

BOOK REVIEWS

Stéphane Gerson, *The Pride of Place: Local Memories and Political Culture in Nineteenth-Century France* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003).

Review by James R. Lehning, University of Utah

Since the publication of the multivolume study of French *Lieux de mémoire* edited by Pierre Nora in the mid-1980s, historians of France have shown a continuing interest in the ways in which perceptions and representations of the past have affected French culture. These studies of memory have been very diverse, but they have provided some of the most illuminating of historians' recent insights into the French past. This work by Stéphane Gerson adds to that literature, examining the state policies and local groups that revitalized and shaped local memories in provincial France between the 1820s and 1870s.

While the groups and individuals that Gerson studies were not the first to emphasize local concerns, he argues that they were the first to consider these within the nineteenth-century context of debates about "territorial identity, citizenship, and governmental authority in a modern nation-state" (6). Local concerns thus were a fundamental aspect of the nineteenth-century reimagination of postrevolutionary France. Gerson's argument is, therefore, that local and modern were complementary, not inimical, in France between the 1820s and 1880s. Hence, the book speaks to several important aspects of French history: the path of what Gerson refers to as "modernization" in nineteenth-century France, the relationship of the French state to provincial elites, and the changing place of local and specific concerns during this period.

Gerson examines these general concerns through the Comité des travaux historiques (CTH), scientific congresses and the Institut des provinces, Parisian journals on the provinces and decentralization, local learned societies and archaeological commissions, historical pageants, and cultural periodicals. While he claims to examine all French regions, there is a strong emphasis on the one department he studied in depth, the Nord. In examining the CTH, he finds a narrative that he extends beyond the specific regional circumstances of the Nord: initial steps toward recovery of the patrimony in the 1820s; a first

peak around 1830; a pause in the 1840s; a second peak between 1847 and the early 1850s; increasing conservatism in the 1850s, followed by a third peak, between 1857 and 1865, marked by demands for decentralization. The development of this field in the course of the century acquires particular significance as the many local organizations that became involved in these patrimonial activities existed, as Gerson says, "at the juncture of civil society and governmental action ... in which official action met the initiatives of civil society" (67-68).

These efforts to catalog and describe local monuments and communal histories arose for many members of local elites from a sense of the cultural disruption caused by the French Revolution and the need to restore unity and harmony through an appreciation of the common local past. In the 1820s and 1830s, some also saw this movement as an expression of the democratic society promised by the Revolution, in which the past would belong to all. But such attempts foundered on the growing conservatism of the July Monarchy and the rapid turn to the right by the Second Republic. By the 1850s, calls for preserving the local patrimony and for political decentralization had become increasingly conservative. Similarly, local history, especially in rural areas, became a way of inculcating conservative and traditional values in the face of depopulation and industrial development. This conservative bent of localism was somewhat modified by urban republicans, who used local histories as a way of developing patriotism, national identity, and even male citizenship. By the end of the Second Empire, an "uneasy but steady integration of local difference within the official cult of local memories" had developed (226).

Gerson's analysis provides an important corrective to histories that do not consider the interplay of national and local in French history. He also argues that there is a fundamental continuity from the July Monarchy through the Second Empire of what he calls the "intellectual state," a set of policies by which local artifacts were used to reshape social behavior. Perhaps because of this continuity that he sees across regimes, Gerson does not directly address the political aims of the movements for local memory or the civil society that they were creating in provincial France during the course of the nineteenth century. While he notes that the "French Revolution constitutes ... the backdrop of the field of local memories" (202), there are few instances of invocation of the local memory of the events of the 1790s. This may suggest that the local memory he is studying was a way of avoiding the legacy of the Revolution.

It is of course significant that these organizations did exist. In combination with studies such as Carol Harrison's work on Alsace (*The Bourgeois Citizen in Nineteenth-Century France: Gender, Sociability, and the Uses of Emulation*), they demonstrate that the myth of a France lacking a civil society should be discarded. But Gerson's work, if it shows that there was great interest in local memory among provincial elites, and that this was carefully encouraged by the state, principally concludes that this relationship was confused and

ambiguous: “At once private and public, political and apolitical, local and embedded in national, if not universal, frameworks, it captured and promised to allay the indeterminacy of a postrevolutionary era” (277). He focuses on the provincial notables who were the backbone of the nineteenth-century regimes he examines. It should not be surprising that these men favored local initiatives that they could dominate and that would avoid the dangerous implications of 1789 (and even more 1793) by reviving medieval memories. But leaving out artisans, workers, and peasants—whose memories may have focused more on the Vendée war, the dechristianization of the Year II, the Volunteers of 1792, or the Terror—may mean leaving out those French men and women for whom the “indeterminacy” of the nineteenth century could best be resolved not by a decentralized state but by a powerful central state that would, for example, provide an education for their children even if local elites (and national elites such as François Guizot and the Comte de Falloux) thought that this was asking for dangerous social change.

Eric Kocher-Marboeuf, *Le Patricien et le Général : Jean-Marcel Jeanneney et Charles de Gaulle 1958-1969*, 2 vols. (Paris: Comité pour l’Histoire économique et financière de la France, 2003).

Review by Alain Chatriot, CNRS, CRH-AHMOC

Le livre d’Eric Kocher-Marboeuf, aujourd’hui maître de conférences à l’Université de Poitiers, est issu d’une thèse de doctorat d’histoire soutenue, en janvier 1997, à l’IEP de Paris sous un titre d’ailleurs plus exact par rapport au contenu du livre : *Une décennie d’actions au service de la France gaullienne, Jean-Marcel Jeanneney 1959-1969* et sous la direction de Serge Berstein, qui donne ici une préface. Le délai écoulé entre la soutenance et la publication du livre laissait supposer que la thèse avait été repensée et réécrite pour se constituer en livre. On peut cependant fortement en douter quand on voit la structure de ces deux volumes qui s’apparentent plus à une édition *in extenso* qu’à une véritable écriture de livre. Certes, la nature de l’éditeur a pu accentuer ce penchant, mais on peut regretter cette situation qui offre ainsi une mine de documentation mais pas véritablement un ouvrage de réflexion sur un sujet pourtant passionnant.

La première question justement posée dans la préface et dans l’introduction concerne le fait, inhabituel pour un travail de recherche historique, que le sujet principal du livre est un homme politique français vivant. Serge Berstein indique d’ailleurs le « risque de lui servir d’historiographe ». Les prudences présentées par l’auteur dans son introduction générale ne sont

cependant pas sans poser de nombreux problèmes. On peut penser en effet que l'on est loin des diverses réflexions sur la biographie aussi bien celles de Pierre Bourdieu, Giovanni Levi, ou Jacques Le Goff, lorsque Eric Kocher-Marboeuf explique : « Il ne faut jamais oublier qu'une biographie réussie n'est rien d'autre qu'un roman véridique » (2). La particularité de la démarche consiste pour reprendre ses termes à opérer une « coupe géomorphologique », le « substrat étudié étant la République gaullienne dans sa profondeur de dix années ». Il ne s'agit pas donc pas d'une biographie complète de Jean-Marcel Jeanneney (d'autant que celui-ci a livré un intéressant volume d'entretiens avec Jean Lacouture, intitulé *Une mémoire républicaine*) mais bien d'une analyse concernant les dix années d'exercice de fonctions ministérielles. Le projet pouvait être passionnant si la problématique consistait, comme l'auteur le laisse espérer, à analyser comment le changement gaullien revendiqué a été vécu et mis en pratique par les hauts fonctionnaires. (Cette recherche a d'ailleurs été au cœur des travaux de la politiste Delphine Dulong, qui a écrit *Moderniser la politique : Aux origines de la Ve République*.) Mais hélas, les très riches archives déposées par Jean-Marcel Jeanneney au Centre d'histoire de l'Europe du vingtième siècle (CHEVS) constituent peut-être un piège plus qu'une solution, et on peut s'étonner de l'affirmation présentée à la fin de l'introduction : « Comme il est facile d'en juger, le fonds d'archives constitué par le ministre suffit amplement à analyser son action ». On est ainsi loin des méthodes de base de la critique et du recouplement des sources.

Les deux volumes s'organisent chronologiquement en trente-sept chapitres et cinq parties d'inégale longueur : les batailles de la modernisation industrielle ; l'ambassade en Algérie (juillet-décembre 1962) ; un ancien ministre toujours actif ; le ministère des occasions manquées : les Affaires sociales (1966-1968) ; et l'année des paradoxes (juin 1968-juin 1969).

Le chapitre premier donne des éléments sur la famille Jeanneney présentée comme une « dynastie républicaine », le père du ministre du général de Gaulle, Jules Jeanneney, avait été l'influent président du Sénat de la fin de la Troisième République. Ce chapitre, comme l'ensemble du livre, comporte de curieux jugements de valeur de l'auteur sur la personnalité de Jean-Marcel Jeanneney : « Il en résulte un indéniable sens des réalités provinciales et une capacité à maintenir une certaine distance vis-à-vis des modes intellectuelles parisiennes et de la propension à la vanité des hommes de pouvoir » (15). On peut aussi noter dans la conclusion cette étrange formule dans une comparaison lyrique entre Pompidou et Jeanneney : « [P]resque tout séparait Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, héritier de l'austère morale républicaine de son père, à un Georges Pompidou, pétri d'une intelligence vive mais enclin à un certain hédonisme comme beaucoup d'esthètes » (1095). Le terne récit factuel est souvent rehaussé par une grandiloquence maladroite, comme avec ce genre de saillie : « L'art suprême de l'homme politique n'est-il pas de faire oublier qu'il fait de la politique, c'est-à-dire qu'entre des choix possibles, il a su rendre le sien irremplaçable ? » (115)

Si on dispose des renseignements minimaux sur Jean-Marcel Jeanneney (né en 1910, formé à la Faculté de droit de Paris et à l'École libre des sciences politiques, docteur en droit avant d'être agrégé de sciences économiques en 1936), la présentation des doctrines économiques du professeur Jeanneney est peu développée et encore moins mise en rapport avec ses fonctions ministérielles. L'entrée en politique de Jeanneney ne fait pas l'objet d'une longue analyse, elle s'explique principalement par les liens d'amitié de Jeanneney avec son ancien condisciple de la rue Saint-Guillaume, Michel Debré, nouveau premier ministre de la Cinquième République. La vie quotidienne du nouveau ministre, souvent présenté comme technicien compte tenu de son absence d'expérience politique, est centré autour d'un cabinet réduit dirigé par un autre professeur d'économie, le jeune Raymond Barre. Malgré la présentation détaillée de l'organisation du ministère de l'Industrie, Kocher-Marboeuf ne s'intéresse que peu au fonctionnement administratif et au processus décisionnel si ce n'est dans de plates descriptions (l'analyse menée du courrier reçu au ministère n'est pas totalement convaincante). La suite de la première partie déroule les différents secteurs dont a eu à s'occuper Jeanneney entre 1959 et 1962 : la politique charbonnière (et en particulier sa dimension européenne, le plan de régression charbonnière qui porte son nom, les grèves de Decazeville), les autres secteurs énergétiques (surtout la politique pétrolière et ses grandes manœuvres gaulliennes, mais aussi le conflit des salaires à EDF-GDF), la politique de décentralisation industrielle (sans doute parmi les points les plus originaux de l'action menée par Jeanneney), et l'action pour quelques secteurs particuliers (le textile et l'artisanat).

Quittant le gouvernement avec l'arrivée de Pompidou, Jeanneney accepte de répondre à la demande expresse du général de Gaulle, de prendre, lui qui n'est pas diplomate, la première ambassade de France dans la jeune Algérie indépendante. Ses fonctions vont durer peu de temps (juillet 1962-janvier 1963) mais amènent le « patricien » à prendre conscience des difficultés des relations avec les anciens départements coloniaux. Les archives personnelles de l'ancien ministre permettent d'accéder essentiellement aux nombreux télégrammes diplomatiques expédiés depuis Alger. On peut regretter là encore, que malgré la richesse de cette information archivistique, aucune analyse ne soit réellement effectuée en prenant en compte l'historiographie existante sur ces questions. L'intérim avant de retrouver des fonctions ministérielles ne le voit pas oublié par le pouvoir politique qui lui confie différentes missions : la présidence d'une commission chargée de réfléchir sur la politique de coopération avec les pays en voie de développement, sa nomination au Conseil économique et social et à la délégation française au Conseil économique et social de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Il reprend également son enseignement d'économiste, mais cette question reste peu traitée dans le livre.

La quatrième partie, qui est l'une des plus intéressantes, concerne ce que l'auteur nomme « le ministère des occasions manquées », c'est-à-dire les

fonctions de Jeanneney au tout nouveau ministère des Affaires sociales entre 1966 et 1968. Il a en effet pour première mission de réaliser la fusion des différents ministères sociaux. Contrairement à sa première période ministérielle à l'Industrie, Jeanneney est cette fois confrontée non seulement aux clivages politiques et à des revendications sociales plus vives. Le ministre se retrouve de plus, avec le contexte de rigueur voulue par Debré à la rue de Rivoli et par Pompidou à Matignon, dans la situation délicate de ne rien avoir à proposer réellement pour des négociations sociales. De plus, il est réticent face à la vision gaullienne de la participation, et il échoue à refonder le dialogue social s'avérant un piètre négociateur lors des grèves de 1967. La grève des mensuels de la métallurgie de Saint-Nazaire est analysée dans le détail et pour une fois avec des sources qui ne sont pas seulement celles des archives du ministre. Les analyses sur mai 1968 sont très rapides (il est vrai que les archives du cabinet ont été détruites volontairement). Kocher-Marboeuf rappelle simplement la présence silencieuse du ministre des Affaires sociales qui reçoit les négociateurs dans son ministère à Grenelle, mais laisse le Premier ministre Georges Pompidou à la manœuvre. Outre l'autonomisation de la politique de l'emploi et la loi de décembre 1966 sur la formation professionnelle, les grands chantiers du ministre concerne aussi la réforme de la Sécurité sociale. Les ordonnances de 1967 sont analysées dans le détail, comme les tentatives de réforme médicale ou l'impulsion en matière de constructions hospitalières. Dans tous ces différents domaines, l'auteur présente des actions qui doivent cependant s'affronter à de nombreuses oppositions et contradictions. Certains chapitres, comme par exemple celui sur la politique familiale, manquent nettement des références historiographiques élémentaires sur ces sujets.

La cinquième partie concerne une période assez brève—juin 1968 à juin 1969—mais très remplie pour Jeanneney. Il se présente d'abord aux législatives à Grenoble contre Pierre Mendès France à qui il ne pardonne pas son engagement en mai '68, et après une campagne discutable (assez bien restituée dans le livre), il l'emporte d'une très courte majorité. Après cette victoire, Jeanneney est appelé à nouveau par le général comme ministre d'État ; il n'obtient pas l'Éducation nationale confiée à Edgar Faure, mais une mission concernant la réforme de la régionalisation et du Sénat. Le débat constitutionnel essentiel qui aboutit au référendum du 27 avril 1969 est là encore vu avec un manque de connaissance du dossier par l'auteur du livre, qui ne fait que suivre au jour le jour l'action d'un ministre convaincu de la réforme gaullienne mais ne percevant pas toujours les tensions internes à son camp. L'échec du référendum et le retrait du Général de Gaulle ne signent pas encore la fin de carrière politique de Jean-Marcel Jeanneney qui décide d'accepter la chancellerie pour la durée de la présidence intérimaire d'Alain Poher. Aucune conclusion ou réflexion réelle n'est apportée par l'auteur si ce n'est une synthèse stricte des différents chapitres.

La publication offre quelques photographies surtout dans le premier volume mais sans que celles-ci ne fassent vraiment l'objet d'une réflexion. Par

rapport à la masse du texte, la place des annexes est réduite (huit documents), et si certaines sont intéressantes (en particulier sur la décentralisation industrielle), une sélection plus complète et plus judicieuse aurait été nécessaire. La présentation des sources et de la bibliographie est très décevante : les sources sont très peu détaillées et alors que le livre repose intégralement sur le fonds Jeanneney déposé au CHEVS, aucun inventaire, même sommaire, n'en est livré. Une partie des sources pose de véritables problèmes ; elle est intitulée « Archives orales » (1132-45) et constituée d'une série de courtes et inégales notices concernant des personnalités politiques ou administratives (elles ne sont hélas pas toutes constituées avec la même précision, mais sont plutôt intéressantes). On ne sait cependant pas si ces personnes ont fait l'objet d'entretiens (ni leurs nombres, ni leurs dates ...), ce qui oblige à s'interroger sur la catégorie « archives » : dans l'introduction, on signale l'existence de ces « grands témoins » mais sans plus de réflexions sur cette catégorie d' « archives orales ». Les sources imprimées sont peu nombreuses, ce qui semble surprenant sur une période aussi proche. La bibliographie est franchement problématique pour un ouvrage scientifique ; malgré le sujet, elle est quasi-exclusivement franco-française (deux références seulement sont en anglais, et l'une concerne un article publié par un historien français !) et monodisciplinaire (les sciences sociales—économie, sociologie, et surtout science politique—sont copieusement ignorées). On peut y trouver toute sorte de manuels universitaires ou d'articles issus des revues de vulgarisation (de qualité, mais le décalage existe tout de même), mais peu d'études approfondies (et certaines absences sont difficilement explicables). Si la bibliographie du livre est plus complète que celle de la thèse, il est difficilement compréhensible que les responsables de la collection aient pu laisser passer un choix de références aussi partielles.

Bref, l'ensemble des deux volumes constitue un objet hybride plus proche de la thèse de doctorat inachevée que du livre. L'intérêt principal réside dans la masse de données factuelles (et par chance un index des noms assez pratique) issues des très riches archives Jeanneney (et à ce titre il est une source intéressante pour des bibliothèques universitaires), beaucoup plus que dans une réflexion sur la politique économique de la période gaullienne. Le lecteur peut ainsi se rendre compte du travail scientifique encore à mener sur les débuts de la Cinquième République française.

Herman Lebovics, *Bringing the Empire Back Home: France in the Global Age* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).

Review by Andrés Reggiani, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (Buenos Aires)

Bringing the Empire Back Home is Herman Lebovics's third book on French heritage (*patrimoine*) politics. As such, it completes a trilogy begun with *True France*, which covered the period from the 1900 International Exhibition in Paris to Vichy, followed by *Mona Lisa's Escort*, a splendid study of André Malraux and the creation of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. *Bringing the Empire Back Home* tells how, in the last thirty years, policymakers, social scientists, regional and anticolonial activists, politicians, and administrators have struggled over France's identity in an age increasingly dominated by ethnic politics and US-led globalization. Its five chapters illustrate France's complex process of coming to terms with its colonial past—and of confronting its postcolonial condition. The book opens with a discussion of the Larzac regionalist movement in the Southwest. The rich symbolism of this episode and the author's vivid account of the actors and issues involved make the first chapter one of the book's most accomplished parts—and the most amusing to read. In recent times, Larzac became associated with the colorful icon of the antiglobalization movement, José Bové. It was in the regional town of Millau that he and a group of followers denounced US global imperialism by smashing a McDonald's in 1999. At the time, a trade war was being waged, triggered by the French ban on US hormone-fed beef and the ensuing US prohibition on imported French Roquefort cheese, one of Larzac's main staples. In the early 1970s, this otherwise peaceful region located at the southern edge of the Massif Central was upset by the government's decision to expand a local military base, an idea concocted by Georges Pompidou's defense minister, Michel Debré, who was seeking additional training areas to replace the sites lost in the colonies. Until then, Larzac was a Catholic, conservative region with a very small leftist constituency. Initially, many local peasants were willing to sell their land; however, in the end, most resisted government expropriation. Such an outcome was possible largely because they connected their struggle to that of other oppressed minorities in Brittany, the Basque provinces, Catalonia, Corsica, and New Caledonia.

Linking the local with the national and global was the work of a group of *ex-soixante-huitards* who, disappointed by May 1968's failure to forge a student-worker alliance, looked to the regionalist cause as a new basis for progressive politics. Why did former Maoists and leftwing Catholics support a movement—in fact, they radicalized it—that since the French Revolution and throughout the Third Republic had been associated with conservative and even reactionary politics? Here Lebovics draws a crucial distinction between heritage as “something fixed, perfected in the past”—the illusion of an “impossible going-home-again”—and heritage as a liberating utopia that looks forward to a “more humane time and place” (4)—an idea dear to Marxist

thinkers, such as Ernst Bloch, as well as to communitarian Catholics. This definition of Larzac as a forward-looking *Heimat* was made clear by the militants' nonviolent methods of resisting the centralizing state as well as by their solidarity with the forces of anti-imperialism. In fact, they phrased their struggle as an anticolonial one, just like the Irish, Basque, and Catalan separatists. In 1974, they organized a harvest festival to help feed the Third World and welcomed regular visits from peasant and minority groups from all over the world. They even offered the Kanak people of New Caledonia a piece of their Larzac land. Beginning with the "red-white-black" spring of 1972, this revolt of leftists, Catholic peasants, and communitarian Christians became a successful contestatory movement that brought together anticolonialism, anti-militarism, the struggles for local power against central domination, a new internationalized regional consciousness, ecology, and, last but not least, "new media-savvy strategies of resistance" (17)—a crucial element for a movement that embraced nonviolence.

But why was there no negotiated settlement? Above all, why did the peasants listen to the city people who came to them as bearers of the true regionalist consciousness? The answer to this question comes partly in Chapter Two, a wonderful study of the imaginative way in which the French colonial administrators reinvented themselves as metropolitan cultural technocrats. To understand the radicalization and endurance of the Larzac protest we must see Debré's "good idea for some waste land" (29) as an example of an authoritarian style of state policy that forced the inhabitants of distant regions into a Paris-created national *imaginaire*. Since the early 1960s, de Gaulle and Malraux "pursued as their principal cultural project the disciplining of regional identity" (58). In the decade before the unrest in Larzac, decolonization tore the French empire apart, sometimes with disastrous consequences for the metropolis, as in Indochina and Algeria. The loss of the overseas territories was aggravated by the effects of economic modernization. The *Trente Glorieuses* accelerated the crisis of traditional hierarchies and habits by encouraging vertical and horizontal social mobility. The countryside became a "desert" while peasants and foreign workers flocked to cities. How could France—or a certain vision of it—be held together under the pressure of such a combination of identity-dissolving factors? Would France become "like Switzerland," as Debré had feared, if it lost the colonies? Malraux had the answer. He convinced de Gaulle that culture could be used as a "universal adhesive" against the "splits and breaches" that threatened the nation (58). Accordingly, he brought over sixty former colonial administrators into his new ministry and asked one of them, the Chad veteran Émile Biasini, to do in France what they had done overseas, namely bringing the provinces closer to Paris by infusing them with the capital's cultural values.

The government responded to Larzac by trying to take the regionalist cause away from its militants. One strategy followed by President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and his premier, Jacques Chirac, was to impose a conservative

reading of France's multiple heritages by institutionalizing 1980 as the *Année du Patrimoine*, essentially a state-sponsored celebration of old stones and dead people. The other was to develop counterinsurgency methods to fight the "guerilla ethnology" (*ethnologie sauvage*) waged by the radical populists of the regionalist movement (7). Here is where social scientists came to the aid of the besieged administrators. Following decolonization, France was left with plenty of jobless experts on African and Asian peasants. Yet, as the Gaullist archeologist and former governor of Algeria Jacques Soustelle admitted, the "ethnography of France remains to be done" (89). Academics such as Isac Chiva, who was Claude Lévi-Strauss's assistant at the Collège de France, now had the chance to create a new research field tailored to the government's aims. The ideological nature of the new ethnology promoted by the Gaullists lay neither in their conservative vision of French identity—they used the *Année du Patrimoine* for this—nor in a specific body of theory, but in dismissing the political work of regional actors as "the pseudo-scientific illusion of a spontaneous ethnology that individuals and groups might carry out on themselves and by themselves" (99).

The victory of the Socialist candidate François Mitterrand in the national elections of 1981 brought important changes. One of the first acts of the new president was to cancel the plan for expanding the Larzac military base. By and large, the pluralist discourse of the Socialist administration led to a decrease in the numbers and militancy of the regionalist movements. But the 1980s brought new issues to the fore. Immigration replaced regionalism as the main concern of state cultural policy. Foreign workers and their families had been in France for a long time, but they had always been treated as people without heritage—much like the industrial working class before the Popular Front. They were largely seen as a temporary and unpleasant ethnic reality that would either return to where they came from—Jean-Marie Le Pen's notion of *différentialisme*—or assimilate into French mainstream lay culture. The last two chapters of *Bringing the Empire Back Home* examine how, first under Mitterrand and then under Chirac, policymakers and cultural experts have tried to answer the question, what is it to be French? Lebovics's analysis of Socialist responses to Le Pen (Chapter Four) and the ongoing debate over France's new museum policy (Chapter Five) illustrate the seeming failure of the pluralist agenda endorsed by Mitterrand's Minister of Cultural Affairs, Jack Lang, the economist Marc Guillaume, and the anthropologist Maurice Godelier. This outcome was partly the result of the *effet Le Pen*, which forced conservative Socialists to close ranks behind the party's old Jacobin universalism and, in the process, killed the leftist project of thinking about France as a cultural democracy.

It is hard to imagine a more appropriate moment for *Bringing the Empire Back Home*. The shocking view of thousands of enraged young men *issues de l'immigration* setting their suburban neighborhoods on fire in October 2005 have made Lebovics's an unusually timely book. "The finest outcome, thoroughly possible in France," Lebovics writes in the closing paragraph of his

book, “would be to accommodate a respect for multiplicity without violating the egalitarian promise of the Republic.” Here is, in simple terms, the fundamental political issue faced today by liberal multicultural societies. He concludes with a note of cautious optimism, hoping that France will find the will and means to face the challenge of synthesizing “the regional, the national, the European, the ethnic postcolonial, and the global” (190).

The question is whether this synthesis is possible. Can social solidarity be reconciled with a genuine respect for cultural diversity under the present conditions, when so many ethnic narratives are burdened with the memory of tragic pasts? Otherwise, cultural pluralism would not pose a problem. Moreover, even if the French state were willing to embark upon a “rainbow” policy, who would be the interlocutors who speak for each minority? Immigrant communities remain divided along national, linguistic, and religious lines. To give one example, in France and Germany there are hundreds of national and local Muslim associations; yet, they speak for only a tiny minority of the 6 million French and 3 million Germans who profess the Islamic faith. The worst outcome would be a token pluralism in which the state, unable or unwilling to find an inclusive *imaginaire* with which everyone can identify, pays lip service to the historic grievances of its minorities by encouraging an identity politics of competing memories through ritualized forms of public acknowledgement of past abuses (such as the Gayssot, Taubira, and Mekachera laws). Lebovics ends with an optimistic note and shows that important changes are taking place. Consider the projected construction of a museum of domestic popular culture in Marseilles or the alternative ways of defining Frenchness outside the familiar sites where culture is formally displayed, as in the enthusiasm with which most French people cheered the victory of their country’s multiethnic football team in the 1998 World Cup.

Andrew Knapp, *Parties and the Party System in France: A Disconnected Democracy?* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

Review by Michael S. Lewis-Beck, University of Iowa

Andrew Knapp has written *the* book for those who want to be up-to-date and fully informed about French parties. This well-written compendium offers a bounty of excellent descriptions, facts, figures, tables, and maps. Besides, there is ample discussion of political party theory, and how it applies. In addition, the author offers his own explanation for the workings of the parties and their fortunes over time. Finally, he interprets the meaning of the 2002 elections

and hypothesizes increasing malaise for the future. Below, I expand on each of these contributions.

Any volume on French politics worth its salt must have good maps, and Knapp does not fail us here. The cartography of the departments shows good display, especially with the choropleth of voting patterns in the presidential and parliamentary elections. Such maps, a mainstay of French electoral studies, continue to reveal important changes, such as the shift in the Socialist vote from south-north to west-east (Maps 6.1-6.2). These visual aids help the reader organize the complex French political space, as do the excellent, not to say unique, tables offered. The candidates and results of Fifth Republic elections are conveniently chronicled (Tables 2.1-2.3). An impressive key to political party abbreviations 1901-2002 appears (Table 1.3). The Gaullists, for example, have run under six different letterheads, as have the Socialists. This key, in itself, highlights the kaleidoscopic picture of French parties. Further, the author constructs an invaluable genealogy of the parties over this hundred-year (plus) period (Table 1.2). The genealogical maze finds order from careful superimposition of a Left-Right continuum, which seems to have held the French parties together since the Revolution.

Helpfully, a detailed, lively chapter on the evolution, electoral connection, and organizational characteristics of each major party (or party grouping) is given. Each of these chapters has a main theme. The one on the Communists attempts to account for their long-term decline. The far-Left parties, with their strong Trotskyist presence, are seen as a growing home for dissatisfied traditional leftists. Knapp regards the Socialist record largely as one of failure, in part because they have no commanding idea. The Greens face a dilemma, in that they cannot win without Socialist support. The UDF, a mixed bag of elements on the moderate Right, with weak party identity, has all but completely disintegrated. Gaullism, the leading force of the traditional Right, has been given the coup de grace by its own leader, Jacques Chirac. The rise of the National Front continues, stirring up racism and posing grave strategic concerns for the traditional parties of the Right.

In addition to providing us with a rich source book for party activities, especially for the recent years of the Fifth Republic, Knapp interprets these activities in terms of different theories. He examines the Lipset and Rokkan cleavages model, Duverger's cadre-versus-mass-parties idea, Riker and minimal winning coalition theory, and the catch-all party notion. While these frameworks provide some insight, in the end he rejects them for the French case. He argues that, essentially, parties have been, and are, weak. He admits that this is of course not invariably so, as there have been periods when organization and membership strength seem on the rise. Take the example of the Gaullists. One of their members claimed, "We're a real party, with real activists. ... [T]he UDF is a country club" (258). However, its membership numbers peaked in 1985 at something like 150,000, falling to about 76,000 in 1999. Opinion poll results show that Gaullism has little meaning in

contemporary times, even when the respondent is an RPR identifier. The few remaining bits of the RPR were merged by Chirac into the umbrella UMP after his victory in 2002.

For Knapp, the 2002 elections—with high abstention, record protest voting, and Le Pen on the second ballot—represent an acute manifestation of the French political malaise. He sees the party system as disconnected from the voters. The percentage of voters who identify with a party is falling; the public views politics as increasingly corrupt; the Left-Right ideological distinction is fading; party memberships are dropping; and grass-roots campaigning has all but disappeared. In sum, he sees “no sign of an end to France’s malaise. Indeed, there is every prospect of it deepening” (342).

While the author paints a dark picture, reality is perhaps not that dark, even by his own admission. He concedes that democratic values are still held, that the parties are strong in Parliament, that leaders are still recruited from the parties, that only a small percentage of the people never vote, that voters still tend to identify as Left or Right, and that party supporters sharply differ on many issues. Further, he reports that the French are consistent with the European average in terms of organizational memberships. And, they are somewhere near the middle with respect to confidence in political institutions, compared to citizens of other Western democracies. These facts suggest that, after all, the system is not in fatal decline.

On the contrary, the French may serve as a seedbed of party revival, a response to what Knapp calls “a long-standing French paradox that a country that practically invented the terms of modern political discourse ... should have had such difficulty in sustaining on a long-term basis the complex organizations that are political parties. Not one of the parties covered in this book should face the future with much serenity” (378). I would propose that, first, the downturn in parties is neither so steep nor so linear. Take as an example the combined Communist and Socialist voting strength (first ballot, legislative elections) over the Fifth Republic (Table 3.1). The pattern of support is a seesaw, with the percentage moving down-up-down-up-down-up, in a rhythmic cycle from 1958 to 2002. (The only exception is 1973-78 when, if the pattern were perfect, the 1978 percentage would have been less than the 1973 percentage.) Note also that the percentage of support in the first year, 1958, was 34.4, almost the same as in 1997, when it was 33.7. It would seem premature, even in the face of the 2002 result (which equals 28.9, greater than that of 1993), to conclude that the shared voting strength of these parties are in extended decline. A similar exercise can be carried out for the Gaullist electorate during presidential elections (Figure 9.1). From 1965 to 2002, the percentage of support for the Gaullist candidate went up-down-up-down-up-down. In the legislative arena, for Gaullists and non-Gaullists on the traditional Right, the percentage of support was 36.0 in 1962 and 33.3 in 2002 (UMP). Again, there are signs of the seesaw pattern and not too much long-term instability, at least at the legislative level.

These rough looks at the trajectory of vote support for major parties on the Left and Right imply that the future of the French parties might not be as bleak as Knapp fears. I suggest this is due to something he himself notes: the characteristic bipolar multipartism induced by the French electoral rules. On the first ballot, there is fragmentation, as parties compete for a chance to go on. On the second ballot, they come together Left versus Right, in an attempt to win the office. This produces a dynamic in electoral outcomes, with party support rising and falling in a rhythm, as incentive to coalesce waxes and wanes. Because of this fluctuation, it may look, in the short run, as if a certain party, or parties, are in deep decline, e.g., the Gaullists plus the moderate Right elements, which have morphed into the UMP. However, this may be just a temporary change that amounts to little more than a name change, something the leading traditional Right parties have experienced throughout the Fifth Republic. If so, such changes are not paradoxical, but rather a necessary part of the uniquely configured French political system.

Amanda Nettelbeck School of Humanities University of Adelaide Adelaide, SA, Australia. Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series. ISBN 978-3-319-62922-3. James R. Lehning is Professor of History at the University of Utah in Salt Lake City, Utah. ix. x Editors and Contributors. The University of Chicago Press. Books Division. Chicago Distribution Center. Book Review. To Be a Citizen: The Political Culture of the Early French Third Republic. By James R. Lehning. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001. Pp. x+193. \$39.95. Avner Ben-Amos. Tel Aviv University. <https://doi.org/10.1086/427591>. First Page. James R. Lehning's 6 research works with 5 reads, including: Paris: Capital of the World. James R. Lehning's research while affiliated with University of Utah and other places. Overview. Publications (6). Paris: Capital of the World. Article. Jan 2003. James R. Lehning.