

## BOOK REVIEWS

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Andrew Jainchill, *Reimagining Politics After the Terror: The Republican Origins of French Liberalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).

**Review by John Shovlin, New York University**

In this admirably clear and well-written first book, Andrew Jainchill argues that French liberalism was formed in the years between 1794 and 1804, and that it developed among a cohort of politicians and intellectuals he calls the “republican center,” including Benjamin Constant, Pierre-Claude-François Daunou, Louis-Marie de La Révellière-Lépeaux, Pierre-Louis Roederer, Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, and Germaine de Staël. (By French liberalism, Jainchill means the strain of political thought developed in the works of Alexis de Tocqueville, not what he refers to as the “rationalist liberalism” of François Guizot and the Doctrinaires.) Jainchill’s central claim is that this Tocquevillean variety of liberalism has been tinged, since its inception, by distinctively republican concerns and imperatives. Most notably, he argues, French liberals in the tradition stretching from Constant to Tocqueville embraced the importance of civic engagement for citizens as a necessary bulwark against the loss of liberty. Modern liberty, they held, could be durably preserved only in a polity where something of the liberty of the ancients continued to actuate citizens. French liberalism took on this republican complexion because of the context in which it emerged—the years following the end of the Terror, when republican moderates sought to refound the Republic, and to preserve it from the twin dangers of Jacobinism and royalism, and, subsequently, from the threat of Napoleonic despotism.

In its emphasis on the political creativity of the Directory period, Jainchill’s book offers a stimulating contribution to a recent historiographical current that has sought to transform scholarly understanding of the French Revolution after Thermidor. This revisionist scholarship argues that far from being a moment dominated by reaction, or by the self-serving chicanery of politicians interested merely in holding onto power, the second half of the 1790s was a period when politicians and intellectuals grappled imaginatively with new problems of political order raised by the experience of revolution

and by the challenge of creating political stability. Jainchill's key move, which distinguishes his argument sharply from some of the other new work in this area, is to argue that the political thought and practice of the late 1790s was strongly influenced by classical republican preoccupations: "Simply put, the conceptual matrix through which the post-Terror republican center understood politics was essentially classical republican in nature" (10). He sets out to substantiate this claim in a series of chapters that explore the making of the constitution of 1795; the concern governing elites showed with the creation of republican manners; and debates over the meaning of French expansionism and the character of a desirable international order. His argument is not that classical republicanism dominated political discourse to the exclusion of other alternatives, but that it was sufficiently influential to set the terms of debate. Even those who saw the world of politics in a very different light had to contend with classical republican ideas. For example, in the sphere of foreign policy, Jainchill argues, debate was shaped by concerns that over-expansion could threaten the foundations of liberty, as it had destroyed the Roman Republic in antiquity. The Directory's policy of establishing "sister republics" in the late 1790s developed in response to "a widespread sense that annexation would prove disastrous for the Republic" (166). Those political actors who favored annexation had to offer arguments that minimized the danger expansion posed to domestic liberty. Ultimately, he argues, varieties of liberal and authoritarian republicanism evolved in dialog with the classical republican perspective.

Other historians in recent years, while attending to many of the same historical trends as Jainchill's book, do not characterize this moment as a classical republican one. James Livesey and Richard Whatmore, in particular, view classical republicanism as moribund by the late 1790s and argue that French politics was mediated in the latter part of the eighteenth century by various strains of "modern" republicanism. The difference among these perspectives is not merely one of terminology. Livesey and Whatmore accord decisive importance to political economy as a framework for political thought in this period. For them, the story of republicanism in the 1790s hinges on the reconceptualization of commerce as a foundation of, rather than a threat to, civic welfare. Jainchill's decision to deemphasize this dimension of political discourse lies at the heart of his interpretation. Though he does not say so explicitly, perhaps it is Jainchill's view that the attention to commerce, fashionable in recent scholarship, has produced an exaggerated picture of structural transformation in French political thought.

One of the ambitions of *Reimagining Politics after the Terror* is to show that political imagination shaped political practice. Jainchill argues that the constitution of the Year III, for example, was partially molded by classical republican preoccupations, as was the foreign policy of the Directory. He suggests that the liberal and authoritarian strains of republicanism that developed in opposition to the classical perspective underpinned alternative political pro-

jects—the Napoleonic centralization of authority at home and empire building abroad. I am somewhat skeptical of this dimension of Jainchill’s argument. When political imagination could support such a wide variety of political projects, it is not clear what it means to argue that it “shaped” any particular outcome. Jainchill seems to want to argue that political ideas actually drove events at points in the late 1790s. But such a conception of the relationship between ideas and outcomes leaves us with the paradox of Napoleonic despotism growing out of a classical republican moment. Ultimately, Jainchill is more interested in exploring the languages that mediated politics than in tracing the progress and outcome of political struggles. This is a legitimate focus, but it may lead the author to overestimate the extent to which formal political ideas constrain or impel action, while losing sight of the way ideas can serve agendas they did not shape.

David S. Barnes, *The Great Stink of Paris and the Nineteenth-Century Struggle against Filth and Germs* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

**Review by Jann Matlock, UCL (University College London)**

The lithograph on the cover of David Barnes’s book shows a Parisian street scene from September 1880. At first glance, it represents a standard exchange of seductive leers between a gentleman of Paris whose class is evident from his top hat, cufflinks, and white trousers—and “une Parisienne,” too well dressed to be a common *fille*, too visible in the street not to be for sale. Lest we wonder if the caricaturist, Draner, had simply caught a proper lady on her way home, the piglet hanging from her fan figures her relations metaphorically. Despite its allusions to debates raging in the last decades of the nineteenth century, this caricature is not about cleaning up “parisiennes,” but rather about another kind of hygiene problem, much more immediate in the heat of 1880: the Great Stink of Paris. We know this because the gentleman who peers at the woman through his glasses does so with the benefit of a “new system of pince-nez” that blocks his nose so he won’t have to smell anything around him. That the “odors of Paris” were so horrendous as to necessitate a “pince-nez” for the woman as well ensures us—just barely—that the problem has surpassed regular bourgeois complaints about Parisian salubrity.

The Great Stink of Paris was actually two Stinks, which frame Barnes’s study of a series of public health crises that found Parisians of both 1880 and 1895 railing about foul smells. These crises left government officials and scientists speculating about causes, remedies, and, in a new development during the early Third Republic, state responsibility. As we learn in the course of

Barnes's book, the Great Stink of 1880 was a "historical watershed," not only for how it inspired disgust but for how it manifested the fundamental changes that were "reshaping French politics, science, and culture" (13). Although the source of the 1880 Stink was never determined, despite important efforts by a public health commission, by the time of the 1895 Stink, the problem inspired much less anxiety, suggesting that bacteriology had taken hold, but also that Parisians had much greater faith in their government's ability to protect them from danger.

Barnes does a splendid job of depicting public anxieties about the stench that overwhelmed Parisians in 1880, and of tracing the campaign by government officials and physicians to respond to these concerns during the following two decades. His book makes an important contribution to both urban history and medical history through its recalibration of the history of public health: to enrich the history of a series of triumphs over dangers, he advances "cultural histories of health-related knowledge and practices" (8). In his concern with the "history of meaning," Barnes supplements and deepens the work of Alain Corbin on the history of smell (*Le Miasme et la jonquille*, 1982), especially through the fascinating discovery that Pasteur, father of the germ theory of disease, actually wrote in 1880 that the odors were capable of spreading disease—something no one would have believed by 1895, during the second Great Stink. Between 1880 and 1895, Barnes shows, bacteriological understandings of disease triumphed over miasmatic ones; and yet fighting danger continued to draw on old responses to what one could smell and see. He explains this cohabitation of the old and the new by what he calls the "sanitary-bacteriological-synthesis": the convergence of the old concerns of the sanitary movement of the mid-century ("filth and contamination, cleanliness and morality") with the new bacteriology (focused "on danger of contact with potentially sick bodies and bodily substance, tests for the presence of microbes, and the promise of their control through laboratory science") (3).

For decades, doctors and public health officials forged connections between what stank and what could kill in order to work pragmatically with what people were prepared to believe and could be encouraged to change about their hygienic practices. In fact, Barnes shows in his epilogue, even today, "hygienic products" continue to be marketed through a savvy targeting of old myths about dangerous smells and the potentially nefarious bacteria they may signal. Even if it is true that "not everything that stinks kills and not everything that kills stinks" (the message of germ theory, [37]), public health experts and hygienists have long exploited obsessions with certain kinds of filth, disgust with certain kinds of odors, and expectations that contamination may lie where one can smell something stinking.

Barnes makes some of his most important archival inroads through a study not only of Paris, but of the provinces, where he is able to follow the local authorities' fascinating responses to disease. These officials' everyday practical strategies provide a complex picture of the transformation of public

health in France, particularly as they shed new light on assumptions that, unlike their equivalents in England and Germany, French officials dithered too long before acting and took few financial risks. Barnes nuances the picture by arguing that hygienists acted in durable ways to build a knowledgeable citizenry and that local officials worked hard to educate the public about risks. Particularly interesting is Barnes's study of hygiene teaching in the newly secularized primary school system of Jules Ferry. Likewise, Barnes provides a fascinating analysis of how the obsessions of mid-century hygienists like Louis René Villermé were transformed in the later century into programs for "clean white bodies" (100). I would have liked to see more on the way this ordering of public and private space worked in the expanding French colonial project that was, along with the school system, Ferry's major "contribution" to the Third Republic. I also would have liked to see Barnes give more attention to how other concerns about salubrity, for example hysteria about the female vote and fears about prostitutes passing as more respectable than they merited, played into the anxieties over the "odeurs de Paris." Barnes argues convincingly that one of the reasons why Pasteur bolstered anxieties about the health dangers of the Stink was that the "social and political turmoil" (4) of the newly liberalized Third Republic did not allow much room for maneuver by public officials. Given how hard-won democracy had been, for the same government that amnestied the Communards in 1880 to have devoted public funds to revamp its waste disposal system might have been more "government for the people" than the bourgeoisie (many of whom had spent the summer at the fragrant shore) were prepared to accept. As Barnes shows, the republican government was bent on a program of improvement through philanthropy.

Given the rich material on the diverse views about how to resolve the Stink, Barnes might have delved more into the popular representations of the two Great Stinks. He provides useful tables and boxes explaining the historical thrust of the notion of "infection," detailing the secondary school hygiene curriculum in 1890, and chronicling shifts in local etiologies for typhoid and diphtheria. He might also have offered a chapter on the cultural struggles in 1880 and 1895 over the meanings of the Stinks. His analysis of a fake Zola article in 1880 in the right-leaning *Figaro*, which projected a volume by the novelist on *The Great Sewer Main*, gives us an idea how profitable further discussion of popular responses might be. Barnes's summary of the various press positions of 1880 left me wanting to know more about the differing politics of the papers' positions, about the speculations by larger circulation dailies like *Le Petit Parisien* (which had a half million more readers than *Le Figaro*) on issues like public responsibility and potential remedies, and thus about how this bolstered the growth of a tabloid press. It would also be interesting to learn whether newspapers' obsessions about the Stink touched other debates such as those on education, women's suffrage, and the colonies. We may indeed not be able to know exactly how Paris smelled in 1880, but Barnes speculates that the best guess is that it smelled like excrement, due to problems

with cesspits, sewage dumping, and inadequate policing of waste removal systems. We can, however, know a great deal more about how the fantasies of those smells' dangers worked in tandem with other anxieties. Barnes is certainly right that we cannot assume that a system like the one in Germany would have been more effective in combating either Stinks or infectious disease, but the resistance to public outlay of expenses for such a system makes for a fascinating study. I left Barnes book wanting to know more about why, despite the very new assumption in 1880 that the government should do something about this public health crisis, the left-leaning press seemed so convinced that nothing would be done that it satirically depicted the Commission established for this purpose as doing its work in the sewer surrounded by rats. More remains to be said about how artists of 1880 and 1895 represented these horrible odors. A caricature like the one on the cover of Barnes's book opens that question intriguingly. Perhaps Barnes or another scholar will take its invitation to consider further how the cultural meanings of these anxieties about smell played out in relation to—and even transformed—representations of other moralizing practices and other seductions.

Willa Z. Silverman, *The New Bibliopolis: French Book Collectors and the Culture of Print, 1880-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).

**Review by Christine Haynes, University of North Carolina at Charlotte**

On the eve of the First World War, a book collector named Henri Beraldi commissioned for himself a one-copy luxury edition of a book he titled *Le Monument du costume, 1900-1910: La Vie mondaine à Paris*. Modeled after a late-eighteenth-century work of the same title, it was to feature seventy original watercolors by the popular illustrator Pierre Vidal. Never published due to the outbreak of the war, Beraldi's commission nonetheless stands as a "monument" of the antebellum culture of book collecting, Willa Silverman argues in this fascinating study of the "new bibliopolis" (136). While Beraldi's project might be dismissed as esoteric, in Silverman's retelling it becomes emblematic of broader trends in fin-de-siècle France. Through a study of such bibliophilia verging on bibliomania, Silverman illuminates a number of aspects not just of print history, but of sociocultural history. Combining the approaches of Anglo-inspired analytical bibliography and French-inspired *histoire du livre*, she highlights the role of books as material as well as intellectual objects. In the process, she reveals much about the transformation of the book industry, the response to technological change, and the evolution of bourgeois male sociability in France between the Franco-Prussian War and World War I.

To delineate “the new bibliopolis,” Silverman focuses on the writings, organizations, and publications initiated by Octave Uzanne, a “modern” bibliophile who coined the term in a manifesto of 1897. Branded by his idol Edmond de Goncourt as “this man who has a drop of sperm spurted into his eye,” Uzanne was a passionate but acerbic journalist, author, editor, publisher, and bibliographer, who promoted the collection and production of contemporary *livres de luxe*. A former protégé of Charles Nodier and the “Bibliophile Jacob” (Paul Lacroix) at the Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal, he used his publications to champion eighteenth-century works, then more recent efforts as well. Later in his career, he founded two associations of collectors of modern books, the Société des Bibliophiles Contemporains (1888-1894) and the Société des Bibliophiles Indépendants (1896-1901).

Silverman uses the example of Uzanne to argue that the new bibliophiles were ambivalent about technological modernization. On the one hand, they feared the consequences of the democratization of production and consumption. On the other hand, however, they made extensive use of new technology, particularly photomechanical reproduction techniques, to produce their luxury books. Like William Morris in England, whose work he admired, Uzanne simultaneously embraced and rejected industrialization in book production. While he relied on modern improvements in color printing, binding, and typography, he also repudiated American-style marketing and insisted upon traditional craftsmanship, reviving the woodcut, for instance. Of Uzanne, Silverman remarks, “He was, in fact, a peculiar herald whose desire for reform coexisted with conservative, even reactionary leanings” (22). In her view, such a Janus-like, or evolutionary, approach to modernization among modern bibliophiles demonstrates that in the late nineteenth century elite and mass culture were not diametrically opposed, but in fact overlapped.

The case of Uzanne, among other bibliophiles (including Beraldi and Paul Gallimard, father of the legendary publisher), illustrates another of Silverman’s central contentions: that the amateur often assumed the role of designer, financier, and/or distributor of the book he commissioned. Following the lead of Beraldi, who proclaimed, “If you want books, make them yourself,” bibliophiles became procreators of the works they collected (140). Contrary to Robert Darnton’s model of a “communications circuit” running from the author through the publisher, the binder, and the bookseller to the reader, Silverman shows that, in the case of the production of luxury or art books, many of these functions were often consolidated in a single figure. Situating this concentration of roles in the context of the development of the modern publishing industry, notably in the so-called “krach” or “crisis” of the book in the 1890s, she argues that the field of fine book production became a distinct “reversed economic world,” as opposed to the growing field of commercial book production (122). In this “reversed world,” collectors served as tastemakers, mediating between writers and artists (especially of the Symbolist and Art Nouveau movements) in Brussels and in Paris.

For those scholars outside the field of book history, though, perhaps the most significant contribution of *The New Bibliopolis* is its vivid description of a nineteenth-century type of bourgeois sociability, the social circle. Tracing the history of a number of associations founded by new “Biblio-Contempos” (with names like the Amis des Livres, the Société des Bibliophiles Contemporains, the Société des Bibliophiles Indépendants, the Cent Bibliophiles, and Les XX), Silverman shows how they distinguished themselves from more traditional organizations of book collectors, such as the Société des Bibliophiles Français, which were more aristocratic and artisanal in their composition and approach. In contrast to these traditional societies, which resembled salons, the new associations were gentlemen’s clubs, complete with billiards, *fumoirs*, leather armchairs, and elaborate banquets. Through a careful analysis of the publications and keepsakes of these associations, Silverman offers a particular case study of the general form of the bourgeois circle, first examined by Maurice Agulhon. While she might have done more to explain the relationship between these associations of amateurs and the principal professional organization in publishing, the Cercle de la Librairie (which was founded in 1847, not 1879, as she writes), with whose activities they often overlapped, she nonetheless furthers our understanding of the evolution of elite sociability.

Placing these associations in the context of fin-de-siècle bourgeois culture, Silverman suggests that they illustrate the development not just of conspicuous consumption but of heightened masculine identity. Silverman is especially strong in her analysis of how bibliophilia reflected and reinforced gender norms. Asserting that book collecting was gendered male, she shows how bibliophiles either denounced women as haters and destroyers of books, due to anxiety about the “femme nouvelle” entering the public sphere of book production, or regarded books as sexual objects, treating them as “virgins” to be caressed. Taking this fetishization of books to an extreme, some bibliophiles even bound their treasures in female human skin (177)! Noting that many bibliophiles were bachelors, she suggests that book collecting constituted a substitute for sex. Comparing book collecting to dueling and bicycling, Silverman argues that this competitive “sport” was one of a variety of strategies for reinvigorating masculinity following the defeat of the Franco-Prussian War.

Silverman concludes her history of bibliophilia by comparing the discourse about books circa 1900 to another *fin-de-siècle*, the late twentieth century. Evoking a short story of 1895 by Uzanne entitled “La fin des livres” (“The End of Books”), which prophesied the replacement of print by phonograph as well as the death of French in favor of English, she raises the question of whether the codex book is threatened by the current digital revolution. Suggesting that books are no closer to an “end” than they were in 1895, Silverman sees such anxiety as a recurrent response to technological innovation and cultural democratization. Impressively researched and beautifully illustrated, *The New Bibliopolis* reaches beyond the small group of elite dandies at its core to

reflect more broadly upon the nature of texts as material objects, a topic which remains relevant in our own day.

J. P. Daughton, *An Empire Divided: Religion, Republicanism, and the Making of French Republicanism, 1880–1914* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

**Review by Caroline Ford, University of California, Los Angeles**

Léon Gambetta launched the anticlerical campaign that characterized the early years of the French Third Republic in 1877 with the battle cry, “Clericalism—there is the enemy!” The state subsequently set out to secularize education as well as public institutions and to republicanize the far-flung regions of metropolitan France; this process culminated in the separation of Church and state in 1905. Only a year earlier, however, in 1876, this fire-breathing anticlerical declared that France must support its “Catholic clientele in the world,” adding that anticlericalism was not an item for export. J.P. Daughton’s impressive study goes to the heart of this apparent contradiction in untangling the complicated history of religion in the making of France’s colonial empire. While the history of French colonialism has increasingly come to absorb the attention of scholars, the role of religion and missionaries in this history has been largely ignored or pushed to the sidelines until recently, while historians of the British empire have produced a significant body of work on the subject. Daughton argues that the Catholic Church, through its missionaries, was central to shaping colonial policy and that ironically these enemies of the Republic—Catholic religious workers—frequently carried out the Republic’s “civilizing mission” and the colonial administration often relied on them to do so. Daughton skillfully explores some of these paradoxes while showing that “civilizing” policies were not purely liberal or republican and that colonial rule was not monolithic, but rather the product of negotiation and compromise between often warring and divided combatants. This book focuses on colonial policy and practices at the grassroots, but it also seeks to consider how the development of empire helped to define the nation at home in metropolitan France.

This study focuses on the French imperial expansion from 1880 to the First World War and is divided into five parts, consisting of two chapters each. While providing an introductory chapter on the origins and traditions of the nineteenth-century missionary movement, the book centers on three case studies, which illustrate the variety of colonial experiences. These include three of France’s most important colonial possessions: Indochina, Polynesia

(Tahiti and the Marquesas Islands), and Madagascar. He argues that French missionaries initially had little interest in promoting France as a nation abroad and were indifferent to imperialism. They were primarily concerned with religious conversion and extolled the missionary as Christian martyr. Daughton argues that this began to change during the early Third Republic as the colonial administrators increasingly came into conflict with missionaries, forcing them to justify their purpose and redefine their vocation to dovetail with the Republic's civilizing mission. The great strength of this book is to show how these conflicts, compromises, and negotiations were played out in distinct ways as a result of the different challenges that each colony presented. In Indochina the French were primarily concerned with security, forging alliances, and clamping down on social discontent, so French colonists and administrators were content to compromise with missionaries, even in instances in which they came into conflict. In Polynesia security was not a concern after 1880, and the French appeared to be more preoccupied with issues of morality and depopulation. The types of missionaries in the two colonies were also quite different. While missionaries in Indochina were primarily male, a significant number of the missionaries in Polynesia were sisters of Saint Joseph de Cluny or the *Congrégation des Sacrés-Cœurs*, who saw their mission to be moral and directed to young girls. Despite alliances that were formed between missionaries and colonial administrators in propagating a civilizing mission, these colonies were not immune from the bitter religious conflicts in metropolitan France. At the height of the Dreyfus Affair missionaries came under fierce attack by Freemasons in Indochina. After the radical republican electoral victories in 1902 the Ministry of Colonies came under was pressured to stem the influence of Catholic missions in the French Empire. It decreed a policy of laicization in Polynesia by removing crucifixes in public places and by banning teaching and nursing sisters from government hospitals and schools, despite resistance by some who continued to see missions as an inexpensive means to spread the civilizing mission.

The role and place of the missionary in Madagascar was quite different from relationships that were forged in Indochina or the South Pacific. The French only gained control of the island in 1896, and the influence of British Protestant missionaries had made itself felt in the preceding years. Colonial rivalries, the religious conflict between Catholics and Protestants, and violent indigenous opposition to French colonial rule shaped how the colonial administration would view Catholic missionaries, who were never subject to the criticism and hostility that they experienced in Indochina and Polynesia. Missionaries were seen as an inherent part of the civilizing mission and bulwarks against both Protestantism and the imperial designs of Britain. Charles Le Myre de Vilers, a former resident-general of Madagascar, declared, "Abroad Catholicism is France" (201). Indeed, the oft-quoted phrase in Madagascar was "*qui dit Français dit Catholique; qui dit Protestant dit Anglais.*"

This rich and well documented book is based on extensive research in wide variety of libraries and archives located in France, Italy, Tahiti, and Vietnam. Daughton's analysis is both subtle and nuanced, revealing the importance not only of religion but of religious conflict in the construction of France's colonial empire. While the wealth of documentation that he has uncovered shows beyond a doubt that colonial rule was "fraught with inconsistencies, conflicts and contradictions" (263), the book is less effective in its goal of illuminating the formation of the nation in an international context or how French identity was shaped by colonialism. Daughton does devote a chapter to how France's leading missionary organization, the *Cœuvre de la propagation de la foi*, and other organizations sought to educate the public on France's moral obligations to empire using mass media technology and publications, but the extent to which French men and women embraced their vision or understood colonialism through their eyes is far from clear. Daughton provides some fascinating insights into how indigenous populations exploited the divisions and contradictions that existed among the colonial occupiers, especially in Madagascar, but protonationalist rebels, indigenous preachers, and ethnic minority leaders remain at the margins as shadowy figures. The book contains an intriguing photograph (figure 6.1) of indigenous Malagasy preachers and deacons who were ostensibly powerful and prestigious, challenging the racial balance of power on the island. The French feared that they were agents of the British and auxiliaries of the London Missionary Society. One is left to wonder how they might have seen themselves. Daughton tells a compelling tale of how an evangelizing mission became a civilizing mission, while pointing to some of the legacies of this mission in a postcolonial world. In so doing he not only makes an important and innovative contribution to the field of French history, but to colonial and European history more generally.

Richard S. Fogarty, *Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914-1918* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).

**Review by Martha Hanna, University of Colorado**

To secure victory in the First World War the French Army needed as many men as it could muster. And although more than eight million Frenchmen (in a nation of less than forty million) were mobilized between 1914 and 1918, losses were so severe that French strategists feared that these numbers alone would not suffice: France would also have to tap into the vast "reservoirs of men" that the empire represented. Ultimately, almost half a million colonial

troops (*troupes indigènes*) served in the French Army during the Great War, either in combat units or in support positions behind the lines. Yet it is not clear that these men, recruited from West and North Africa, Madagascar, and Indo-China, were deployed to the best strategic effect because racial prejudice so deeply permeated French military thinking as to limit how and where colonial troops were used. This is the fascinating story that Richard S. Fogarty explores in *Race and War in France*. Based on extensive research in the archives of the French Army and of colonial authorities, he argues that a fundamental tension pervaded French military attitudes towards the deployment of colonial troops during the First World War. On the one hand, republican egalitarianism held that all men were equal; and yet racial (and religious) prejudice prompted military commanders to doubt the loyalty, intelligence, reliability, and martial resolve of many colonial troops. As Fogarty remarks, “commitment to the ideals of universalism and egalitarianism pushed French officials to include *troupes indigènes* in both national defense and the national community, while racism pulled these same officers back from measures that would make the full integration of colonial subjects into national life a reality” (12).

Racial prejudice and preconceptions influenced almost every aspect of French military thinking. The belief that some colonies were populated by “martial races” and others by less manly types doomed West African troops—praised as fearsome, albeit primitive, warriors—to serve as shock troops on the Western Front, while men from Madagascar and Indo-China, deemed “non-martial races,” usually served in support positions behind the lines. Loyalty to Islam made Algerian and Moroccan recruits suspect, for commanders feared that they would be more likely to desert to the enemy in order to wage “holy war” against the Entente. This meant that North African troops were not used in the campaign against Turkey, and although they were thus spared the particular horror of storming the heights at Gallipoli, they deeply resented the clear implication that their commanders thought them untrustworthy. Senegalese troops, admired for their martial valor, were nonetheless demeaned as intellectual primitives who lacked the capacity (or so it was thought) to learn proper French: in 1916 the French Army created a language primer that taught the *tirailleurs sénégalais* a grammatically rudimentary version of French in which all nouns were masculine and all syntax followed a simplified, but laughable, prescribed form (156). The French High Command also thought colonial troops, including those of the “martial races,” insufficiently stoical, and thus less prepared than white, French troops for the stalemate of the Western Front. Yet the guiding principle of French military planning until at least October 1914 had been that of the offensive à *outrance* on the grounds that all troops needed the allure of offense to maintain their morale. Stoicism, it seems, was something that even Frenchmen had to acquire the hard way, in the mud of northern France. French commanders, quick to praise the French troops for their stoicism, seem to have forgotten this in their disparagement of colonial troops’ resolve.

Fogarty acknowledges that racist attitudes alone did not determine military policy towards colonial troops. Practical considerations, essential to the efficient operation of a multi-lingual and multi-cultural army, inevitably limited opportunities for advancement among men not fluent in French and not schooled in mathematics. Commanding officers needed to know that their orders would be clearly understood; artillery batteries could not function if the officers and NCOs responsible for calculating firing lines lacked a basic knowledge of geometry. Thus colonial soldiers were not the only ones whose modest education limited their chances of advancement in the heavy artillery, as the wartime career of the young French peasant, Paul Pireaud, makes evident. Yet racist thinking was so pervasive as to leave its mark everywhere. Although colonial troops enjoyed few opportunities for promotion, and could never be promoted above the rank of captain, those who were commissioned always had to defer to a white officer of the same rank. Furthermore, French commanders often confused an inadequate education—a defect that could be corrected in white soldiers—with low intelligence when encountered in colonial troops. Finally, the military service of colonial soldiers only rarely carried with it the rights of full citizenship, as was customary for all white Frenchmen. Blaise Diagne, a Senegalese deputy, worked assiduously (and successfully) to secure citizenship rights for veterans from the West African communities of the Four Communes, but Algerian veterans fared poorly. Stigmatized for their Islamic faith, the latter could become citizens only if they relinquished their allegiance to sharia: “attempts to facilitate the naturalization of Algerians foundered on the incompatibility French officials believed existed between Muslims’ religious identity, symbolized by the *statut personnel* and practices such as polygamy, and French national identity, which required absolute conformity to French cultural and legal norms” (257).

*Race and War in France* is built on extensive research, but the nature of the topic—and the relative scarcity of sources beyond those generated by the military and colonial officials—means that some questions are answered in greater depth than others. Thus we have a very good sense of how racial bias, incompatible though it was with the republican principle of egalitarianism, informed the judgments of the French military. What we do not understand as well, however, is whether this was also true of French civilian society. This is a question that touches directly on the issue of social and sexual relations between colonial soldiers and French civilians. Fogarty demonstrates clearly that colonial and military officials were more than a little put out when *troupes indigènes* had the temerity to send home erotic postcards showing white Frenchwomen in various stages of undress. Surely these colonial subjects, having ogled lissome ladies of ill-repute, would never again show respectable Frenchwomen residing in the colonies the deference that was their due. But the hierarchy of race upon which imperial authority rested in the colonies seemed much less firmly entrenched in civilian, metropolitan France: not only did French families welcome colonial troops into their homes, but some con-

sented to marriages between bourgeois (and hence respectable) young Frenchwomen and colonial soldiers. How is it that these civilians were so much more open to civility and intimacy across the color line than was the military high command? And what can we thus infer about the tension between racial prejudice and republican ideology, a tension that Fogarty documents so well for the officer corps, in French society writ large? One way to tackle this question suggests itself: given that many regiments integrated colonial and metropolitan units—on the admittedly racist grounds that colonial troops needed the example of true, disciplined French soldiers if they, too, were to perform adequately—what (if anything) can we glean from the postal control records of white soldiers in these regiments to shed light on how rank and file metropolitan troops interacted with, accepted, or distanced themselves from the colonial troops in their midst?

*Race and War in France* is a well-written, carefully argued study that advances in significant ways our understanding of the important place of empire in the Great War. The French Third Republic called upon its distant “sons” to serve the mother country in its time of need, but all too often it treated those sons with disdain and condescension, refused them their hard-won rewards, and in the process exposed the limits of republican ideology. It is a sad but important tale that needed to be told, and Richard Fogarty has told it well.

Spencer D. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul: French Education, Colonial Ethnology, and Muslim Resistance, 1912-1956* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009).

**Review by Harry Gamble, College of Wooster**

Long neglected, the history of education in colonial Morocco is the subject of two recent books. Hamid Irbouh's *Art in the Service of Colonialism: French Art Education in Morocco 1912-1956* (London: Tauris, 2005) explores the Protectorate's efforts to orient and control artisans and the production of traditional Moroccan crafts. Spencer Segalla's *The Moroccan Soul* proposes, more broadly, to investigate the various kinds of colonial schools that were set up for Muslims, intentionally leaving out the separate school systems that served the European and Jewish populations.

Segalla is most interested in the initiatives of Georges Hardy, who served as director of public instruction in the Protectorate between 1920 and 1926. More than any other official of his generation, Hardy played a key role in inventing and promoting new forms of colonial education, not only in Morocco, but across the French empire. Segalla devotes an entire chapter to Hardy's tenure as inspector general of education in French West Africa (1912-

1919). While in Dakar, Hardy worked to frame a school system that would be adapted to colonial Africa and not to metropolitan France. His reforms drew a crescendo of criticism from French-educated Africans, particularly in Senegal. Having succeeded in having their French citizenship confirmed in 1916, the inhabitants of Senegal's Four Communes were particularly hostile to Hardy's restrictive views of colonial schooling. When they gained new leverage over colonial policy—as a result of their support for the war effort—Senegalese elites successfully pushed for Hardy's removal. Segalla contends that this confrontation significantly sharpened Hardy's hostility towards "acculturated natives." Drawing on the well-known accounts of Denise Bouche, Alice Conklin, and G. Wesley Johnson, Segalla provides a useful summary of Hardy's years in Dakar. The addition of this chapter on French West Africa constitutes an interesting move, given that studies of colonial education have usually been confined to particular imperial settings, with little concern for intercolonial exchanges. However, by remaining so tightly focused on Hardy, Segalla tends to reduce these exchanges to the migration of one key official, from Dakar to Rabat.

Hardy's ideas and actions continue to dominate the book's subsequent chapters. Segalla underscores the community of ideas and sentiment that linked Hardy and the resident-general of French Morocco, Louis-Hubert Lyautey. Both men were struggling to frame a colonial order that would be rooted in tradition, even as it promoted carefully controlled forms of modernization. Like Lyautey, Hardy viewed social leveling and messy westernization as looming dangers that had to be contained through careful colonial intervention. Colonial schools were seen as one way to address these problems. Despite their deep affinities, one also senses a certain amount of friction between Hardy and Lyautey, but Segalla only mentions this tension in passing.

Hardy's relationship with colonial ethnology proved even more complex. Although Morocco was prime terrain for administrators with an interest in ethnology, Hardy often showed little patience for this research, which seemed to produce an overabundance of localized information that could not easily be used as the basis for educational policy. When it came to understanding Moroccans and how they should be educated, Hardy usually preferred to trust intuitions and generalizations. His book titles suggest his method: in 1925 Hardy published *L'Enfant marocain: Essai d'ethnographie scolaire*, followed by *L'Âme marocaine d'après la littérature française* the following year. Although he suggests that Hardy was ultimately most inspired by his own brand of ethnic and racial psychology, Segalla does not carefully examine how this kind of collective psychology fit with, or opposed, dominant trends in colonial ethnology. Segalla does point to Hardy's reluctance to endorse the Arab-Berber divide, which had become a dominant trope in colonial ethnology. Hardy challenged this binary by sketching out a hybrid Moroccan mentality that incorporated, however uncomfortably, both Arab and Berber elements. We are told that Hardy only fleetingly entertained the idea of establishing separate

schools, designed specifically for Berbers. But in reality, Hardy's policies seem to have been rather more complicated. For example, Hardy and his successors insisted that education in "Berber areas" be given entirely in French; this was quite different from the language policies followed in other areas, where Arabic was usually used alongside French, in variable proportions. Segalla does not adequately sift through these complexities.

During Hardy's tenure, schools were less concerned with reinscribing an Arab-Berber divide than they were with distinguishing and preserving social classes. Commoners entered rural and urban schools, which provided summary education and the beginnings of vocational training in farming or local trades. The sons of traditional elites could begin their studies at *écoles de fils de notables*, which followed a more ambitious Franco-Muslim curriculum. A percentage of the graduates of these schools went on to the highly elitist *collèges musulmans*, which were designed to produce carefully positioned collaborators, who would maintain their traditional status and identity even as they learned to work alongside the French. But when Hardy left Morocco in 1926, both of these educational systems for Muslims remained quite embryonic, with a combined total of only 6,228 students. Roughly speaking, these school systems accounted for only one-fifth of the Protectorate's education budget, the bulk of which went to finance schools for Europeans.

If Hardy is the central figure in Segalla's study, considerable attention is also given to Louis Brunot, who served as head of Muslim Education from 1920 to 1939. These two officials worked together when it came to imagining Moroccans and their education. Unlike Hardy, who left Morocco in 1926 to become the director of the *École Coloniale* in Paris, Brunot remained in Rabat until the eve of the Second World War. With so much weight given to these two actors, Segalla finds little space for a careful examination of how educational discourses and directives were applied (or modified, or rejected) at the local level. Too focused on Hardy's and Brunot's generalizations about a "Moroccan soul," Segalla does not allow us to appreciate how colonial schools confronted local contexts and cultures.

A more thoroughgoing study of the local dynamics of colonial education can be found in Irbouh's *Art in the Service of Colonialism*. Unlike Segalla, Irbouh probes inside individual schools and workshops, highlighting not only the efforts of local education officials, but also the complex responses of specific Moroccans. A rather different picture emerges from Irbouh's study. We see how French authorities (many of whom worked under Hardy) sought to use artisanal training to reinvent and codify the "authentic" styles of Morocco's different towns and rural regions. Far from promoting a synthetic vision of Morocco, those responsible for artisanal education sought to carefully update local vernaculars, which were said to be inherently deficient or to have degenerated with the arrival of cheap foreign imports.

In Segalla's telling, the influence of Hardy and Brunot was so decisive that it continued to inform educational policy, not only after the Second World

War, but well after Moroccan independence. Unfortunately, the legacy of interwar schools is not convincingly demonstrated. After devoting four chapters largely to Hardy and Brunot and their views of education, Segalla seems to rush through the remainder of the book. The Popular Front period, the Vichy period, the postwar period, and the post-independence period are all briefly touched on, but they are not given any of the weight that Segalla gives to the 1920s and early 1930s. In many ways, this is Segalla's point—that the essentializing schools of Hardy and Brunot were so powerfully established that their influence rippled across later decades.

The last chapters of Segalla's book do leave some room for the resistance of Moroccan Muslims, who had their own ideas about education. Throughout the duration of the Moroccan Protectorate, Moroccans took advantage of an array of educational options, which the colonial state never managed to effectively control. These included keeping one's children at home, patronizing rival school systems such as the Salafi "free schools," gaining access to the Protectorate's European schools, making educational pilgrimages to Egypt and the Middle East, and finding a way to study in metropolitan France. Other forms of resistance took place within the colonial school system. Segalla shows how students and former students of the *collèges musulmans*, pressured education authorities to provide larger doses of "modern" education. The *collèges musulmans* eventually gave into this pressure when they introduced the baccalauréat in 1930. But obstacles to French education remained in place and only a few students at the *collèges musulmans* succeeded in passing the baccalauréat (a total of four in 1933).

This would change after the Second World War, when the Protectorate government finally realized that assimilation posed a lesser risk to French authority than the developing nationalist movement. Pressured by young elites—many of whom had passed through the *collèges musulmans*—Protectorate authorities drastically expanded the educational system, while providing ever greater access to French education. But even as their demands for access to metropolitan-level education gained traction, nationalist leaders had already begun to call for other school reforms, aimed at consolidating an autonomous Moroccan identity. Segalla argues that the essentializing legacy of the schools of the 1920s and 1930s helped nationalist leaders to frame a school system that would promote reductionist understandings of the Moroccan nation. If schools in post-colonial Morocco refused to sufficiently acknowledge the place of the Berbers within the nation, it was partly because they retained aspects of Hardy's vision. Similarly, post-independence efforts to "Arabize" the school system, and thereby reduce the role of French, are seen by Segalla as an ironic perpetuation of Hardy's efforts to essentialize Moroccan identity.

Paul Jankowski, *Shades of Indignation: Political Scandals in France, Past and Present* (New York: Berghahn, 2008).

**Review by Julian Wright, University of Durham**

Three essays, a trilogy of vices to be weighed against the classic trinity of modern France: in *Shades of Indignation*, Jankowski invites us to discuss treason, corruption, and injustice, and to reflect on what history can tell us about French social attitudes toward these sins in our own day. Each essay scours previous ages to find traces of the “prevalent political morality” of other generations. Jankowski’s erudition is deployed to consider not so much what scandal tells us about the French, but about unfolding legal, political, and popular definitions of scandal in a country where the law and the state have had a tortured relationship since the early middle ages. Indeed, one of the unstated themes of the book is precisely the uniquely complex story of the legal basis of France’s polity.

While the richness of the book is beyond question, it would nevertheless have been interesting to have a final essay, rather than the terse conclusion included here, weaving together the three themes and drawing together these deep-rooted fluctuations in the way state and people have been reconceptualized through the periods that Jankowski knows best. Jankowski obliges us nonetheless to consider the history of French society’s engagement with the legal problems he describes as something that is constantly shifting—hence the ‘shades’ of indignation that society expresses in subtle variations over time. This is not a history of shocking errors of judgment, deeply troubling financial irregularities or appalling treachery; but rather a history of things that look more or less wrong depending on who is looking, which regime is in power and which legal jurisdiction is in place, taking into account wider moral absolutes as they themselves fluctuate. Treachery between 1938 and 1945 could take on many different forms and definitions; the level of corruption that citizens of 1900 and their descendants of 2000 could tolerate would likewise vary. Even within one time-frame, the irregularities that might exercise investigating magistrates under Mitterrand would never excite the public as much as the idea of innocent hemophiliacs being poisoned as they underwent blood transfusions. Thus Jankowski invites us to a mature reflection on scandal, considering the critical transformations that take place when a scandal quietly dies as much as the heady moments when headlines are made.

Treason is the crime that has perhaps changed most, in the eyes of the law and the public. In Capetian times, it could attach itself most obviously to crimes against the lord or king; but the concept of a crime against the state, so essential to Justinian’s legal definitions, was more difficult to pin down. Of course, centuries later, Richelieu would weave together the “national enterprise” and its “royal incarnation,” making *lèse-majesté* into a broader category that would in due course entail a new idea: *raison d’état*. The suddenness of the changes brought about by the French Revolution was such, however, that the

new concept of *lèse-nation* became a tool of terror, as the shifting definitions of nation and people entailed uncertainty over how to define treachery in the new order. This uncertainty forms part of the story of the unfolding crisis of 1792-94. But it lies, still more importantly, at the heart of the regime-round-about of nineteenth-century France. Marshal Ney was only the best-known of the many political figures who found that regime change left them in a quandary. It effectively became a commonplace that disloyalty to a regime could in fact entail loyalty to the nation. This was the argument both of Pétain, ending the Third Republic, and de Gaulle, denouncing Pétain's new revolution. The speed of these shifts is best encapsulated in the example of Lieutenant Mornet, author of the concept of *trahison morale* as applied during the First World War to convict the spy Bolo-Pasha, and who would have the task, three decades later, of laying out the roots of Marshal Pétain's complicity with Germany. Perhaps it is that very rapidity that has allowed the definition of treachery to crumble in its *lèse-majesté* or *lèse-nation* formulations, leaving in the twenty-first century a simpler concept in which the citizen is exalted, and where the most heinous of crimes is now that against humanity.

The reputation of the "Incorruptible" Robespierre was made during the scandal of the East Indies Company during the Terror; but few later politicians have managed to make their own careers out of the peccadilloes of others. As modern regimes or presidents change, the discovery of scandals and venality can give the appearance that corruption, if it is not to become endemic, needs new personalities, new political blood. But, long before the scandals that embroiled the Ralliement pour la République in the 1990s and the Socialist Party in the 1980s (scandals that seemed to tarnish the political class in the eyes of political commentators, but not always the man in the street), the novelists of the fin-de-siècle had realized that the public perceived corruption as something deeper than mere financial impropriety. Indeed neither Wilson, nor the *chéquards* of the Panama affair, nor Stavisky would cause the Third Republic its terminal problems. The irony of this chapter is that the emergence of a fundamentally venal system of royal administration in the medieval and early modern periods was profoundly associated with a strong sense of outrage at the misuse of public interests. The court that was designed in 1716 to investigate public finance declared "we could not punish so many guilty parties appropriately severely without dangerously disrupting commerce and shaking the entire structure of the state" (65). The example of the unfortunate Fouquet who traded upwards in the purchasing of offices, to such a point that he became the king's creditor, is developed with flair by Jankowski to demonstrate the tensions and contradictions of the crimes of *concussion* and *peculat* in the ancien régime. Ultimately, for Fouquet as for Chaban-Delmas or Giscard d'Estaing three hundred years later, corruption was a tool your political opponents used to unseat you—but the public, with less immediate political gain to be made, were less judgmental.

Jankowski's final essay, on injustice, returns to the theme of legality and the state that he had opened up in the chapter on treason. Here the inherent tension within the law, most noticeable in competing liberal ideas of justice, provides the *leitmotif*: is the role of the magistrature to uphold the freedom of the citizen by protecting the state and good order? Or, as in the concept of equity, should it seek inspiration for a more wide-ranging role, as did the judge who acquitted a beggar in 1898, insisting that the interpretation of law should rest on "the most generous precepts of humanity" (134). Under the ancien régime, of course, the right to administer laws equitably was contested by monarch and parlement. This contest helps to explain the dissonance between the gradual decrease in arbitrariness of royal authority and the growth in perceptions of injustice, notably those propounded by Voltaire and other publicists in the second half of the eighteenth century. Jankowski demonstrates the lengthy history of equity as an appurtenance of royalty—a sign of the monarch's right to innovate and adapt; indeed it clearly resonates with Judeo-Christian notions of godly rulership. This deep-rooted concept is at the heart of many of the most problematic confrontations between state and citizen in modern times. It marks out, most importantly, the legal system at the time of the Dreyfus Affair as embroiled in the eternal paradox of the magistrature: that the good order of the state must be administered at the same time as equity is upheld. It is above all ironic that the bold, investigative magistrature of the middle years of the Fifth Republic is now under attack from a climate of opinion that finds their actions inequitable. Once again, the primacy of the individual seems assured. Jankowski concurs with Marcel Gauchet on the rise of the "personal" (48).

Thought-provoking, rapid in their movement across time and fluent in their manipulation of diverse legal and political theories, these essays are also sometimes dense and demand a certain degree of patience. Jankowski's prose, which finds new abstractions in already complex material, can be off-putting at times. The editors have missed some little mistakes, and it's difficult to know what this sentence means: "Even when the justice system itself failed the citizenry, and when a capitulation appeared to sacrifice truth to convenience, judges and lawyers outdid the journalists in unsparing, unsparing as their own critics" (162). Nonetheless, historians of political, legal, and social history will all derive much profit from following Jankowski's fascinating discussions. Most gratifyingly, the propensity of some historians to pursue scandals and headlines for their own sake is quietly countered, throughout the volume, by Jankowski's wise and meticulous examination of the subtle gradations in the social understanding of scandal.

Patrick Weil, *Liberté, égalité, discriminations: L'Identité nationale' au regard de l'histoire* (Paris: Grasset, 2008).

**Review by Clifford Rosenberg, The City College of New York and the Graduate Center, CUNY**

This little book covers a great deal of ground, with authority. Readers looking for an introduction to present-day debates over race and immigration, discrimination, and the memory of discrimination in French nationality law, and the politics of commemoration will find no better guide than Patrick Weil. At once conceptually sharp and archivally grounded, *Liberté, égalité, discriminations* brings together three essays Weil published in leading French journals over the course of a dozen years, updated for this volume and tied together with a new introduction. The essays were picked to make a political point, and the resulting volume retains a unity of purpose rare for such collections. Weil takes aim here at President Nicolas Sarkozy and his penchant for craven, populist, anti-immigrant appeals. The French President has suggested that France has the right to choose immigrants based on geographic or ethnic origin, that France suffers from an excess of repentance for sins of the past, and that the country has gotten hopelessly mired in "memory wars." In each case, Weil takes the opposite view. Together the essays present a compelling challenge to the current administration and a sophisticated intervention in the contemporary debate over identity politics in France.

The first, and most substantial, of the three essays deals with the role of racial prejudice in French immigration policy. Weil paints a thorough portrait of the racial thought of leading policy makers. He looks not only at published writings but draws heavily on internal government reports and correspondence, the debates that weighed most heavily in political decision making. He explores the anxieties and ethnic preferences of Alexandre Parodi, Alfred Sauvy, Pierre Tissier, and, in particular, the immigration expert Georges Mauco. Weil's treatment of Mauco is particularly damning. Extensive passages document Mauco's racism. France, in Mauco's view, could never integrate Jews, Armenians, or Arabs. The other men broadly shared this vision of an ethnic hierarchy and degrees of assimilability, though they tended to be less rigid; even the Resistance leader, Tissier, agreed that "the Jewish problem exists, even in France" (35).

Instead of leaving the story there, however, and satisfying himself with documenting cases of French racism at the highest levels, Weil takes a critical further step. He considers the relationship between thought and action. Here his findings may surprise. Despite the manifest racism of those policy-makers, immigration policy and especially the laws governing access to French citizenship have remained surprisingly color-blind since 1945. After the Second World War the central government actively promoted the migration of Algerian Muslims to the French mainland, urging big business to employ Algerian workers even when those businesses were reluctant to do so. On one hand,

this picture is too rosy. Weil overlooks the explicit racial criteria French politicians used to restrict the entry of North Africans during the interwar years; he brushes aside police methods that have targeted ethnic minorities and discrimination in labor and housing markets (esp. 13, 85–86). But, with respect to formal, national-level immigration law, he is absolutely right: France was the first country in the industrial West to establish broadly egalitarian immigration rules and also the first in which the executive branch has tried to violate those rules in favor of racial preferences. Sarkozy wants to build on a tradition of discrimination that, historically, has been largely relegated to the realm of administrative directives and discretionary enforcement and elevate it with the sanction of parliamentary law.

In the second essay, Weil moves from the history of discrimination to its memory among victims and its commemoration by the general public. Why is it, he asks, that some discriminations leave deep scars and elicit public outcry while others receive much less attention? France has radically restricted the legal rights of Algerian Muslims, Jews, newly naturalized French citizens, and French women who married foreigners. But the response of the victims and societal recognition of those past discriminations is very different. The latter two cases provoked remarkably little protest. Some 200,000 French women lost their nationality, often without their knowledge, when they married foreign men. The newly naturalized, in turn, had to wait five to ten years to enjoy all the benefits of citizenship. In both cases, the victims remained dispersed and difficult to mobilize. Individuals grappled with their individual plight, unable to connect their personal suffering to others'. Discrimination against Muslims and Jews, however, has provoked major public outcry.

Weil presents a suggestive if abstract answer to this puzzle. Building on Henry Rousso's work on the "Vichy syndrome," Weil contends that the intensity of recent memory wars stems not from pervasive, ongoing discrimination and official denial but rather its absence. Years after the actual trauma ended, unexpected, trivial events triggered in turn the Vichy and then Algeria syndromes, irrational, obsessive responses out of all proportion to the events that provoked them. This Freudian argument works better for Vichy than Algeria. Into the Mitterrand years, the nationality of children born in France to Algerian Muslims remained contested, to say nothing of police harassment and other forms of discrimination against people of North African origin, which persist. But Weil's focus on these specific triggers effectively calls attention to the disparity between the collective memory of different groups whose claims to French nationality were rejected by the French state. The problem is not an excessive repentance for past sins, he shows, but a selective one.

Finally, he turns to commemoration. Several times in the country's past, Republican France has combined a celebration of fundamental values with a radical ban on any activity that challenged those values, bans that, strictly speaking, are at odds with republican egalitarianism. In the course of his work on French nationality law, Weil discovered an overlooked aspect of the aboli-

tion of slavery in 1848. At a stroke, the *quarante-huitards* affirmed the Republic's core values and proscribed any who failed to respect them: jurists at the time, he found, referred to the measure as a supra-legal one that punished crimes of "lèse humanité," that is, a forerunner of crimes against humanity. With the definitive establishment of the Third Republic in the 1880s, French authorities famously made July 14 the national holiday, and, at the same time, revised the constitution to prevent any alternate form of government, thereby restricting the political rights of (the quite numerous) monarchists. A century later, in the 1980s, after the scale of Vichy's collaboration had become clear, the so-called "loi Gayssot" outlawed any denial of crimes against humanity committed during World War II. More recently, the "loi Taubira" made explicit what was implicit in 1848, celebrating the abolition of slavery and condemning the practice, explicitly, as a crime against humanity. Hardly a recent development, the effort to define the boundaries of acceptable opinion has a lengthy republican pedigree.

Taken together, these essays show a major historian in his prime. Tacking back and forth effortlessly between present day political disputes and their antecedents in the past, Weil does full justice to both. He eviscerates Sarkozy's recent efforts to claim a usable past and presents a challenging alternative vision of the uneasy relationship between liberty, fraternity, and inequality.

Cécile Laborde, *Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

**Review by Cheryl B. Welch, Harvard University**

*New York Times*' writer John Vinocur notes that the French avoid the real issues and compromises necessary to create an identity that is both Muslim and French by charades such as debates over whether to ban the burqa, which he calls "low-risk choreography as ancient as the minuet."<sup>1</sup> In the so-called republican revival in contemporary political theory, some have noted similar dances of avoidance in which the legacies of historical figures like Machiavelli and Rousseau become a field for stylized sparring over the deficiencies of contemporary politics without the high risk of directly confronting messy questions of class, religion, and identity. In *Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy*, Cécile Laborde succeeds in leading the reader through some of the intricate steps of both of these modern minuets. Trained as a political theorist in both France and England, and a neo-republican fellow traveler, Laborde is very well-equipped to act as a guide to francophone and

anglophone republicanism.<sup>2</sup> But it is her own lucid intelligence that makes *Critical Republicanism* such a provocative and stimulating read.

Laborde's book is above all a contextualization of the hijab controversy in French political thought, illuminating why the debate over Muslim girls' right to wear the hijab in schools became a lightning rod for debates over France's political identity. But it is larger than a book on the hijab controversy in two senses. First, she uses her understanding of contemporary political theory in the English-speaking world to gain critical distance on French republican thinking and to translate its tenets into the language of Anglo-American political theorizing. Thus the French republican understanding of fairness is likened to Brian Barry's egalitarian liberalism; French notions of liberty as autonomy are explicated through Rawls's distinction between a comprehensive liberal education and a political liberal education; *laïcité* emerges as a more robust version of liberal neutrality; the insights of French feminists are appropriated through the lens of Philip Pettit's republican theory of non-domination. Yet Laborde points out that French republicanism is a distinctive theoretical force in its own right. In England and America, republicanism is often a perspective to be excavated in order to reveal buried insights: past Machiavellian moments that implicitly indict the crass individualism, materialism, or quietism of the present. In France, by contrast, republicanism is not dead. With common roots in ancient and early modern thought, but nurtured in different soil and grafted in a particular way onto Enlightenment values, French republicanism is a living thing, continually revived to meet the political crises of European political modernity. Laborde's work above all facilitates a transatlantic conversation about the meaning of republicanism in modern political thought.

A second way in which *Critical Republicanism* surpasses the issue of the hijab is in its sustained analysis of how religious and ethnic identities should intersect with the public sphere in modern pluralistic societies. Laborde's deepest instinct is to think that the "universalism" of French republicanism, with its celebration of citizens as equal regardless of particular loyalties, identities, and beliefs, represents a way forward in the difficult politics of the twenty-first century. As she remarks, "The fact that republican ideals have been imperfectly realized does not mean that they are incoherent or illusionary and that they cannot be used by minorities to challenge the status quo" (223). The "critical republicanism" of her title is an internal critique: sympathetic to the ambition of French republicans at their best, but sharply critical of them at their worst.

Laborde casts her discussion in the form of reconstructed debates between "official French republicans" and their indigenous critics ("tolerant" republicans) about the wearing of the hijab in public schools. These debates represent a dispute within the tradition of French republicanism over the history and practice of concepts that both endorse, namely the foundational triad of *égalité*, *liberté*, and *fraternité*. Part I discusses the need for modern states to treat all equally; Part II discusses the importance of fundamental liberties; and Part III asks whether and how the modern state should foster solidarity. Each section

proceeds in the same contrapuntal rhythm with a reconstruction of the official republican position from its own standpoint, a similarly sympathetic reconstruction of the criticisms made of this position by looser or more tolerant republicans, and finally, Laborde's own complex position, symbolized in her judgment that a correct understanding of the demands of equality, liberty, and fraternity would permit the wearing of the hijab in public schools, though not for the reasons put forth by most critics.

It is obviously not possible to do justice to the nuances of "critical republicanism" in a review, but in general, Laborde faults official republicans for being willfully seduced by their own universalistic and egalitarian principles in a way that obscures the real history of the French Republic and its social legacy. It is as if these official republicans have a debilitating hearing impairment: deaf to the constant background noise of colonialism and historically-generated inequities and injustices, yet hyper-sensitive to any sounds that echo historical debates within Christianity over proselytism and the place of religious symbols in the public sphere. Tolerant republicans, on the other hand, have perfect pitch when it comes to grasping the "mass of anomalies, exceptions, and compromises" (70) that constitute the history of the Republic; they are highly attuned to the cultural specificities underlying claims to neutral universalism. But they draw exactly the wrong conclusion from listening to this discordant history. They conclude that respect for the differences of fellow citizens means recognizing and entrenching such differences in the public sphere. But this, Laborde argues, is to generalize and institutionalize the status quo and to ignore the negative impact of multicultural and multi-religious accommodation on vulnerable members of benefitting groups, to slight the rights of non-believers, and, most important, to ignore the state's duty to equip its citizens for political life.

Laborde's view that official republicans confuse ideal theory with a deeply flawed social reality is perhaps strongest in Part III, which completely accepts the counter-history of critics who attack the myth of French republican assimilationism. The nationalist myth that peasants (and immigrants) were turned into French citizens by adopting a superior French universalist culture and abandoning their own provincial or foreign roots relies on a highly contestable construal of French common culture and a false reconstruction of the ways in which past immigrants were assimilated. Not only did and does the real republic fall short of its principles, Laborde argues, but, as the *Beur* movement of the 1980s rightly concluded, it is faithless and corrupt: "la République est une menteuse." Laborde's goal, however, is not condemnation but rather the revival of more inclusive nineteenth-century republican aspirations, in which social equality and political equality support each other. In the search for ways to eliminate the institutional, cultural, and social obstacles to the fair incorporation of minorities, the onus is on mainstream institutions "radically to reform themselves in ways that promote the political and social participation of all" (230).

If Laborde's attempt to infuse the principles of the official republicans with the historical and sociological realism of the tolerant republicans is most apparent in her discussion of the need to make solidarity real, her own theoretical position comes into focus most clearly in her discussion of the need to make liberty real. She criticizes tolerant republicans for having combined modest doses of political liberalism with a "postmodern sociology of subjectivity" in such a way as to diminish the idea of freedom and to dull its critical edge. Her alternative reaffirms the emancipatory role of French education in producing autonomous free citizens. Following Philip Pettit, however, she defines autonomy not as the realization of one's potential as a reasoning being, but as the capacity to resist domination. And extending Pettit's work, she includes in the notion of "domination" paternalistic forms of control internalized by vulnerable members of society. Republican educators should foster the development of "minimum discursive control" or "voice" so that citizens, including Muslim girls, can learn to speak up for themselves. Laborde endorses careful contextual analysis of actual power relations as the way to discover which attachments have become debilitating and oppressive adaptive preferences. But it is perhaps here that her discussion seems least grounded in context and most free-floating. How can schools encourage "minimal autonomy" without imposing views of the good life or refashioning selves? Laborde is frustratingly elusive when not blithely over-confident on this point. "By autonomy-related skills, I mean an extensive set of skills encompassing practical reason, moral courage, critical skills, awareness of the 'burdens of reason,' exposure to a diversity of ways of life, understanding of the full range of one's rights, and so forth" (158). And so forth, indeed.

If some aspects of her account of critical republicanism are not as clear or intuitively plausible as Laborde suggests, this does not detract from the merit of her work. A surefooted and intelligent guide to debates over identity politics in France, Laborde manages to achieve both analytical distance from, and sympathetic engagement with, her subject. Her use of two languages of liberal republican theory to clarify each other and to illuminate matters of urgent political importance models a way to think about reforming "non-ideal" societies and deserves the attention of anyone seriously interested in doing so.

## Notes

1. "France Fails to Talk About the Real Issue," *New York Times*, 19 January 2010.
2. See also *Republicanism and Political Theory*, ed. Cécile Laborde and John Maynor (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).

Susan J. Terrio, *Judging Mohammed: Juvenile Delinquency, Immigration, and Exclusion at the Paris Palace of Justice* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).

**Review by Katherine C. Donahue, Plymouth State University**

Susan Terrio spent five years, from 2000 to 2005, investigating the juvenile justice system in Paris. Her time spent at the Paris Palace of Justice and at associated institutions, such as the youth detention center at Fleury-Mérogis prison, resulted in a well-researched and deeply instructive account of the processes of investigation, prosecution, and decision-making in cases brought against youths. These young people are often, but not always, the children and grandchildren of North and West Africans. Some are immigrants without papers, but many are the children of French citizens and are firmly French themselves. Terrio documents how decisions on whether to prosecute or set free are made. She makes explicit the transitions in courtroom procedure and in the selection and education of judges, prosecutors, and social workers undertaken by the French system of judgment and penalization over the last century. French concepts of personality, culture, and society have clearly changed over time. Occasionally influenced by American approaches to juvenile justice and urban social ecology, the French have alternated between rehabilitative and retributive models for understanding child development.

The French juvenile justice system has been particularly challenged by the immigration of North and West Africans who were initially encouraged to come to France in the 1950s and 1960s. Their descendants are now the ones whose behavior is considered to be the “delinquency of exclusion.” These young people are delinquent, it is argued, because they are excluded from French society. Concerned about integration and adherence to French customs and values, the French Republic, and the children of that Republic, the French are faced with problems of un- and underemployment and an education system that tracks certain youths into vocational schools even when students oppose such placement away from better schools that offer some guarantee of success. Without much future, living in housing that now reflects the economic exclusion felt by the children of immigrants, these youths occasionally turn to violence, as they did in October and November of 2005. Described by the French administration as “savages” or “scum,” these young people encounter a system of justice that grapples with how best to discipline what are seen as unruly youths who have not internalized the middle-class French *habitus*.

The policies of the French juvenile justice system reflect changing views of categories of childhood, of children’s moral and legal responsibilities, of the place of immigrants, and of their incorporation into French society, no matter where these immigrants and their children come from. Terrio focuses primarily on the cases of juveniles with African and Muslim backgrounds. Mohammed is the most commonly chosen name for Muslim boys, hence the title of the book.

Yet Terrio is inclusive in her focus, for she includes examples of cases brought against Asian and eastern European juveniles. In a chapter entitled "New Barbarians at the Gates of Paris?" she draws on the interactions of Romanian street children with the justice system in order to broaden further her description of changing notions of childhood moral and legal responsibility.

Terrio moves skillfully from descriptions of the juvenile justice system and its workings to the changing representations of youths who appear before them, to the education of the juvenile court personnel, including the prosecutors and judges, to the tension between anti-penal and pro-penal judges, and to the role played by *éducateurs*, or court caseworkers, who once were from working-class backgrounds and who are now predominantly middle-class and female. Depending on the climate of the time, these *éducateurs* have alternately been regarded as social workers or probation officers. Throughout the book the interplay among class, gender, and role is also apparent among the defendants, their prosecutors, and their judges. A graduate of the *École Nationale de la Magistrature* who chooses to work in the juvenile justice system faces being excluded from the fast track of advancement in that system. The fact that women have increasingly become judges has enabled a perception that female juvenile judges are playing the role of social workers. Yet the class and gender differences between the judges and the preponderance of youths who appear in the system ensure a wide gap in understanding the stressors and causes of behavior considered to be delinquent.

The personnel working in the justice system clearly wrestle with the concept of culture. Many of the youths arriving in the court system are assumed to be guilty of "a poverty of culture linked to a culture of poverty" (229). At best, by incorporating ideas of the role of the culture of poverty in determining what is deemed to be bad behavior, judges, prosecutors, and *éducateurs* often ignore the strains placed on these youths by poor education and lack of jobs. When trying to be sensitive to cultural difference, the courts hire ethnopsychiatrists to interview, and explain to the court, the behavior of children and their parents who, the ethnopsychiatrists allege, may have connections to Malian or Senegalese views of witchcraft, or who possess what is viewed as an overly close attachment between a mother and her child. One particularly sad example of the latter is when concepts of cultural difference protected an abusive but well-regarded middle-class French father from prosecution while the court removed a nine year old Algerian-Turkish boy from his mother's care, claiming that the boy was too attached to his mother, as was the mother to the son (198-201).

Chapter six, "Rendering Justice in Chambers," provides case studies of the interactions that occur when bringing youths to the justices' chambers for a hearing. There are restrictions on the severity of the penalty that can be imposed in these cases, but the judges can order supervision and judicial control, tantamount to surveillance, "rather than as a possibility of transformation through rehabilitation" (181). Terrio's descriptions of individual cases

provide colorful insights into the lives of youths and their relatives in France. Overcrowded hotels, high-rise apartment blocks, and streets that many French policemen dare not patrol produce a number of the young people who appear in the Paris Palace of Justice. However, there are also the well-educated youths with aspirations and hopes who get caught in the system. One such example is Ahmed, a middle-class boy who happened to observe, and then intervene in, an unruly Bastille Day celebration (175). Terrio's descriptions of these various lives lead one to wish there could have been personal interviews with the youths and their relatives, since the court transactions she describes do not always fully flesh out the lives of the accused.

In "Judging Delinquents in the Juvenile Court," chapter seven, Terrio describes the ways in which the court system views the proper outcome of prosecution in court. She notes that in the United States a youth's moral character is considered. Is he or she a "bad kid"? If so, there should be some retribution. In France, however, it is important that the youth acknowledge the "wrong done to the social order" (224). The symbolic capital of class, hard work, and aspirations is the operational currency used in the court system. Juveniles are expected to plead guilty, dig deep inside themselves, and resolve to adhere to French values. In short, they must become integrated into French society. The justice system expects that a "culture of confession" should be operational (242). Courtroom dramas seem to play out according to a particular script. Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges appear to play ascribed roles that are meant to work out a satisfactory solution. Yet defendants do not always seize the opportunity to confess and, as Terrio explains, despite their histrionics, the defense attorneys seem to have little effect on the outcome (240-44).

Terrio does a good job of describing the frustration and anger of the young people who appear at the Paris Palace of Justice. Their grandfathers and fathers worked in factories and in construction. Those jobs are disappearing, replaced by positions in the service sector. Education for these positions takes longer than it did for vocational training and, even upon successful graduation there is still no assurance that the youths will actually get a job, largely because their color and pattern of speech work against them. Academic failure is common. The future is at best uncertain (245). With little to do and nowhere much to go, these youths occasionally find a target for their frustration. Many of the cases appear to be prompted by petty theft or vandalism. The penal model of dealing with these cases, as opposed to a rehabilitative model, Terrio argues, places importance on restitution to victims (253). The goal is for the perpetrator and the victim to recognize each other in order to move toward acknowledgement of the impact of the violation on both parties. Yet, despite meetings with the victims and interactions with the judges, prosecutors, attorneys, and *éducateurs*, that recognition does not necessarily happen.

In her penultimate chapter, "New Barbarians at the Gates of Paris?", Terrio documents the difficulties of the French juvenile justice system in coping

with undocumented, unaccompanied minors prosecuted for illegal activities. The flow of Romanian street children, some with, some without relatives, is a case in point. The French view of who and what constitutes a child is on occasion at variance with non-French or non-Western views. News of the creation of a special court, Court L, in Paris, to deal with unaccompanied minors accused of illicit activities, and of French attempts to protect these minors, spread to Romania, where some children were encouraged by their families to migrate, particularly because of these French policies. The provision of protections for unaccompanied minors has not been successful. Often the children are not actually unaccompanied, nor did they feel they need protection. These children do not respond to summonses, or they appear in court and then disappear.

Terrio concludes *Judging Mohammed* with some depressing statistics. Between 1994 and 2001 firm prison sentences for minors rose from 1,905 to 4,542 per year and the number of pretrial detentions doubled (286). Twenty-four percent of prisoners are foreigners; twenty-five percent are French citizens whose fathers were foreigners. Under President Nicolas Sarkozy, a Justice Minister (of North African descent) oversaw the imposition of automatic minimum sentences for repeat offenders, and the lowering of the age of majority for criminal prosecution from eighteen to sixteen years. This, Terrio points out, was a return to the Napoleonic penal code of 1810. A poll published in *Le Figaro*, a conservative newspaper, indicated that 77 percent of those polled thought that the judicial system was not doing enough to punish juvenile offenders (289). *Judging Mohammed* makes clear that the Parisian juvenile justice system is not blind, nor is *égalité* necessarily considered relevant. Terrio's book is an important contribution not only to the literature on juvenile justice systems, but also to the literature on the challenges faced by nation-states such as France whose core values and principles imperfectly meet the changing needs of its citizens.

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