The Treaty of Warsaw: The Warsaw Pact Context

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The standard Cold-War era narrative of the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Warsaw of December 1970 is quite simple. The Polish communists feared that a resurgent West Germany, which refused to recognize the postwar Polish-German border, the Oder-Neisse line, would one day seek to revise it by force. Fearful for Poland’s security, they demanded that the FRG and the West in general recognize the border as permanent. Finally, after nineteen years of waiting on the Polish side, West German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, in his capacity as Chairman of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), proposed in March 1968 that Bonn “respect or otherwise recognize” the Oder-Neisse Line until a final German peace treaty. In response, on May 17, 1969, Poland’s communist leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, offered to negotiate an agreement in which Bonn would recognize the border. After Brandt’s election to the chancellorship in the fall of 1969, Bonn and Warsaw entered negotiations. The result was Bonn’s de facto recognition of the Oder-Neisse line in the Treaty of Warsaw of December 1970.

This traditional portrait of the origins of the Warsaw Treaty is accurate to the extent that it underlines both communist Poland’s fears of a West German threat to its borders and the significance of the break between Brandt’s Ostpolitik and previous West German policy towards Poland. Research using newly opened Polish and East German sources suggests, however, that this portrayal is inaccurate for two major reasons. First, Poland was not a passive actor waiting for Bonn’s recognition. In fact, it was Poland, more than the GDR, that successfully blocked any substantial improvement in relations between the Soviet bloc and Bonn from 1967 to 1969. When Gomulka finally decided to open up to Bonn in 1969, he entered into a running conflict with the Soviet Union and the GDR over whose interests were to take priority in negotiations with the West Germans. Second, the traditional narrative suggests that the only factor affecting Poland’s decision to enter into negotiations with Bonn was Brandt’s offer. Available sources, however, suggest that it was not Brandt’s offer, but changes within the Warsaw Pact—specifically, the openness of Moscow and East Berlin to negotiations with West Germany—that led Gomulka to break down and respond to Brandt’s offer.

My essay will focus on Gomulka’s offer in May 1969 to enter into negotiations with Bonn, the offer that culminated in the Treaty of Warsaw.
of December 1970. Gomulka’s opening to Bonn, I will argue, was determined more by the inner dynamics of the Warsaw Pact than any epiphany on his part with regard to West Germany. Specifically, the GDR’s unwillingness to serve as a buffer against German unification, along with Moscow’s failure to compel it to do so, led Gomulka to make his historic opening to Bonn. Only the utter failure of Gomulka’s hard line towards Bonn within the Warsaw Pact led him to seek improved relations with Bonn.

To understand why Gomulka looked increasingly to the GDR as a buffer state in the mid-1960s, one must begin with the Soviet Union—specifically, the way in which Moscow’s actions undermined his German policy goals. Gomulka’s greatest concern was the security of Poland’s western border, the Oder-Neisse Line. He not only sought Western recognition of the border, delineated at Potsdam, but he also opposed any changes in the East-West balance that might threaten it and encourage German reunification.² A third priority for Gomulka, closely related to the other two, was to prevent any German-Soviet deal at Poland’s expense. The Polish leader suffered from a “Rapallo complex” and was paranoid about any Soviet negotiations with the West Germans.³

A turning point came during Khrushchev’s last year in power, 1963–4. As Sino-Soviet tensions mounted, Khrushchev spoke more and more about the possibility of a “new Rapallo” with the FRG.⁴ That is, he sought to reduce tensions on Moscow’s European front in order to have a free hand for dealing with China.⁵ During a visit to the FRG in the summer of 1964, Khrushchev’s son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubei, suggested to West German officials that Moscow was no longer opposed to West German access to nuclear weapons, that concessions could be made at the GDR’s expense, and that the Polish border could be revised at some future date.⁶ Polish intelligence succeeded in taping some of Adzhubei’s private conversations, and Gomulka provided Khrushchev’s opponents in Moscow with a transcript. The transcript was used to discredit Khrushchev and to help justify his removal in October 1964.⁷

Although the new Soviet leaders, Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin, openly broke with Khrushchev’s policy, Gomulka knew that the geopolitical temptation to reach an accommodation with Bonn still remained as the Sino-Soviet rift escalated.⁸ How could Gomulka prevent or forestall a Soviet-West German accommodation, help preserve Germany’s division, and further secure Poland’s western border, the Oder-Neisse Line? It was at this point that Gomulka turned to the GDR. He sought to foster a special relationship with the GDR based on common opposition to Soviet concessions to West Germany, for he knew that the East Germans had also opposed Khrushchev’s Rapallo policy.⁹ This was no easy matter. Gomulka and the GDR’s communist leader, Walter Ul-
bricht, strongly disliked each other, and they had frequently argued in the past over domestic and foreign policy. The GDR itself had only reluctantly recognized the Oder-Neisse Line in 1950, under pressure from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the shock of Khrushchev’s Rapallo policy led Ulbricht to reconsider the GDR’s relations with Poland, and there was a warming trend from 1964 to 1966. Ulbricht praised the Polish communists for limiting their economic and political contacts with West Germany and for calling on Bonn to recognize the GDR. 10

Gomulka, however, wanted more from the East Germans. Since the Berlin Crisis, he had insisted that the GDR integrate itself economically with the Soviet bloc. He wanted the GDR to be bound economically to these countries in the same way that the FRG was bound to the European Economic Community. The GDR’s economic integration with the Soviet bloc would not only help Poland raise its productivity and standard of living through new technology, but it would also help maintain Germany’s division. 11 Gomulka’s opposition to German reunification also led him to oppose the GDR’s various proposals for German unity, including the SED’s proposed exchange of speakers with the West German Social Democrats (SPD) in 1966. 12 Gomulka worried that a wave of nationalism might one day spark German reunification, which would be a threat to Poland’s western border. In general, the Polish leader favored Abgrenzung between the two German states long before it became an issue in Moscow and East Berlin.

Although Ulbricht praised Poland’s increasingly hard line towards West Germany, he was not willing to take the measures Gomulka sought. In 1965, he vetoed a program for closer economic cooperation with Poland because it conflicted with the GDR’s ambitious economic goals under the “New Economic System” (Neues ökonomisches System, or NÖS), Ulbricht’s project to transform the GDR into a leading economic power.13 He also proved reluctant to discard East German slogans favoring German unification, lest the West Germans gain a propaganda advantage. Only a second major crisis in the Warsaw Pact’s German policy led Ulbricht to reconsider the GDR’s relations with Poland.14 The crisis came in 1966–7 in the form of Bonn’s “new Ostpolitik.” The FRG offered to conclude renunciation of force agreements with all the Warsaw Pact states, except the GDR, and then it revised the Hallstein Doctrine to permit diplomatic relations with the GDR’s allies. Bonn refused, however, to recognize either the GDR or the Oder-Neisse Line. As the other East European states rushed to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn, Poland and the GDR faced the prospect of isolation within their own alliance.15 The Soviet Union, for its part, offered to negotiate with Bonn over renunciation of force and did not oppose diplomatic relations between the socialist states and West Germany.16 Only Gomulka’s forceful inter-
vention with Brezhnev led the Warsaw Pact to impose three conditions on diplomatic relations with the FRG in February 1967: Bonn’s recognition of the GDR, its recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line, and its renunciation of access to nuclear weapons in any form. In response to Gomulka’s successful intervention, a grateful Ulbricht finally agreed in principle to wide-ranging economic cooperation with Poland. In the spring of 1967, Poland, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia signed a series of friendship treaties—dubbed the “iron triangle” in the West—that reaffirmed the Warsaw Pact’s hard line towards Bonn. On the eve of signing the Polish-East German friendship treaty, Ulbricht committed the GDR to closer economic cooperation with Poland in all areas, including semiconductors and computers. He told Gomulka that the GDR was “removing German unification from the international agenda.” The Soviet Union, for its part, agreed to enforce the Warsaw Pact prohibition on diplomatic relations with Bonn until the FRG recognized the GDR and the Oder-Neisse Line.

In the spring of 1967, Gomulka was at the height of his influence within the Soviet bloc. He had succeeded in making recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line a precondition for diplomatic relations with Bonn. The Soviet Union, it seemed, had returned to a hard line towards West Germany: there would be no deals with the FRG at Poland’s expense. Most importantly, the GDR had agreed to further separate itself from West Germany and to enter into closer economic cooperation with Poland and its Eastern bloc neighbors. For Gomulka, this was the key to preventing German unification. By the end of 1967, however, Gomulka’s arrangements collapsed. The cause was not the smaller Warsaw Pact states, but the GDR and the Soviet Union.

The first blow came in the fall of 1967. Although Ulbricht had every intention of improving economic relations with Poland, he failed to do so. During the summer of 1967, under his orders, the GDR’s vice premier, Julius Balkow, negotiated a far-reaching agreement on economic cooperation with Poland. East German Premier Willi Stoph approved the agreement and invited his Polish counterpart, Jozef Cyrankiewicz, to East Berlin to sign it. Problems arose, however, when the final draft crossed the desk of Günter Mittag, Ulbricht’s main architect for the NÖS. The agreement, Mittag concluded, did not conform to NÖS criteria and was of questionable economic benefit to the GDR. Ulbricht, forced to choose between cooperation with Poland and his pet project, NÖS, chose the latter. Poland rejected a series of revisions proposed by the GDR; Mittag’s office had gone so far as to remove a passage calling for a “higher stage” of cooperation with Poland. At the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the October Revolution in Moscow in November 1967, a bitter confron-
tation ensued. Gomulka allegedly yelled at Ulbricht, “Why don’t you buy our industrial products—you treat us like a colony (Hinterland)!” Ulbricht allegedly snapped back, “Because you Poles produce such shit!” Relations between Poland and East Germany entered a deep freeze from which they would not recover until Gomulka fell from power in December 1970.

The fact that Gomulka, despite Ulbricht’s rejection, did not give up on his plans for economic integration with the GDR, demonstrated the importance that he attached to maintaining Germany’s division. The Polish leader turned to Moscow for support. Brezhnev was sympathetic; the East Germans, he suggested to Gomulka, were unreasonable in their economic demands. In apparent response to Gomulka’s warnings about an “economic reunification of Germany,” Brezhnev advised Ulbricht in December 1967 to limit intra-German trade to items that were “economically necessary.” Visibly encouraged by Moscow’s response, Poland came forward with a new initiative to bind the GDR economically to the other socialist states: a proposal to reform the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). The Poles called for the adoption of a common, exchangeable currency as a first step towards economic integration in Eastern Europe. Not surprisingly, Ulbricht opposed the idea. He told the Soviets: “With such proposals, I could blow up all of Comecon.”

Still, Moscow offered bland encouragement to Gomulka to pursue his proposal in order to prevent a public rift within the Soviet bloc.

While the GDR backed out of its economic commitments to Poland, Moscow continued its own discussions with Bonn over renunciation of force in 1967–68. In the talks, Moscow betrayed a willingness to compromise with Bonn at the expense of Poland’s interests. When Gomulka received Moscow’s draft renunciation of force agreement, he was appalled by what he read. After Gomulka had spent months publicly opposing Bonn’s attempt to gain recognition of the fact that there were “disputed questions” between the Soviet bloc and Bonn over borders and recognition, the Soviet draft proposal included the phrase “peaceful regulation of disputed problems.” On May 23, 1967, Gomulka offered his assessment of the Soviet counter-proposal in a letter to Brezhnev. The inclusion of such a phrase in a renunciation of force agreement with Bonn, he warned Brezhnev, would mean that “Poland and other states that signed such declarations would recognize as ‘disputed’ our western border, along with the GDR’s existence as a sovereign German state.” The Soviets removed the offending language, but continued their discussions with Bonn.

The GDR responded to Moscow’s continuing talks with Bonn with its own initiative: a draft agreement for relations between the two German states. The GDR’s proposal was in technical violation of the Warsaw
agreement because it did not demand that Bonn recognize the Oder-Neisse Line. Although Brezhnev approved the GDR’s draft, Poland intervened, and Moscow then compelled the East Germans to include the Polish border issue. Bonn, for its part, rejected the East German proposal, but continued its negotiations with Moscow over renunciation of force.

Summing up, by the end of 1967, Gomulka’s policy had failed. Although Moscow had blocked the other socialist states from establishing diplomatic relations with Bonn, it was continuing its own talks with Bonn regarding renunciation of force, and these talks threatened to end in a compromise contrary to Polish interests. At the same time, the GDR had rejected economic integration with Poland and seemed oblivious to the danger of closer economic ties with Bonn. The GDR had also undertaken its own initiative to normalize relations with Bonn, without any consideration for the Oder-Neisse Line.

Given the relative openness of both the Soviet Union and the GDR to negotiations with Bonn, why did Gomulka persist in his hard line towards West Germany? After the Cold War, West German journalist Hansjakob Stehle revealed a possible reason: Gomulka had not been informed about the efforts of Willy Brandt’s trusted lieutenant, Egon Bahr, to make secret contacts with Warsaw in January 1968. (Bahr suggested to a Polish diplomat in Vienna that Bonn might recognize the Polish border up to the point of German reunification.) Although Gomulka was not informed about Bahr’s attempted contact until over a year later, other considerations, I believe, prevented Poland from considering negotiations with Bonn in early 1968. After all, Brandt publicly offered at the Nuremberg convention of the SPD in January 1968 “to respect or otherwise recognize” the Polish border until a German peace treaty; Gomulka certainly knew about Brandt’s speech. One likely reason why Poland did not enter into talks with Bonn was because Gomulka feared that if Poland wavered in its hard line, the Soviets, the GDR, and the other socialist states would have used it as an excuse to enter into their own negotiations with West Germany. Furthermore, maintaining Germany’s division was a higher priority for Gomulka in early 1968 than Bonn’s recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line. The key to improving Polish-West German relations, Gomulka repeatedly told the Soviets, was not Bonn’s recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line, but its recognition of the GDR.

Other factors also prevented Gomulka from reconsidering his hard line towards West Germany in early 1968. In March, the “anti-Zionist campaign” began. The “Partisans,” a faction of the Polish communist party, purged alleged Jews and reformers from the party’s ranks in a bid to take power. Poland’s veteran foreign minister, Adam Rapacki, resigned in protest when the campaign spread to the Polish foreign min-
istry; it would have been difficult at that point for any diplomatic contacts with Bonn to have come to fruition. Moreover, the “Partisans” sought to outbid Gomulka in nationalistic rhetoric; they linked the Jews and Germans together in an alleged international conspiracy against Poland. Any offer by Gomulka to normalize relations with Bonn would have been denounced in early 1968 as betrayal. At the same time, the reforms of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia were threatening to spill over into Poland and undermine Gomulka’s rule. Gomulka joined Ulbricht in harshly criticizing Alexander Dubcek and the Czechoslovakian communists for their efforts to normalize relations with Bonn. Both Ulbricht and Gomulka in particular were pushing the Soviets to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia. To Gomulka’s chagrin, Brezhnev wavered; he also did not seem to oppose Prague’s growing relations with West Germany. The Soviets finally joined both Poland and the GDR in publicly denouncing Prague’s contacts with Bonn in June 1968, only weeks before the invasion. Even then, Gromyko made clear to the GDR Moscow’s continuing interest in talks with West German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt and other SPD officials.

In the autumn of 1968, Gomulka might have made an opening to West Germany, but he did not. He, along with Ulbricht, clearly hoped that the invasion of Czechoslovakia would dampen Moscow’s enthusiasm for détente with West Germany. For the Soviets, however, the invasion of Czechoslovakia was truly a “traffic accident on the road to détente.” They hastened to re-establish contact with Willy Brandt.

Three developments at the end of 1968 and beginning of 1969 led Gomulka to reconsider Poland’s hard line and to make his opening to West Germany. First, the Soviets made clear that they would continue their own talks with Bonn over renunciation of force. Since the Soviets were clearly going to negotiate with Bonn on matters of interest to Poland, including recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line, Gomulka wanted Poland to have its own, parallel negotiations.

The decisive factor in Gomulka’s opening to Bonn was not the Soviet Union, however; it was East Germany. Gomulka failed in his larger goal of binding the GDR economically to the Soviet bloc. In December 1968, the GDR concluded a long-term trade agreement with Bonn; this was the second factor that led Gomulka to make his opening to Bonn. The intra-German trade agreement provided for a doubling of West German exports and a tripling of East German exports over six years. The increased level of trade was to be fueled, in part, by a “swing” credit of DM 350 million from West Germany. Gomulka warned the Soviets that if the GDR’s economic “integration” with the FRG continued at such a pace, it would lead to German reunification. At a meeting with Brezhnev and Kosygin in Moscow on March 3, 1969, Gomulka reiterated—perhaps for
the last time—that the future of the GDR was of greater concern to Poland than the Oder-Neisse Line. He told the Soviets: “Brandt has said . . . that the FRG would be prepared to recognize [our] borders until the unification of Germany. On this basis we could enter into talks, and as a result we could have diplomatic relations with both the GDR and the FRG. We do not want, however, to create any diversions [spekulacja]. Our stance with regard to Germany derives from other sources. We believe that the loss of the GDR would mean crossing out the results of World War II and would open the way to a great offensive against our camp.” Gomulka demanded that Moscow not only take action to compel the GDR to cooperate more closely with Poland in the economic realm, but also to support Poland’s proposal for Comecon reform. Despite Gomulka’s lobbying in Moscow, Poland’s initiative for Comecon reform—aimed at East Germany—met with defeat at a Soviet-bloc summit in April 1969. Ulbricht, backed by the Romanians, effectively vetoed it. The Soviets, wanting to preserve a façade of unity, substituted a meaningless declaration in favor of multilateral cooperation. For Gomulka, this was the third and final straw. Less than a month later, he made his offer to Brandt to negotiate a border.

At a meeting of the Polish Politburo on June 2, 1969, Gomulka explained the grounds behind his opening to West Germany. He complained in general about the movement within the Eastern bloc towards improving economic and political relations with Bonn, but he reserved his harshest criticism for the Soviet Union and the GDR. In 1967, the Warsaw Pact, he said, had agreed to act in a unified fashion towards the FRG, but the Soviets had decided to negotiate an improvement of relations with Bonn on a bilateral basis. Poland, he implied, could not afford to be left behind, so it would enter into its own talks with the FRG. Gomulka then added, “There is also the matter of the GDR . . . What’s going on there should not come onto the agenda. Ulbricht’s conception boils down to this: there’s no use linking [the GDR] economically with Poland, there’s no use talking about economic integration. . . . They reject close economic bonds, they have a policy of tightening cooperation with the FRG. One can say that the GDR is joining ‘the six’ [the EEC] through the FRG. . . . It is known that extensive economic relations also lead to political relations, and a process of merging follows. This creates the prospect that not only economic rapprochement will follow, but also unification. We should not permit this to come onto the agenda.”

To summarize, the danger of a future unification of Germany, caused by the GDR’s economic policies, along with the threat of diminished sovereignty for Poland, resulting from Soviet-West German negotiations, led Gomulka to make his opening to Bonn. If the Soviet Union had not been so open to Brandt’s overtures, or if the GDR had agreed to economic integration with Poland, Gomulka would have likely vetoed or post-
poned any negotiations with West Germany. The Comecon summit in April 1969 had made clear, however, that the economic future of the Soviet bloc would not be based on economic integration, but on an economic opening to the West. For Gomulka, this meant the “economic reunification” of Germany and the potential collapse of the Soviet bloc. He had to rescue what he could, while he could, for a communist Poland.

The potential unification of Germany and Moscow’s perceived willingness to compromise Poland’s security interests compelled Gomulka to obtain an independent West German guarantee for Poland’s western border. Gomulka achieved his goal with the Treaty of Warsaw of December 1970. He obtained de facto recognition of the border in a bilateral treaty with the FRG at a time when the future of the border was threatened—in his opinion—through the policies of the Soviet Union and the GDR. If the Warsaw treaty was a victory for Brandt, then it was even more so for Gomulka; it was his crowning achievement, attained less than two weeks before his fall from power on December 20, 1970.

Notes


2 Douglas Selvage, “Poland, the German Democratic Republic and the ‘German Question,’ 1955–1967,” (Ph.D. Diss., Yale University, 1998), passim.


8 Gomułka’s close associate, Artur Starewicz, told Mieczysław Rakowski in 1966: After all, . . . it’s clear that when Khrushchev came forward in the summer of 1964 with his initiative to improve relations with Bonn, he was not alone. Certain circles stood behind him. Khrushchev is gone, but these people remain.” Rakowski, Dzienniki polityczne, 1963–66, 370.


11 In February 1965, Gomułka told the East German ambassador to Poland, Karl Mewis, that the GDRs continued existence as a socialist state could only be secured through its economic integration with the other states of the socialist bloc, especially Poland and the USSR. His goal, Gomułka said, was to link the GDR to the other socialist states with ties of interdependence that would be impossible to break. If the GDR failed to link itself economically with the other Comecon states, Gomułka warned Mewis, it would eventually be swallowed up by the FRG. Protokół ze spotkania przywódców PZPR i KPZR w Moskwie, 3–4 marca 1969r.


13 Notatka z rozmowy I sekretarza KC PZPR Władysława Gomułki z ministrem Spraw Zagranicznych ZSSR Andriem Gromyko /7 grudnia 1967/ [Memorandum from a Conversation of First Secretary Władysław Gomułka of the CC of the PZPR with the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko /December 7, 1967/], in AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 2642, pp. 185, 190–95; and Przemówienie tow. Gomułki na spotkaniu z I sekretarzami KW i kierownikami wydziałów KC w dniu 12 grudnia 69r. [Comrade Gomułka’s Speech at a Meeting with the First Secretaries of the District Committees on 12 December 1969], in AAN, KC PZPR, 237/V-911, p. 14.


15 See Selvage, Poland, the German Democratic Republic and the German Question, Chapter 6.

16 On Moscows willingness to enter into negotiations with Bonn over renunciation of force, see Moscows response to Bonns “ Peace Note” in Dokumente zur Deutschlands Politik (hence-


24 Interview, Andrzej Werblan, December 3, 1993. Although this exchange was not included in the transcript of Gomulka’s meeting with Ulbricht, their recorded exchanges were also quite heated. S. Trepczynski, Notatka ze spotkania delegacji partyjno-rradowych Polski i NRD w Moskwie, w dn. 8. listopada 1967 r., November 8, 1967, in AAN, KC PZPR, p. 110, t. 116.


30 When Ulbricht complained to Brezhnev in March 1967 about Prague’s growing contacts with the FRG, the Soviet leader advised him not to interfere with the socialist states’ economic relations with West Germany. The Soviets apparently did not officially question Prague’s relations with Bonn until Dubček’s visit to Moscow in May 1968. After over a year of complaints from Ulbricht, Brezhnev finally brought up the large numbers of West Germans traveling to Czechoslovakia; he suggested that their visits were undermining the security of the Warsaw Pact’s borders. “Stenografische Niederschrift der Verhandlungen der Delegationen des ZK der SED und des ZK der KPdSU am 21. März 1967 in Moskau,” n.d. AAN, KC PZPR, p. 114, t.33, pp. 28–90.

31 On Rapacki’s steadfast stance, see, for example, his comments to Brezhnev in March 1969 in Protokół ze spotkania przywódców PZPR i KPZR w Moskwie, 3–4 marca 1969 r., n.d. AAN, KC PZPR, p.114, t.33, pp. 28–90.

32 Hansjakob Stehle, Eine vertrackte Vorgeschichte.

33 On Rapacki’s resignation, see Stanisław Stomma, Pościg za nadzieją, Świadkowie XX Wieku, Vol. 3 (Paris, 1991), 145.

34 The most glaring example of the Partisans propaganda was a book that linked Jews—even during the Holocaust—with the Germans in alleged anti-Polish activities: Tadeusz Walichnowski, Izrael-NRF a Polska (Warsaw, 1968). The book was translated into German and English.


36 When Ulbricht complained to Brezhnev in March 1967 about Prague’s growing contacts with the FRG, the Soviet leader advised him not to interfere with the socialist states’ economic relations with West Germany. The Soviets apparently did not officially question Prague’s relations with Bonn until Dubček’s visit to Moscow in May 1968. After over a year of complaints from Ulbricht, Brezhnev finally brought up the large numbers of West Germans traveling to Czechoslovakia; he suggested that their visits were undermining the security of the Warsaw Pact’s borders. “Stenografische Niederschrift der Verhandlungen der Delegationen des ZK der SED und des ZK der KPdSU am 21. März 1967 in Moskau,” n.d. AAN, KC PZPR, p. 114, t.33, pp. 28–90.


39 “Wystąpienie tow. Gomulki w sprawie NRF na posiedzeniu B.P. w dniu 2 VI 1969r.,
attachment to Protokół Nr. 5 posiedzenia Biura Politycznego w dniu 2 czerwca 1969r., n.d.,
in AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 1742, pp. 269–73.

40 The West German Economics Minister, Karl Schiller, publicly announced the
details of the agreement on December 6, 1968. Telegram, Lodge, American Embassy in Bonn, to
Secretary of State, December 6, 1968, in: NARA, RG 59, Subject-Numeric, 1967–69, Box 918, FT GER
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41 Protokół ze spotkania przywódców PZPR i KPZR w Moskwie, 3–4 marca 1969 r., n.d.
AAN, KC PZPR, p.114, t.33, pp. 28–90.

42 See Gomułka’s handwritten notes during the XXIII Extraordinary Session of the CMEA in
Moscow, April 24–6, 1969, in AAN, KC PZPR, p. 110, t. 16. Also see Douglas Selvage,
Polska-NRD. Doktryna Ulbrichta w świetle dokumentów, Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki 3 (1994):
77–106.

43 “Wystąpienie tow. Gomulki w sprawie NRF na posiedzeniu B.P. w dniu 2 VI 1969r.,”
attachment to “Protokół Nr. 5 posiedzenia Biura Politycznego w dniu 2 czerwca 1969r.,” n.d.,
in AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 1742, pp. 269–73.