No. of Electoral Parties (A) <sup>c</sup>	Effective No. of Parliamentary Parties (B)	Difference A - B
Cambodia	2.81	2.39	0.42
Average (1993-99)			
Indonesia (1999)	5.05	4.87	0.18
Korea	3.99	2.95	1.04
Average (1988-2000)			
Malaysia	2.40	1.60	0.80
Average (1968-99)			
Philippines	3.99	4.90	N/A
Average (1987-2001)	(1995-98) <sup>b</sup>	(1987-2001)	
Singapore	1.96	1.03	0.93
Average (1968-97)			
Thailand	5.64	5.03	0.61
Average (1992-2001)			
Taiwan	3.09	2.69	0.40
Average (1992-2001)			
Bangladesh	4.07	2.79	1.28
Average (1991-96)			
Nepal	3.89	2.48	1.41
Average (1991-99)			
Japan	3.30	2.82	0.48
Average (1947-2000)			

a. Elections for the first or only chamber only, excluding parties with a share of votes/seats less than 1 per cent.  
 b. The statistics provided by the electoral commission COMELEC are incomplete for the years 1987-92 and 2001.  
 c. For computation see Laakso and Taagepara, 1979: 3-27.  
 Source: See Table 4.

Which types of party system do we find in Asia? The concept of party systems refers to the structure of all the parties in a state, including the patterns of interaction between the parties (co-operation versus competition). Two factors are particularly eminent: a party system's fragmentation and its polarization. The Italo-American scholar, Giovanni Sartori, uses these two factors to develop his typology of party systems. By counting the number of 'relevant parties'<sup>8</sup> and determining their ideological distance from each other, he distinguishes several types of party system (1976, chs. 5 and 6).<sup>9</sup> Sartori then goes on to combine the variables of fragmentation and polarization (ideological, religious,

8. According to Sartori (1976: 122-124), a party must satisfy two criteria in order to count as relevant. First, it must find 'itself in a position to determine over time, and at some point in time, at least one of the possible governmental majorities' (coalition potential). Second, 'its existence, or appearance, affects the tactics of party-competition - by determining a switch from centripetal to centrifugal competition ... - of the governing-oriented parties' (blackmail potential). To compare large numbers of cases we propose a threshold of at least 1 per cent of parliamentary seats as the minimum for a party to count as relevant.  
 9. Hegemonic party system; predominant party system; two-party system; limited pluralism; extreme pluralism; atomized party system.

ethnic, etc.) to discriminate two sub-types in each of the two basic types of limited and extreme pluralism: the strongly polarized party system, in which competition between parties takes a centrifugal direction, and the weakly polarized party system, that causes centripetal tendencies of competition (1976: 120-134).

Table 9: Types of Party System in Pacific Asia

		FRAGMENTATION <sup>a</sup>		
		High (Extreme Pluralism)	Moderate (Limited Pluralism)	Low (Two-party or Less Systems)
POLARIZATION <sup>b</sup>	high	Indonesia	Bangladesh	Cambodia Nepal
	moderate	Philippines		Malaysia Singapore
	low	Thailand	Japan Korea Taiwan	

- a. According to the effective number of parliamentary parties. Effective number of parliamentary parties (N) < 2.5 means low fragmentation; 2.5 ≤ N < 4.5 means moderate fragmentation; N ≥ 4.5 means high fragmentation.
- b. Classification is based on qualitative ratings by the author. Polarization relates both to ideological-programmatic conflicts and the polarization within the parliament between ethnic, religious or linguistic groups and political leaders, respectively (e.g. Bangladesh). Only parties gaining seats in the first chamber of parliament are counted. Polarization within the party system does not always represent the real polarization of society (e.g. Philippines).

Sources: The effective number of parties is taken from Table 7; classifications of the degree of polarization are based on information from the chapters in this volume and Croissant and Merkel, 2001.

The illustration shows the type of party system found in each country. The spectrum ranges from *extreme pluralism* in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, to *moderate pluralism* in Bangladesh, Taiwan (both with less than three effective parliamentary parties), Japan and Korea, to *two-and-a-half party systems* in Cambodia and Nepal, and to *predominant* or even *hegemonic party systems* in Malaysia and Singapore.

There is widespread consensus among scholars that party systems have a positive bearing on the institutional efficiency and effectiveness, and consequently, on the governability of a political system, if (1) they are fragmented moderately or weakly, since low fragmentation facilitates the forming of government coalitions and of majorities, and accelerates thereby decision-making in parliament and cabinet, and if (2) they are moderately to weakly polarized, since low polarization mitigates the danger of ideological antagonism between political parties, which otherwise would lead easily to a paralysing and destabilizing political confrontation. In contrast to this, highly fragmented

or highly polarized party systems tend to have a negative bearing on governability. They hamper the formation of parliamentary and governing majorities and/or tend to bear highly antagonistic confrontation between different ideological, ethnic or otherwise segmented 'lager' (political camps).

The party system considered most obstructive to governability and political stability, extreme pluralism with high polarization, exists only in Indonesia, whereas five countries – Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, Korea and Taiwan – encompass weakly polarized party systems with moderate to (very) low fragmentation. Not surprisingly, those countries are considered by most scholars as the countries with the best record of governability, political stability and socio-economic performance in the region. But they are not necessarily the most 'democratic' regimes in the region. While the literature lists Korea, Taiwan and Japan with their *limited pluralism* type party systems as the most consolidated democracies in Pacific Asia, for various reasons Malaysia and Singapore are characterized mostly as 'semi-democratic'. The analyses of Yeo Lay Hwee and Lim Hong Hai illustrate at least that both cases are located at the borderline between predominant party system and hegemonic party system, due to high disproportionality, over-representation of the largest party/alliance and discrimination against opposition parties.

On the other hand, the less-than-three party systems in Bangladesh, Nepal and Cambodia are not necessarily very conducive to consolidation in spite of weak fragmentation, because they are highly polarized and further unsettled by their civil war or civil war-like experiences (Cambodia and Nepal), or by ethno-religious strife and the conflict between individual political leaders (Bangladesh). The highly fragmented party systems in the Philippines and Thailand may not pose a great threat to political stability and democracy, since they are balanced by low levels of polarization. However, high fragmentation certainly is an obstacle for institutional efficiency and effectiveness, and consequently, for the governability of democratic regimes, because it tends to show efficacy-reducing effects like short-lived multi-party coalition cabinets (Thailand), divided government (Philippines), mutual blockades between political parties and legislative gridlocks (see Croissant, 2002b; 2002c). We discuss this point in the following section.

### *3. Governability*

The number of political parties, the degree of political polarization between them, the breadth of participation in government by parties and the relationship between parliamentary and executive majorities, i.e. 'divided governments' in presidential systems or 'minority cabinets' in parliamentary systems, are highly significant aspects for the stability and effectiveness of governments and the continuity of government policies (see Tsebelis, 1995; Morgenstern and Nacif, 2002; Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000).



Following Douglas W. Rae, the effect of electoral systems on the breadth of participation in government by political parties can be measured by looking at their capability to produce so-called manufactured majorities (1967: 67). A majority is manufactured when a party wins only a minority of votes but a majority of seats. It may be contrasted with earned majorities, where a party wins majorities of both votes and seats, and with natural minorities, where no party wins a majority of either votes or seats.

Table 10: Majorities and Minorities in Asia

	<b>Manufactured Majorities (No.)</b>	<b>Earned Majorities (No.)</b>	<b>Natural Minorities (No.)</b>	<b>Elections (No.)</b>
Cambodia	1	—	1	2
Indonesia	—	—	1	1
Korea	—	—	4	4
Malaysia	1	10	—	11
Philippines	1	—	4	5
Singapore	—	8	—	8
Thailand	—	—	4	4
Bangladesh	—	—	2	2
Japan	10	4	6	20
Nepal	2	—	1	3
Taiwan	2	1	1	4
Total	17	23	22	64

Sources: See Table 4.

Table 11 allows us to differentiate two groups of political systems in Pacific Asia. The first group consists of electoral systems with a high capacity to produce manufactured or earned majorities. The second group consists of systems where natural minorities are the rule, in some countries without any exception.

Contrary to the theory, there is no clear correlation between patterns of majority formation in parliament and the type of electoral system. While three plurality systems in single-member constituencies and multi-member constituencies have a good record, three systems do not; and neither do the segmented systems show a clear tendency.

Table 11: Majorities and Types of Electoral System in Pacific Asia

		High Capacity to Produce One-party Majorities		Low Capacity to Produce One-party Majorities	
		In more than 50% of all elections	In 100% of all elections	In less than 50% of all elections	Only natural minorities
<b>PR Systems</b>				Cambodia <sup>a</sup>	Indonesia
<b>Segmented systems</b>	Japan Taiwan				Korea Philippines (1998-2001) Thailand (2001)
<b>Plurality systems in SMCs and MMCs</b>	Nepal	Malaysia Singapore		Bangladesh Philippines (1987-95)	Thailand (1992-96)

a. Cambodia is a borderline case since the constitution provides for a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly confirming the government. Although there was a manufactured majority in the 1998 general elections, this was an absolute majority not large enough to ensure the parliamentary vote.

PR - proportional representation; SMC - single-member constituency; MMC - multi-member constituency

One-party majorities, either earned or manufactured, are not the only way to ensure stable and effective governments. The capacity of coalition cabinets to enforce legislative projects in parliament is not automatically inferior to one-party cabinets. On the contrary, coalition cabinets are sometimes even more effective in promoting policies because they may count on wider support. Arend Lijphart, for example, argues that successful policy making in general and economic policy making in particular requires not so much a strong hand, as a steady one (1984: 156). Policy continuity, however, needs cabinet stability, or, as Lijphart calls it, cabinet durability. Short-lived cabinets do not have sufficient time to develop sound and coherent policies; conversely, a high rate of cabinet durability indicates that cabinets are able to command strong support in parliament; it also indicates that the government has a high capability to discipline the parliament and to enforce its policy projects (Lijphart, 1999: 129).

The electoral system used in legislative elections influences only indirectly cabinet durability. Supplementary characteristics of the party system, such as the ideological distance between parties (polarization), voters volatility, or the type of government system (parliamentary, presidential or 'mixed systems'), are also important variables (see Sani and Sartori, 1983; Morlino, 1998: 85-103). But there is a general rule for parliamentary systems: the stronger the majoritarian effect of the electoral system, the more the electoral system tends to concentrate the party system. This usually produces a lower fragmentation of the party system. The smaller the effective number of parties in parliament and


the higher the capacity of electoral systems to create majorities, the more likely single party cabinets or minimal winning coalition cabinets are. Single party cabinets have a higher average life span than minimal winning coalition cabinets, and they have a higher average durability than minority cabinets or oversized coalition cabinets.

Cross-national studies support this argument. Taylor and Herman as well as Lijphart found a strong inverse correlation between cabinet durability and the degree of party fragmentation (Taylor and Herman, 1971: 37; Lijphart, 1984). Bingham Powell (1982), Laver and Schofield (1990) and King et al. (1990) present statistical evidence for a relationship between degrees of fragmentation, ideological polarization, volatility of party systems and government stability and cabinet durability. The statistical evidence can be formulated into the following hypothesis: the higher the fragmentation, the more intense the ideological polarization, and the higher the volatility of the party system, the more volatile and the more insecure the distribution of *bargaining power* between political parties, and therefore, the more complex and unstable the parliamentary arena. But it is in parliament where political parties decide on the formation and downfall of cabinets (parliamentary systems), and cabinets have to prove their capability to decide policies (parliamentary *and* presidential systems).

The following data are calculations based on a narrow definition of cabinet duration. Three criteria are used for the termination of a cabinet. The life-span of a cabinet ends in the case of new elections, or of changes in party composition or prime ministership (Lijphart, 1999: 132). In presidential and presidential-parliamentary systems, the criteria are changes in party composition of cabinets, changes in presidency or coalition status, or new elections for the presidency. This modification was introduced since, in parliamentary systems, a cabinet has to resign before elections, and prime ministers must be elected by the new parliament after elections. Therefore legislative elections do have an automatic effect on cabinets in parliamentary systems, but not in presidential systems. Two notes: First, because reliable information about the party composition of presidential cabinets in the Philippines and Indonesia has not been available to the author, the first criterion is not used in these cases. Second, Cambodia is not included in the sample for the same reason and the violent circumstances of the cabinet dissolution in the year 1997 (see Gallup, this volume).

Figure 1 presents the average cabinet durability in ascending order. At first sight, there is a relatively clear correlation between party system fragmentation and cabinet durability. Thailand ranks last as expected, since party system fragmentation is high and the electoral system neither benefits the strongest party nor creates manufactured majorities. The ranks of Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Singapore and Korea also fit with expectations since they almost correlate in both rankings. But the average cabinet durability in Nepal, Taiwan and Japan seems to be deviant, and the Philippines is the main outlier.

Figure 1: Average Cabinet Duration (in months)



Note: Data for Malaysia exclude the period 09/70-09/74.  
Sources: Based on data in Croissant, 2002c; Leifer, 1996; Cook and Stevenson, 1998; Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann, Vol. II, 2001; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*.

Nepal ranks second last in cabinet durability, although the theoretical assumption predicts a high average cabinet duration since the electoral system clearly favours the strongest party, reduces party system fragmentation and creates manufactured majorities. Japan ranks worse than expected, considering that the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party ruled the country continually from 1955 until 1994. On the other hand, Taiwan ranks better on cabinet durability than on party system fragmentation. Finally, the Philippines rank highest for cabinet durability – a country whose party system is the second most fragmented in the region, whose electoral system has a low capacity for manufactured majorities and whose cabinets are notorious for their political weakness and inefficiency.

What are the reasons? Taiwan's good record of cabinet stability is most of all the result of two institutional factors: its presidential-parliamentary 'mixed' system and its electoral system's high capacity to produce manufactured majorities, albeit with weak electoral disproportionality and low over-representation of the strongest party. As long as the president and the majority of the Legislative Yuan belonged to the same party, the Kuomintang (which was the case between 1947 and March 2000), cabinet stability was easily defended. This of course results also from factors outside of the institutional order, i.e. the Kuomintang's former hegemonic position in the party system, its

(formerly) strong roots in Taiwanese society and its high capability to balance intra-party factionalism over a long period of time.

Table 12: Ranking of Party System Fragmentation and Cabinet Durability

	Party System Fragmentation <sup>a</sup>	Cabinet Durability <sup>b</sup>
Singapore	1 (smallest fragmentation)	2
Malaysia	2	3
Nepal	3	9
Bangladesh	4	5
Taiwan	5	3
Japan	6	8
Korea	7	6
Indonesia	8	7
Philippines	9	1 (highest durability)
Thailand	10 (highest fragmentation)	10 (lowest durability)

a. The smaller the number of effective parliamentary parties, the higher the rank.

b. The higher the average cabinet durability, the higher the rank.

The unexpectedly low average durability of cabinets in Japan is above all the result of distinct party factionalism and factional fighting within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. The circulation of the prime ministership among faction leaders is a frequently used instrument for political bargaining inside the party and an effective instrument to regulate the competition between the different factions. This underlying dynamic helps to put the brief lifetimes of Japanese cabinets into better perspective. Although individual cabinets have come and gone, many of the same ministers and especially the same party have remained in government for nearly 50 years, thereby providing a longer-term perspective on policy and a 'hidden' continuity for cabinets.

Nepal is a different case. The low cabinet duration cannot be explained by informal and government stabilizing mechanisms as in Japan. The short lifespan of cabinets actually *is* an indicator of political instability in Nepal. The reason for unstable cabinets is located within the specific structures and dynamics of the Nepalese party system. Even though the general elections of 1991 and 1999 brought an absolute majority for the Nepali Congress, stable cabinets could not develop due to constant intra-party feuds (Perekrestenko, 1997).

The Philippines' democracy is obviously the most deviant case. The very high average of cabinet duration is in sharp contrast to the weak majoritarian effects of the electoral system and the fragmentation of its party system. The weaknesses of the indicator used here for measuring the dominance of the executive branch are actually shown in the case of the Philippines. In this case, cabinet duration gives a completely wrong impression of the degree of executive dominance, since it only measures the chronic continuity of presidencies. According to this

method, the Philippines had only three different cabinets within 14 years. Matthew Shugart and John Carey and others have shown that in presidential systems the degree of executive dominance or legislative dominance vis-à-vis the other branch of government is related to other institutional elements and characteristics of the party system that cannot be measured with the index of cabinet duration. Significant are elements like presidential decree authorities, the composition of legislative majorities and the coherence and cohesion of parliamentary parties (Carey and Shugart, 1998; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Morgenstern and Nacif, 2002). These variables do not affect cabinet duration in presidential systems but the capability of presidential governments to dominate parliaments.

With regard to the Philippines only, recent research on the presidential-legislative relationship proves that the presidential executive does not dominate the congress. Instead of an 'imperial presidency' we find an 'impotent presidency' in which most presidents are caught in endless bargaining processes with individual members of the congress due to the absence of presidential majorities in congress, the weak credibility of congressional majorities, the lack of presidential decree authorities and a highly volatile party system. This leads to institutional or clientelist gridlocks and political frustrations of the executive (Croissant, 2002a; 2002b). Presidentialism in South Korea and in Taiwan sometimes resembles this scenario of 'impotent presidentialism'. Institutional blockades tend to occur in South Korea, when legislative or presidential elections produce 'competing majorities' in both branches of government. This was the case from April 1988 until February 1990, between February 1998 and August 1999, and has been again since April 2000. Institutional conflicts between the president and Legislative Yuan in Taiwan are frequent since the former opposition Democratic Progress Party won the presidency in March 2000 while the former ruling party Kuomintang still had the majority in parliament.<sup>10</sup>

Table 13 illustrates that competing majorities are the rule in South Korea and the Philippines at the beginning of legislative sessions. The average share of seats won by the party of the president is 45 per cent in Korea and 41 per cent in the Philippines. The average number given for the Philippines, however, includes the results of the congressional elections in 1987, when the pro-democratic alliance led by Corazon Aquino won 72.5 per cent of seats in the House of Representatives and 91.7 per cent of seats in the Senate. When the critical elections of 1987 are excluded, the average share of seats for presidential parties declines to a low 31.8 per cent for the House of Representatives and 27.8 per cent for the Senate. Taiwan does not fit into this trend. But since the Democratic Progress Party of President Cheng Shebiun failed to gain an absolute

10. The November 2001 Legislative Yuan elections were a disaster for the Kuomintang which lost its majority and was reduced to the second largest party in parliament. However, the president's party also gained a little more than one third of the seats in parliament.

majority of seats in parliament in the 2001 general elections, it is uncertain whether Taiwan will break the general trend again in the future. The negative effects of divided government on the political efficiency and institutional effectiveness of the democratic regime have already been high during the last two years, as has been and still is the case in the Philippines and Korea.

Table 13: Average Share of Seats for the President's Party

	<b>First Chamber</b>	<b>Second Chamber</b>	<b>President Governing with Divided Government</b>
Philippines (1987-2001)	40.70	47.30	All presidents built coalitions after gaining office / co-opted independents and representatives from other parties into their party
Korea (1988-2000)	45.10	—	Roh Tae-woo (1988-90) Kim Dae-jung (1998-99; 2000-02)
Taiwan (1992-2001)	52.95	—	Cheng Shebiun (2001-02)
Indonesia (1999)	10.20 30.80	—	Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001-02)

Sources: See Table 4.

An extreme example of institutional gridlock has been Indonesia in the years 2000-2001. Because of the weakness of the president's party in parliament (DPR) and the Supreme Assembly (MPR), and several additional factors (see Sulisty, this volume), the president became a hostage of the political will of the parliament. As Hermawan Sulisty shows in his analysis, the DPR and the MPR were dominated by parties that officially participated in the all-party cabinet, but that were behaving in fact more and more like opposition parties. The most critical point for governability in Indonesia came when those parties decided to use the sharp sword of impeachment as a weapon to turn the presidency over to someone else. Ironically, the same had happened in the Philippines a few months before when the opposition parties decided to set constitutional procedures aside and remove the democratically legitimized and constitutional government by a kind of popular coup d'état.

There may have been good arguments in favour of this strategy. As far as the author knows, in both countries, public and academic opinion on its virtues and perils is inconclusive. We may have to wait and see how it will affect the political development of these two countries in the future. However, these developments in Indonesia and Philippines illustrate very clearly the pitfalls for governability in presidential and semi-presidential systems in the case of a divided government. We shall keep them in mind when we discuss the possibilities for institutional reforms in order to promote further democratic development in Pacific Asia.

## Reforming Electoral Politics

The last section focused on the representativeness of electoral systems as well as their integrative and majoritarian functions. However, even the most representative and integrative electoral system may produce democratically problematic results if the elected institutions are deficient in terms of social inclusiveness and lack of responsiveness to voters' demands, and are elitist in nature.

Lack of representativeness, responsiveness and inclusiveness of parliamentary politics are complaints common to all democracies. However, they are most often heard in young democracies. Here the gap between parliament and the voters appears to be even wider than in established democracies. The socio-political gap is often a consequence of badly institutionalized party systems in young democracies. They have not (yet) been able to perform the functions of socio-political inclusion and adequate representation sufficiently. The chapters on the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia and South Korea provide detailed insights into these problems.

One question is therefore of crucial importance: What institutional choices exist to bridge the gap between parliament and political parties on the one side and citizens on the other? This issue enjoys particular and controversial attention in Pacific Asia. Various young democracies in the region are attempting to reform the institutional access to parliaments by reforming the voting rights of underprivileged social groups such as women and ethnic or religious minorities.

The goal of reforming the electoral law in favour of marginalized groups is to alter the sociostructural composition of the parliament and the spectrum of interest representation performed by the representatives. The most common institutional reforms are the establishment of proportional representation and the introduction of special rights of representation for marginalized groups. Proportional representation is considered to be the democratic electoral system *par excellence* because it faithfully mirrors the political preferences of the population. Advocates of pure proportional representation do not see it as a method of generating an efficient parliament, but as a mechanism to achieve an accurate representation of the different political currents within society. Special representational privileges do not occur exclusively but frequently in combination with proportional representation. A comparative perspective distinguishes two kinds. First, a quota for women as a politically disadvantaged social 'group', and second, rights of representation for ethnic minorities. The second kind is particularly frequent in heterogeneous societies. The institutional forms range from creating constituencies favourable for the election of representatives from particular segments of society or reserving a number of seats in the legislature for them (Bellamy, n.d.: 9).



If we look at the parliaments and party systems of young democracies in the Asia-Pacific region, we gain an unfavourable picture of the state of representative democracy. Studies of citizens' attitudes towards parliament and political parties suggest that most young Asian democracies have undergone a profound delegitimization of the organizations and institutions of representative democracy. Parties and parliaments suffer from a wholesale blame for inefficiency, corruption and passivity in legislating, hostility to reform and programmatic indifference. Political parties are primarily seen as representatives of the vested interests of oligarchic groups. Parliaments are perceived as elitist fortresses.<sup>11</sup>

It is therefore unsurprising that intensive discussions have surfaced in some democracies about the best methods of enhancing the accountability of representatives and parties toward their constituencies and broadening the inclusion of social interests. In particular, ways to ensure the increased involvement of marginalized groups and their interests in the parliamentary process have received much attention.

The Philippines has been a pioneer in this field. As early as in 1987, the Philippine legislature was ordered to make parliamentary representation easier for various social groups by establishing a party-list system (see Teehankee, this volume). This reform, employed for the first time in 1998, has been the most far-reaching in Southeast Asia. However, the implementation faces serious technical problems, as Julio Teehankee illustrates in his chapter on electoral politics in the Philippines. In its 1998-2001 form, the party-list system hardly contributes to the integration of the electorate into a strong parliament and to the emergence of strong parties.

The fundamental problems of the Philippine party system remain unsolved; personalism, programmatic weakness and lack of accountability of the established, big parties controlling the parliamentary process are as pervasive as ever. The efficiency and effectiveness of the legislative process have not been increased. On the contrary, the new procedure might aggravate the problems. It individualizes parliamentary work and focuses it even more on the individual representative than the presidential system does anyway. The transparency of parliamentary decision-making could decrease even further.

In contrast, Taiwan has opted for the 'classic' method of special representation of minorities: representatives of the Overseas Chinese Communities are elected to the Yuan from a separate list, and six out of the 164 seats in the legislative assembly are reserved for representatives of indigenous minorities. Bangladesh has chosen yet another variant of special representation. The 300 directly elected representatives allot 30 extra seats in the legislative assembly to women at the beginning of each legislative period.

11. See, for example, the chapters by Teehankee, Sulisty and Croissant in this volume.

But the example of Bangladesh particularly demonstrates the disadvantages of the method. Since the constitution provides for a separate second mode of achieving women's representation, parties are impelled to neglect the selection and nomination of female candidates in the original electoral process. Additionally, the position of the indirectly elected women is undermined by the lack of direct legitimacy. Therefore, they have not yet been able to become equal representatives in parliament. The established parties have so far not used the special representation for women as a device to strengthen the political clout of women, but as a means to buttress the parliamentary distribution of power and as something to barter with in parliamentary bargaining.

Another mechanism has been chosen in South Korea. The law recommends that the political parties maintain a female quota of at least 40 per cent when nominating candidates. However, compliance is not obligatory, and parties face no negative sanctions if they disregard the recommendation. It is therefore not very surprising that when it first took effect during the elections in 2000, no parties came even close to fulfilling the quota. Although the proportion of women in parliament has risen slightly to a new record high, it still remains at the low level of about 10 per cent.

### *Party System*

When discussing the impact of political parties on democratic development, we need to discriminate between different types of parties. Herbert Kitschelt recently proposed a rough classification of political parties that appears helpful when addressing the issue of *young* party systems. Kitschelt distinguishes three ideal-types: programmatic, charismatic and clientelistic parties (1995: 449).

*Programmatic parties* base their work on specific party programmes. They mobilize voters along social cleavages and issues that find explicit articulation in their platforms. The aims and policy proposals outlined in those platforms draw their substantive content from a certain set of ideological values (e.g. conservative, liberal, socialist, communist or religious values) on which the party feeds and develops. The distinctive features of their respective programmes are easily discerned and thus furnish the voter with a normative and material rationale to prefer one party over another. Consequently, programmatic parties offer to the voter real choices between competing programmes so that they represent a credible alternative to authoritarian regimes, where, in comparison, personal choice is highly circumscribed by the lack of programmatic alternatives. Programmatic parties are most apt to create and sustain stable linkages between voters and themselves, since party programmes based on ideological principles and values can only rarely be altered without damaging the vote and office-seeking ambitions of the party elites. Therefore, out of the three different party types, programmatic parties are the most conducive to the consolidation and stability of democratic regimes.

*Charismatic parties* are defined by the leadership of a charismatic person. They deprive their constituency of programmatic choices. Politics is reduced to the personal dimension, and programmatic choice is downgraded to a mere acclamation of the charismatic leader. Another related problem with charismatic authority is its inherent instability, stemming from the fact that the regime's persistence hinges on the (political) survival of one single individual, the charismatic leader.

*Clientelistic parties* also violate fundamental democratic principles and thus hamper the legitimization of any democratic regime. Officially, they act as if they have respect for the rules of the game. During electoral campaigns, for instance, they purport to champion the production of collective goods. In fact, however, they provide personal favours, partisan benefits and services for their loyal clientele. 'Moreover, in countries where clientelistic parties cooperate in dividing up state revenue and jobs as the booty disbursed to their followers, voting appears a superfluous exercise ... Clientelistic parties work around rather than through the stated rules of democratic competition' (Kitschelt, 1995: 450). Hence their behaviour gives rise to cynicism and undermines citizens' trust in democratic institutions.

All three party types, programmatic, charismatic and clientelistic, are ideal types. Despite the fact that actual parties are always hybrids of two or even all three types, we do find a correlation between the degree to which a party adheres to a particular programme and its contribution to democratic stability. If ideology prevails over personalism and clientelism, the party has a positive effect on democratic stability and consolidation. If clientelism and personalism predominate, the opposite is true.

Which types of parties, then, predominate in Asia? If we classify them with the help of the three types outlined above, we gain a clear picture (see Table 14). Among the 11 party systems, only three are dominated by programmatic or programmatic-clientelistic parties and eight have predominantly clientelistic or charismatic parties. The figure underscores that party systems in Asia exhibit a much lower ideological or programmatic orientation than party systems in the Western world. This can be attributed to the collapse of the communist systems on the one hand, and to the stigmatization of fascist ideologies on the other. In cases where we do find strong polarization, such as Bangladesh and Indonesia, this is more the consequence of ethnic strife or of conflict between individual political leaders than between the radical right and the radical left (see Thompson, 2002; Arenhoevel, 2002). And even true ideological polarization can be traced at least partly to those ethnic causes (e.g. in Nepal). The left-right ideological conflict today only occurs in Cambodia and the Philippines, where it persists with moderate intensity. But the picture is even worse since the predominance of charismatic or clientelistic parties goes together with a low degree of institutionalization in most Asian party systems, as attested by high indices of electoral volatility.

The rate of volatility renders an approximate value for its measurement in young democracies. We agree with Leonard Morlino's statement that '[e]lectoral stabilization involves the establishment of relationships between parties and the public and among the parties themselves. [...] The key indicator of stabilization/destabilization in voting behaviour is *total electoral volatility*' (1998: 85). Total electoral volatility (TEV) is the sum of the absolute value of the difference between the percentages of votes cast for each party between two elections (Bartolini and Mair, 1990). In the case of institutionalized party systems, the volatility index records voter vacillation between established parties and thus usually remains at low levels. In contrast, weakly institutionalized party systems usually face high rates of volatility. They not only facilitate volatile voting behaviour, but additionally, the party organizations themselves are in a constant flux, i.e. their very existence is challenged (cf. Mainwaring, 1998; Levitsky, 1998).

Table 14 presents the average total electoral volatility for nine countries. For reasons of systematic comparison, Japan is excluded from the table because it may be assumed that the regular conduct of elections over a long period of time will calm down electoral volatility. For methodological reasons, Indonesia is also excluded because it has conducted only one election in 1999. Two numbers are given for Malaysia and Taiwan. For Malaysia, the figures differentiate two periods. The first value gives the TEV for the period 1955-69, i.e. before emergency rule; the second value gives the volatility rate for the period 1974-99. Table 14 gives the average TEV for Taiwan in the period 1992-2001 and a second number only for 2001 for reasons explained below.

High voter fluctuations indicate that neither party identification nor party organization are well established yet. The highest scores in the regions are found in the Philippines (42.15) and South Korea (32.86), followed by Thailand (28.65). Only in two countries does a low level of volatility indicate a stabilization of party organizations and alliance structures. Not surprisingly, these are Singapore and Malaysia after 1974. However, for the late 1950s and 1960s the data exhibit a high electoral volatility in Malaysia. Although there is no space to examine this interesting finding more closely, we may conclude that high volatility demonstrates the highly unstable political situation of Malaysia leading to the political crisis of 1969. For Taiwan, the difference between the average TEV and the TEV provided for the year 2001 clearly shows that the 2001 legislative election was accompanied by considerable fluidity and increasing uncertainty in mass voting behaviour, and the destabilization of relationships between parties and the public.

Table 14: Party Types and Electoral Volatility in Pacific Asia

Country	Predominant Party Type	Electoral Volatility		No. of Elections Examined
		Average TEV	Degree of TEV <sup>a</sup>	
Bangladesh	Charismatic	15.10	Moderate	2 (1991-96)
Cambodia	Clientelistic-charismatic	25.00	Moderate	2 (1993-98)
Indonesia	Charismatic-clientelistic	-	-	1
Japan	Programmatic-clientelistic	-	-	-
Korea	Charismatic-clientelistic	32.86	High	4 (1988-2000)
Malaysia	Clientelistic-charismatic	28.68	High	4 (1955-69)
		9.94	Low	6 (1964-99)
Nepal	Clientelistic-programmatic	24.90	Moderate	3 (1991-99)
Philippines	Clientelistic	42.15	High	3 (1987-98)
Singapore	Programmatic	10.90	Low	7 (1968-97)
Taiwan	Programmatic-clientelistic	15.75	Moderate	4 (1992-2001)
		28.60	High	1 (2001)
Thailand	Clientelistic-charismatic	28.65	High	4 (1992-2001)
Geometric Mean <sup>b</sup>		23.33	-	-

a. Scores of more than 5 per cent above or below the geometric mean indicate low or high volatility, respectively, scores in between indicate moderate volatility.

b. For computation of geometric mean, both average TEVs for Malaysia were counted; for Taiwan, only the average TEV of 1992-2001 was counted.

Sources: Same as Table 4 and Rigger, 2001.

A close correlation of predominant party type with the level of institutionalization becomes evident. Party systems dominated by clientelistic and/or charismatic parties have greater difficulties with institutionalizing party identifications and organizations than parties with clear programmatic profiles (except Bangladesh). Two reasons help to explain this phenomenon. First, charismatic parties achieve the 'accumulation of political capital' (Pasquino, 1990: 50) primarily by emphasizing the personal attributes and political talents of their leaders. The accumulated capital is contingent on their personality and independent of the party organization. It is a 'mobile' political resource which can easily be transferred to other organizations should the respective leader choose to switch parties. Party organizations based on the charisma of their leadership have to be weakly institutionalized and structurally vulnerable for the sake of retaining power. Second, clientelistic parties often resemble private, patronage networks of individual office-holders and factions. The politicians and factions involved in these clientelistic networks enjoy a great deal of independence from the national party organization since they generate their own resources and bases of supports. Individual groups or politicians within a party are less inclined to comply with party discipline so that their behaviour brings a certain corrosive effect to bear on the party structure.

The presented empirical evidence poses one question: Is a change of the electoral system an apt means to influence the formation of parties? There are at least three arguments for and two against this assumption. First, the conclusion that party systems would evolve differently if institutional engineering of the type of electoral system were to be applied to them is neither logically cogent nor empirically verifiable. Moreover, the connection of the predominant type of party and the electoral system is statistically not sufficiently robust. It remains to be clarified whether or not it depends on a third, intervening variable (e.g. a democracy's age, or the existence of strong social polarization). Various other factors affect their evolution as well: mode and path of transition, historical party roots, traditional patterns of social stratification, cleavage structure and other central institutions (cf. Merkel, 1997b).

Second, the historical dimension of party systems is, of course, also just a product of traditional patterns of social, economic and cultural variables manifested in the cleavage structure. Several studies on South Korea, for instance, demonstrate that the absence of ideological right-left cleavages in South Korean society explains the lack of incentives for political parties to pursue more programme-based policies (cf. Croissant, this volume). In Bangladesh, on the other hand, the salience of ethnic, religious and even dynastic conflicts between the country's leading political clans covers the division between the economically privileged and the underprivileged almost entirely. Numerous studies on Thailand and the Philippines agree that the reasons for the marginal significance of political programmes lie in the combined effect of several institutional factors and socio-economic conditions, the essential structure of which can be outlined as follows. In both countries, rural areas elect the larger share of mandates. Poverty and extreme income inequality, traditional social structures and bad living conditions constitute strong incentives for the voters to view their votes not as a means to influence political decisions but as a commercial good to be sold to the highest bidder. Similarly, elected politicians are not seen as representatives of political interests but as distributors of state resources.

Informal social institutions co-ordinating the interaction between the *political sphere* and the rest of society form the link between socio-economic structures, citizens' voting behaviour and candidates' campaigning behaviour. They can be subsumed under the concept of clientelism or patron-client relationships. Such personalized relationships offer limited economic and social security to rural voters, and they represent a key device for incorporating the rural population into the political process. But at the same time, they hamper the formation of alternative, modern and generalized modes of interest representation due to their personalistic orientation (Sidel, 1999; McVey, 2000). Compared to the benefits afforded by the clientelistic relationship, which are directly experienced and attributed to specific individuals or groups by the recipients, programmatic engagement becomes quite unattractive for candidates

and representatives. The strategy they pursue is to fulfil their constituency's immediate and particular expectations. This kind of electoral market provides strong incentives for candidates and parties to satisfy the short-term, material expectations of local constituencies instead of adopting long-term programmes for producing collective goods.

Cultural norms, social cleavages and patterns of social stratification elude short-term changes achieved by institutional engineering. Consequently, a change of the type of electoral system would most likely have an effect on the party system in the medium-term. Although the impact of electoral systems on party systems is hedged in by the various factors mentioned above, three reasons suggest that proportional representation offers better conditions for creating a system of stable programmatic parties than a plurality system.

Firstly, plurality systems in single-member or small electoral districts are '*candidate-centred electoral systems*' (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987). They stimulate competition between individual candidates, not parties. Parliamentary representatives are generally more inclined to gain reputations as representatives of local interests and to promote the particular interests of their respective constituencies than to adhere to well defined party programmes. Their main task, therefore, consists of securing and distributing private (particular) goods (cf. Shugart, 1999; Carey, 2000a: 240; Carey, 2000b). Since they judge their political survival to be less a matter of policy-oriented action than of satisfying particular interests, they are not inclined to delegate much political power to party leaders. On the contrary, representatives commonly oppose the enforcement of strict party discipline and pursue grab-and-run strategies that aim at the short-term maximum of private goods for their voter clienteles (Cox and Morgenstern, 2002). The consequence is not only an acute underproduction of collective goods, but also a party system with permanent deficits in terms of programmatic content. Proportional representation, on the other hand, is a *party-centred electoral system*. Candidates' prospects of electoral success depend on their parties' organizational strength, their ability to run good campaigns and their programme's attractiveness. Proportional representation enables party elites to enforce compliance with their programme much more easily than plurality systems because they often decide who is going to be on the party list.

Secondly, plurality systems have a 'mechanical effect' (Duverger, 1964) on the party system which manifests itself in a process of party concentration towards a two-party system. As a result, the number of heterogeneous coalition or electoral parties in party systems dominated by charismatic or clientelistic parties usually increases. This contributes to candidates' individualistic and party-adverse attitudes, and it further undermines the ability of the party leadership to punish or reward individual representatives. We can see that the party's programmatic indifference and the candidates' loose loyalties to the

party programme are two sides of one and the same coin. Candidates and representatives therefore frequently put their party affiliation in doubt, as evidenced by the ease with which they abandon one party and join another with the intention of gaining new or securing existent political support and protection. In contrast, proportional representation can also set off a process of party concentration, because no actual electoral system can provide for a one-to-one conversion of votes into political mandates and many proportional systems have certain minimal percentage thresholds which have to be overcome by parties in order to be considered in the distribution of parliamentary seats. However, the 'mechanical' concentration effect tends to be weaker and the prospects of electoral success for small parties higher. The psychological effects change accordingly; proportional representation offers more incentives and entails less risk for voting for small and new parties.

Thirdly, as already mentioned, electoral systems also produce a 'psychological effect'. The 'psychological effect' of plurality systems further amplifies the mechanical effect. Voters quickly realize that they waste their ballot by casting it for a programmatic party that lacks any chance of winning a particular district's majority. As 'rational voters' (Downs, 1968), they will either abstain from voting or make their cross for one of the big parties. The political factor equally affects the supply side of political competition. Instead of wasting their resources by running as non-performing third-party candidates, politicians will join larger parties to improve their electoral prospects. More proportionally organized electoral systems offer small and new parties better opportunities for successful competition than plurality systems, which favour big parties and incumbents. Proportional representation thus exposes established parties to more competitive pressure and forces them to develop programmatic answers to new voter demands.

Although these three arguments may support the assumption that proportional representation is more likely than a plurality system to shift the development away from personalistic toward programmatic parties, some may argue, notwithstanding, that proportional representation increases the fragmentation of the party system, and that it (indirectly) leads to a political factionalization within parliament. But these objections chiefly address the unrestrained proportional representation as it exists in Indonesia today and as it was in Germany during the Weimar Republic, in Italy from 1948 to 1993 and in Poland between 1990 and 1992. This negative side may be neutralized by the introduction of legal thresholds of exclusion or a combination of proportional representation elements and plurality components. If the threshold is set at a sufficiently high level, it averts party fragmentation quite effectively. Proportional representation 'moderated' in this respect helps to rationalize the party system and facilitates government formation.



### *Reform of Government Systems*

Some authors also discuss far-reaching reforms of the government system (see the chapters on the Philippines, Indonesia and South Korea). While Julio Teehankee shows some sympathy for the idea of introducing a parliamentary system in the Philippines, Hermawan Sulistyono strongly recommends a 'rationalization' of the constitutional separation of powers that would establish a presidential system instead of the current semi-presidential system.

Before discussing this subject in detail, we have to clarify its terminological and conceptual nature, i.e. we have to establish a clear understanding of what we mean when speaking about presidential, parliamentary or 'semi-presidential' systems. There is a widespread consensus in political science that democratic governments can be classified according to the relations between the parliamentary assembly, the government and the head of state. The distinction of parliamentary and presidential systems is fundamental. It found its first expression in Walter Bagehot's comparison of constitutional practice in the British and American political systems in the late nineteenth century. Current studies, however, generally employ more sophisticated classifications, because the simple dichotomy of parliamentary and presidential systems does not hold equally for all governments. Above all, the classification of 'semi-presidential systems' (Duverger, 1980) is controversial. They are characterized by a 'double-headed executive' consisting of a president and a cabinet. The (directly elected) president holds considerable executive and legislative powers, but he shares them with a prime minister and the cabinet.

The most cogent and sophisticated typology was proposed by Matthew Shugart and John Carey (1992). It includes several other variables next to the power of dismissal, namely the power of parliament to check the government, the president's power to dissolve parliament, the president's power to dismiss the prime minister and the cabinet, presidential policy prerogatives and the president's power to nominate and appoint the government. Together, these criteria render a list of five different forms of government.

1. A *presidential system* involves a direct or direct-like popular election of the president and a fixed time limit both to his incumbency and to the parliamentary term. The parliament and the president are independent of each other, and the president can fill cabinet posts at will. The president furthermore has certain, constitutionally granted powers in the legislative process (e.g. the United States of America).
2. In a *presidential-parliamentary system*, the mode of the presidential election is identical. The president gains office via a direct or direct-like popular election. The term of incumbency is fixed. The president can dissolve the parliament, or has some legislative powers, or both. The constitutional provisions creating the double-headed executive grant the president the power to

appoint and dismiss individual cabinet members. Parliament too can remove cabinet members, including the prime minister, from office by means of a vote of no confidence (e.g. the Russian Federation; the German Weimar Republic 1919-1933).

3. The *premier-presidential system* also provides for a direct or direct-like popular election of the president with a fixed term of office. The president holds considerable executive powers, which he shares with a prime minister and a cabinet. He, in turn, depends on the parliament's confidence and cannot be dismissed by the president against the parliament's will. In contrast to presidential-parliamentary systems, the president is not necessarily the head of government. He shares power with a prime minister, and does not necessarily have legislative powers (e.g. Portugal before 1982; Austria).

Presidential-parliamentary and premier-presidential systems build together the group of 'semi-presidential' systems in the sense that they mix elements of presidential and parliamentary systems without the structural and functional logic of one type dominating (cf. Sartori, 1994).

4. In a *parliamentary system* the parliament is sovereign in appointing and dismissing the government. The directly or indirectly elected head of state has no significant legislative powers, nor can he form a government autonomously, nor dissolve the parliament for political reasons (e.g. the Federal Republic of Germany; the United Kingdom).
5. An *assembly-independent government* is elected indirectly by the assembly for a fixed period of time. The government may not dissolve the assembly, but it has legislative powers. During its term it does not depend on the parliament's confidence. The president, who is also elected by the assembly, holds no autonomous prerogatives vis-à-vis the government (e.g. Switzerland; Micronesia).

Comparative government and party research advances four main hypotheses about the relationship of the type of government and the configuration of the party system:

1. Presidential systems, as a rule, give institutional incentives to the emergence of loosely structured *electoral parties*, while parliamentary systems tend to produce well-organized parties and rather cohesive parliamentary groups. The power to dismiss governments, held by the parliament in parliamentary systems, entails the parliament's power to appoint the executive. Due to the power of parliament to appoint and remove the executive, both institutions are highly interlocked. The executive, and particularly the head of the executive, can exert strong control over the parliamentary majority by means of a disciplined parliamentary group (Steffani, 1995; 1997). A comparable influence is hardly conceivable in a presidential system, where discipline within the

several parliamentary groups is relatively low, and parliaments therefore characteristically display certain trends towards volatility in supporting the government. Party discipline in parliamentary systems, in comparison, tends to be high, as it is often strictly controlled and enforced by the party leadership. Whereas parliaments in presidential systems are primarily legislative assemblies, with a special emphasis on the power of the purse, parliaments in parliamentary systems are mostly centres of cabinet formation that can remove the executive from power if they succeed in mobilizing the necessary majority in parliament. It is one major task of the governing party's leadership to prevent such defection. Accordingly, it is the central function of parties in parliamentary systems to install governments and supply them with lasting support. As a result, this form of government is strongly conducive to the emergence of disciplined 'programme parties', which offer coherent party programmes and a cohesive organizational structure. The mutual independence of government and parliament renders the fulfilment of such a function by any party in presidential systems superfluous. Instead, parties here serve to supply presidential candidates with support during their race for office ('electoral machines'). Once election day is over, parties do not feel responsible for the presidents' political fate in the same way as in parliamentary systems. This holds particularly true for parliamentary parties and individual representatives who are mainly concerned with legislation and controlling government action. A presidential system works notwithstanding the lack of stable parliamentary majorities, since it is offset by the relative ease with which ad hoc coalitions are built. Neither the rigorous enforcement of party discipline nor a unified opposition are necessary conditions for a presidential system. Hence it facilitates the emergence of *electoral parties* and members of parliament who direct most of their attention to the legislative process.

2. Presidential systems tend to engender parties with personalistic or clientelistic-charismatic identities, while parliamentary systems generally give rise to programmatic parties. Either form of government has a characteristic impact on the structure of parties and their actions (cf. Truman, 1953: 264), which in turn has a particularly salient impact on the prevalent strategies of integration and mobilization employed by parties. The loose party structures in combination with the focus of political conflict on the presidency further amplify the personalistic character of political competition in presidential systems. It is not uncommon for politicians to find additional political support in structures outside their own parties. It does not follow, though, that parties in presidential systems lack any ideological core or substantive programme, nor is their ideology necessarily eclectic or populist. But their purpose in presidential systems is limited in scope: they serve as 'electoral machines' that seek to gain the highest possible number of political offices. Rarely is their structure very complex, and it usually does not go beyond a constituency recruited on the basis of clientelistic relations. Candidates' prospects of winning the elections largely depend on their individual ability to tap resources and mobilize support.

3. Presidential systems obstruct the institutionalization of parties. The loose party structures result in frequent restructuring of the party system. These restructurings may occur before presidential elections if they are believed to improve a candidate's position in the electoral race. Depending on the electoral system, such developments either contribute to the party system's fragmentation (plurality system) or diminish it (majority system). More often, however, reorganizations take place after the elections. Due to the loose party structure and the low cohesion of representatives to their parties, presidential systems regularly witness the switching of party membership by representatives, which usually occurs in an 'upward fashion': the representative leaves the defeated party to join the ranks of the successful one. Accordingly, presidential and presidential-parliamentary systems frequently induce reductions in fragmentation of parliamentary parties in the aftermath of presidential elections, mostly due to clientelistic, personalistic and opportunistic motives. But the observed effects tend not to be of a lasting nature. Ideological bonds normally prove too weak to prevent the erosion of the newly formed coalition parties in the forerun to the next elections and a new party realignment takes place. Hence presidential systems display high rates of volatility too.

4. In young democracies, presidential systems entail a tendency to polarize the competition between parties (Linz, 1994; Ackerman, 2000). The presidency is the highest prize to be won in the political game. The concentration of political power in this office impels parties to focus almost all their efforts on the presidency. As a consequence, presidential elections, as perceived by political parties, take on the character of final judgments over the winners and losers of the political game. The winner-takes-all principle apparently pushes young democracies towards increased polarization of the political competition, which then easily turns into a zero-sum game. Confrontational, perceptual and behavioural dispositions are reinforced and the risks of social polarization are increased.

We can sum up these considerations with the proposition that each form of government both engenders and requires a specific type of party system. Each one relies on different functional inputs from the involved party system, stimulates the candidates to develop specific political qualities and offers distinct kinds of institutional incentives to political elites. Presidential systems, for instance, amplify tendencies towards party systems that exhibit low levels of programmatic content and institutionalization. In young democracies they furthermore increase the polarization of party systems. Parliamentary systems, on the other hand, encourage parties to strive for higher levels of institutionalization. They usually result in more programmatic parties and more stable party systems.

These tendencies should also be understood as structural responses to the specific functional needs and institutional incentives of each type of government.

In order to be able to avoid institutional gridlock between congress and the president in the case of competing majorities, presidential systems must rely on flexible party systems, unbound by prescriptive programmes or rigid structures. The satisfactory performance of this function requires that fragmentation and polarization of the party system is low. In comparison, the proper functioning of parliamentary systems depends on cohesive and well-institutionalized parties that have the ability to form durable coalitions and effective governments. Their performance too is enhanced by low fragmentation and polarization.

The classical cases of British parliamentarism and American presidentialism seem to underline this. Both models took shape by evolution rather than intentional design (Sartori, 1994), and in Westminster as well as in Washington, the type of government had crystallized before definite parties and the structure of today's party systems emerged. We argue that in both cases the party system adapted itself to the functional needs of government institutions. Political actors, with a certain time lag, reacted to institutional developments by 'inventing' 'appropriate' types of parties.

If we classify the existing governments in Pacific Asia according to their constitutions, we obtain a clear picture (see Table 15). Out of the 11 governments included, seven are parliamentary systems, compared to three presidential-parliamentary systems and one presidential system, characterized by president-dominated executives. Only the Philippines is purely presidential in terms of its constitution, but political reality makes South Korea a presidential system, too (Croissant, 1998). In contrast to other world regions where presidential and semi-presidential systems dominate (i.e. Latin America and Eastern Europe) parliamentary systems dominate Pacific Asia's constitutional landscape.

For the most part, a historical trait is visible. Almost all former colonies install the respective government of their former colonizers, i.e. the British Westminster parliamentarism or the French parliamentary system of the Third and Fourth Republic (1871-1959), with Indonesia being the only exception.

In cases where young democracies could draw from earlier democratic experiences, they usually reinstated the former system with slight modifications, as happened in the Philippines. South Korea and Indonesia, however, retained the systems they inherited from their authoritarian past, despite a brief interim period of parliamentarism during the short democratic period between 1960 and 1961 (South Korea). The Kuomintang simply transferred the Kuomintang regime from the Chinese mainland to the island of Taiwan in 1949. It remained in place, notwithstanding various profound constitutional reforms during the 1990s (Tien and Chu, 1998; Chao and Myers, 1998). Thailand and Japan are exceptions since they never were colonies. Nevertheless, they have developed their very own constitutional traditions, of which parliamentarism is a crucial element.

Table 15: Type of Government

<b>Country</b>	<b>Type of Government</b>	<b>Constitutional Heritage</b>	<b>Dominating Party Type</b>
Bangladesh	Parliamentary	British	Charismatic
Cambodia	Parliamentary	French	Clientelistic-charismatic
Indonesia	Presidential-parliamentary <sup>a</sup>	Dutch	Charismatic-clientelistic
Japan	Parliamentary	Indigenous (with Prussian and US legal traditions)	Programmatic-clientelistic
S. Korea	Presidential-parliamentary	Japanese (with Prussian and Anglo-Saxon legal influences)	Charismatic-clientelistic
Malaysia	Parliamentary	British	Clientelistic-charismatic
Nepal	Parliamentary	British	Clientelistic-programmatic
Philippines	Presidential	American	Clientelistic
Singapore	Parliamentary	British	Programmatic
Taiwan	Presidential-parliamentary	Indigenous (with French and Prussian legal influences)	Programmatic-clientelistic
Thailand	Parliamentary	Indigenous (with strong British influence)	Clientelistic-charismatic

a. Semi-presidential according to Garredo (2000), although the president is assembly-elected.  
Sources: Classifications according to Croissant and Merkel, 2001; Croissant, 2002a; Garredo, 2000 and Table 12.

Historical continuities again attest to the path-dependency of institutional development. Once a particular institutional path has been taken, it appears to acquire some sort of resistance to further change if it is not disrupted at an early stage, as happened to the East European states of the inter-war period. This hypothesis concerning institutional inertia is sustained by the fact that most of all new democracies emerged in the late quarter of the twentieth century. Only a handful (i.e. Greece, Portugal, Belarus and the Ukraine) switched to another type of government after democratization. None of these changes involved a transition from a parliamentary to a presidential system, or vice versa (see Croissant and Merkel, 2001). Moreover, these empirical findings are not weakened even by examining more thoroughly the presidential status in presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary systems. Although further constitutional reforms did occur, especially in Eastern Europe, they mostly

served to fortify the already dominant position of either the president in relation to the parliament, or, conversely, the parliament compared to the president<sup>12</sup> (Garredo, 2000). It follows from the above that radical institutional reforms like a change of government are extremely difficult and 'costly' to carry out and hence extremely rare in 'normal times'. Only revolutionary changes may offer a window of opportunity to instigate them (e.g. Germany in 1949, France in 1958; 1989 onwards in Eastern Europe).

The illustration in Table 15 shows that there is no clear correlation between the government system and the dominant type of political party in Asia. Also the hypothesis explicated above sounds plausible and may be valid in comparative, interregional big number examinations, but it does not tell us much about the development of political parties in Pacific Asia. This contradicts the hope that party politics would evolve differently if the constitutional engineering of the type of government were to be applied to them. Also the implicit assumption that a change in the type of government can be combined with a *tabula rasa* of the party system is not very plausible. The dilemma is that a newly institutionalized government system must work in combination with the same old party system. While a number of institutional arrangements, such as the competition between president and congress, the president's legislative powers and the mutual independence of parliament and executive, draw at least certain boundaries for the practices of clientelistic parties in a presidential system, parliamentary systems lack these checks and balances. As I have argued earlier, a parliamentary system must rely on a party system that is able to sustain that form of government. This, in turn, presupposes the organizational stability, internal cohesion and ideological coherence of parties. It is not sufficient for parties to be powerful enough to install a government – they also need to be stable and coherent enough to maintain it. But it is precisely the organizationally unstable, volatile party systems, marked by clientelism and personalism, that are too weak, too fragmented and too deficient in authority to change and lead the government towards a responsible party government.

A very different assumption therefore gains plausibility. Establishing a parliamentary system without creating simultaneously the corresponding parties is likely to intensify rather than attenuate phenomena like cronyism, short-term policy planning, the management of ad hoc coalitions by the government and a deficient orientation to the collective good. The obstacles to efficient and responsible government are thereby further exacerbated. Matthew Shugart (1999) wields this argument in his advocacy of presidential systems, claiming that they are the best among bad options for young democracies with a party system inapt for parliamentarism. Therefore countries like the Philippines or Indonesia are well advised to reconsider any proposal for a change in the form of government, and to question whether a new system really can work 'better' when it has to keep the old style of party politics.

12. One of the few exceptions is Poland.

## Conclusion

This final chapter deals with the assumption that elections are an instrument for democracy. The functionality of this instrument depends, among others, on the electoral system. Conventional wisdom is that there is a trade-off between the quality and the effectiveness of democratic government. On the one hand, proportional representation systems may be accurate in terms of representation and contribute to the political and social inclusiveness of democratic institutions. The higher fragmentation of the party system, however, slows down decision-making, has a negative bearing on institutional efficiency and hampers the formation of stable cabinets, which, in turn, influences negatively the effectiveness of democratic institutions. On the other hand, conventional wisdom maintains that single-party cabinets, typically produced by plurality or majority elections, are more decisive and hence promote efficient decision-making and more effective policy-making. The conclusion drawn from conventional wisdom is that while proportional representation systems allow for more representative government, this representativeness is at the expense of effective government. Plurality and majority systems allow for more effective majority formation, but this effectiveness is at the expense of representative government. While democracies can compensate for deficiencies in representativeness, at least in the long-run, since majority and minority alternate, a lack of effectiveness may become fatal for democracy as it cannot be compensated for. Therefore conventional wisdom concludes that democracy has to give a higher priority to the principle of effectiveness than to representativeness.

This analysis does not support conventional wisdom. Concerning the advantages and disadvantages of plurality or proportional systems the conclusion that has to be drawn from this analysis is the following: there is no conclusive picture about what is 'better'. The analysis has shown that the dichotomy of proportional representation versus plurality and majority systems is not very useful for the explanation of different degrees of inclusiveness, efficiency and effectiveness of political institutions. Electoral systems with plurality formula create very different political outcomes with regard to these functional imperatives of democratic institutions. While in some cases (Singapore, Malaysia, Bangladesh) plurality systems in single-member constituencies and multi-member constituencies indeed support the rationalization of the party system and efficient cabinet formation, they do not in others, e.g. in Nepal, Thailand (before 2001) and the Philippines. And the high degree of electoral disproportionality of Malaysia and Singapore's electoral systems heavily violates the fairness principle.

In contrast, proportional representation in Indonesia has a good record in representativeness, but obviously hampers the formation of political majorities in parliament. Segmented systems like those in Taiwan and Japan (until 1994)



contribute considerably to the 'rationalization' of the party system, so that the requirement of social inclusion is not neglected, while at the same time the formation of stable governments is promoted. They are the better option compared to single-member constituency plurality systems like that in Nepal and multi-member constituency plurality systems like that in Thailand (before 2001). This result supports the conclusion other authors draw from comparative examinations of the political consequences of electoral systems. Shugart and Wattenberg (2001), for instance, draw the conclusion that 'mixed systems' may be superior to plurality systems in single-member constituencies or multi-member constituencies and to pure proportional representation systems with regard to their record of political representativeness and integration. Therefore, the authors conclude that 'mixed systems', that is electoral systems combining elements of plurality and proportional representation, are the best of all (electoral) worlds.

This conclusion may be overdrawn. However, the lesson that can be learned from comparative analysis is that plurality systems in the form of segmented systems do not necessarily create a trade-off between social inclusion on the one hand and political efficiency on the other, as the cases of Taiwan, Japan and, to a lesser degree, Korea show. On the other hand, the choice of a plurality system does not guarantee efficient formation of governments and cabinet stability. Pure proportional representation systems (Indonesia) pay a high price for representativeness. In order to balance representativeness and integration more aptly, countries like Indonesia, Nepal, Singapore, Malaysia and even Cambodia may be well-advised to modify their electoral systems and to introduce some form of 'mixed' or segmented system.

However, the studies in this volume do point to the need to take other influences into account. Social cleavages, institutional characteristics of the party system and the type of government system mediate and sometimes even contradict the effects of electoral systems. The electoral system alone cannot perform the task of developing representative and effective governments, or political institutions which fulfil the requirements of social inclusion, political efficiency and political effectiveness. As we state at the beginning of this book, any judgement about the influence of electoral systems on democratic governance, democratic consolidation and democratic politics in general has to take the broader institutional architecture of democracy as well as the social fabric into account. The question of how to reform political institutions to improve the chances of consolidation in new democracies cannot be addressed adequately when the electoral system is discussed without looking carefully at other elements of the political system.

Two points merit particular emphasis: the party system and the form of government. Representative democracies need to rely on a system of consolidated and responsive parties with a firm base in society in order to fulfil

the representative function of democracy and to secure its governability. But if we look at the development of party systems in Asia's young democracies from a comparative view, we come to a rather sceptical conclusion. In many countries in the region where democracies have emerged, neither truly responsible and representative democracies, nor consolidated and responsive party systems are established yet. The question of how to reinforce those parties and party systems that promote democracy is still of crucial importance for most young democracies. One of our core arguments has been that each of the different government types favours the emergence of a specific party system. A presidential system appears to hinder the development of stable, well-institutionalized, programmatic, weakly polarized party systems, while a parliamentary system seems to favour them. There are theoretical reasons and empirical facts to believe that institutions, once they have been created by intentional or have emerged by unintentional economic, political and cultural interaction, have a significant impact on political organizations, such as parties and interest groups. But party systems in young democracies have been and are being shaped by many different factors. Historical factors (path dependency) as well as societal (cleavage structure) and institutional factors (electoral system) are among the most important ones. Many different economic, social, cultural and political factors leave their impact on the specific type of parties and party systems. Anybody asking whether or when to choose which kind of institutional reform to support democratic consolidation must bear this in mind. Institutional engineering is possible, but it has its limitations precisely in these factors.

For these reasons, it is a risky, if not inappropriate choice to switch from a presidential to a parliamentary type of government or vice versa in order to 'engineer' more programmatic, responsive (electorate) and responsible (collective goods) parties. An effective government requires compatible parties; this holds true for presidential as well as parliamentary systems. Again there are theoretical and empirical reasons to assume that a switch from presidential governments to parliamentary systems in order to 'engineer' programmatic and non-clientelistic parties runs the risk of a 'constitutional fallacy' and the trap of 'hyperrationality'. Such a constitutional reform does not take into account the non-simultaneous time horizons: the consolidation of a party system takes much longer than the establishment of the constitutional structures. Once the new parliamentary government has been introduced, it has to cope, at least for a certain period of time, with the old, fragmented, clientelistic and irresponsible parties, which would not be able to create a strong and stable government. In such a situation the governability of the country would be less secure than under the old presidential system, where the prerogatives of the president could secure governability at least, even in the absence of strong and consolidated parties. When institutional reformers fail to recognize this, the reforms aggravate rather than mitigate the problems of consolidation and democratic governance. Incrementalism appears to be the most promising reform path.

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