In the prevailing regional geo-political environment, China has emerged as a key player in Asia. Most of the states in South, Central and West Asia, the area that has traditionally been considered the exclusive domain of the US influence, now look towards China as a leading power likely to determine the future pace and direction of the region's political, economic, and geo-strategic orientation. In this backdrop, the emerging broad-spectrum relations between Pakistan and China have come to occupy a significant place on the regional and global geo-political canvases, catching the attention of authors, experts and analysts the world over. The recently published book by Ghulam Ali titled, *China-Pakistan Relations – A historical Analysis* is also a befitting contribution in this regard.

On the whole, the book by Ghulam Ali is an excellent delineation of the various geo-political developments between China and Pakistan over a period of six decades (1950-2015). The author has taken a historical approach to describe these developments, interspersed with some fascinating pieces of analysis, thus, tracing the underlying logic as well as the reasons that actually steered the wheel of history to shape the nature of relations between the two states. Ghulam Ali has also expertly narrated some very interesting details of the bilateral ties between China and Pakistan – the events which largely constituted the foundations on which the edifice of a broader relationship between China and Pakistan rests today.

To begin with, Ghulam Ali unfolds the story of the formative years of China-Pakistan relations, explaining why the two nations were destined to come closer right from the outset and how “Pakistan's participation in the western defence pacts and pro-US policies” led to unfriendly ties between the two states. However, later developments such as the border dispute between China and India were, in fact, responsible for shaping the enduring nature of the Pak-China equation. It can be inferred that the Sino-Pakistan *entente cordiale* developed and strengthened partially due to common hostility towards India. Ghulam Ali believes that the nature of Pak-US relations also played an important role in bringing Pakistan closer to China. He opines that the arms embargo and the strenuous nature of US-Pakistan relations generally increased Pakistan’s dependence on China (Chapter-2). On the other hand, Pakistan’s role in the US-China rapprochement improved its alliance with China and the US, while the same adversely impacted the Pak-USSR ties. It was only after the Pak-India war of 1971 that China started building economic and strategic
infrastructure in Pakistan, which according to the author, was an indication of China’s long-term interests in Pakistan. Consequently, by mid 1970s, “China indicated that it would expand the nature of its relationship with South Asian countries, adopt a balanced policy towards Indo-Pakistan disputes, and restore relations with India”. This was a significant policy stance on the part of China, explaining the future orientation of Chinese policy towards the region. The most important outcome of this orientation vis-à-vis Pakistan was a neutral stance on the Kashmir issue by China. However, interestingly, the Chinese pragmatism did not falter when it came to its special relations with Pakistan: “Beijing continued to support our nuclear and missile program and remained Pakistan’s most reliable arms supplier and source of economic assistance”, explains Ghulam Ali.

Nevertheless, it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that placed Pakistan in the central position between the US and China, “bringing a new level of cooperation between them” (Chapter-3). In the same context, it is pertinent to note that frequent changes of government in Pakistan had little impact on the nature of China-Pakistan ties. Though China gradually improved its ties with India, it wasn’t done at the cost of relations with Pakistan, says Ghulam Ali. He also believes that “most of the changes in China’s policy were a result of overall restructuring in foreign relations rather than an attempt to merely please India”. On the other hand, while Pakistan faced US sanctions time and again, China was always there to compensate, particularly in the realm of defence equipment. This role played by China largely constituted the essence of the permanent nature of ties between Pakistan and China.

The most interesting part of the book is Chapter 5 in which the author has adroitly analysed the post 9/11 scenario in the context of China-Pakistan relations. In this part, the writer has tried to bring home the point that the changes in the security environment triggered by 9/11, in fact, strengthened our ties with China, creating opportunities for both the nations to upgrade their relationship to the level of strategic partnership. For instance, China’s help in building some mega projects in Pakistan, such as Gwadar Port, are part of the same reality. In consequential terms, China has gained access to some of the natural resources of Pakistan and has ability to gain access to larger markets through Pakistan. The most significant manifestation of Chinese outreach in Pakistan is CPEC, which the author has discussed in detail in the sixth chapter.

In a nutshell, Ghulam Ali’s book explains that geography and common regional security concerns provided the basis for ideal relations between China and Pakistan. However, there are also some other factors responsible for the kind of relationship that exists between the two states. The evolving stature of China in the region has come to diversify the nature of its ties with Pakistan, and CPEC, which is a corollary to China’s ambitious One Belt One Road initiative, is the outcome of the same Chinese
re-orientation. If CPEC is implemented, notes Ghulam Ali in the concluding part, it will take the relationship between Pakistan and China to new heights.

The book by Ghulam Ali is a valuable addition to the literature available on the history of Pak-China relations. The episodic presentation of the political, economic and strategic developments between the two states, coupled with argumentative commentary by the author - where the situation demands - makes the reading quite interesting as well as informative. Additionally, use of simple and comprehensible language has helped author describe the most complicated and intricate aspects of statecraft in a convenient manner, reflecting the author’s command over the issue-area – he has discreetly catered to the needs of the variety of readers, ranging from experts to the general public. In this regard, the author deserves a word of appreciation and due credit for striking a delicate balance between the general interests of the readers and the requirements of writing a historical political analysis of issues. Consistency in the overall argument is another noteworthy aspect of the book; nowhere the author seems to have lost his ground. Scanning through the pages of the book, and the vicissitudes in Pak-China relations it entails,, the reader gets convinced of the logic that the author desires to bring forth at the end of his analysis. This makes the effort by Ghulam Ali a must read for people who wish to find wiser ways of dealing with the subject.

Reviewed by Syed Raghab Ali, Ph.D Scholar at the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.
Pressler Amendment in the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was the culmination of US Congress-based endeavours aimed at obstructing Pakistan’s path towards the attainment of nuclear weapons capability. The amendment was signed into law by President Reagan on 8th August 1985 and was invoked for the first time by President George H.W. Bush in 1990. The amendment linked the US assistance and sales of military equipment and technology to Pakistan to two mandatory certifications from the US President: one that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon and second, that the particular assistance package approved by the US President will drastically scale down the risks of nuclear weapons possession by Pakistan. The domain of “assistance” was stretched to include both military and economic spheres. The US-Pakistan bilateral relations took a nosedive after enactment of Pressler amendment. Three colossal losses on Pakistan’s part in 1991 were: suspension of $200 million as aid, halting the sale of 28 F-16s, and cancellation of joint military exercises between the US and Pakistan. Though the amendment was revoked during the Clinton administration but it defines one of the ebbs in the seven decades of Pak-US diplomatic voyage.

Larry Lee Pressler, a three-time Republican US Senator from South Dakota, was the prime architect of Pressler amendment during his stint as head of the US Senate’s Arms Control Sub-committee. His book “Neighbours in Arms: An American Senator’s Quest for Disarmament in a Nuclear Subcontinent” primarily explicates his struggle for preparation and approval of Pressler amendment. He has claimed to be the opponent of nuclear armament in the subcontinent but his efforts were Pakistan-specific, whereas India fully took the advantage and celebrated his spiteful actions against Pakistan. As he proposed his amendment against Pakistan in 1980s, he never even thought of framing similar legislation for curbing nuclear advances in India. The book also entails his acrimonious experience of the Vietnam War, the journey towards the US Congress, the role of Octopus in US decision making and his empathetic viewpoints for the masses in India. The book written by Pressler depicts him as a “tendentious person” towards India vis-à-vis Pakistan, as President Reagan also once enquired him for being over-influenced by Indian-American community. Pressler, a die-hard opponent and critic of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, has remained tight-lipped in his written work over India’s possession of nuclear weapons. Given the fact that both Pakistan and India are non-signatories to the NPT, the US nuclear-related policies and actions must have been even-handed for both as a consequence. Being an ardent advocate of US-India Civil Nuclear
Agreement, Pressler has supported the deal by calling this agreement “indispensible” for the needs of billions of impecunious Indians in order to ameliorate their life standards that have been facing prolonged hours of blackout in their villages. He has justified the NSG waiver granted to India for implementation of civil nuclear agreement and called it the need of the hour. Alike India, Pakistan also grapples with poverty and long hours of power cuts but Pressler has remained cold hearted for the flat broke residing in Pakistan.

The cardinal reason stated by Pressler for his anti-Pakistan nuclear drive was Pakistan’s suspected utilization of US aid - he has repeatedly used the phrase US tax payers’ money - for preparation of nuclear weapons but he failed in describing any such authentic appropriation made by Pakistan either from economic or military aid. This spawns a new postulate in the minds of readers: “A state can prepare nuclear weapons from its own resources as NPT is not violated if native technology and self-generated revenue are used”, meaning the rich states may be allowed preparation of nuclear weapons. NPT—the cornerstone of non-proliferation regime prohibits nuclear-weapons acquisition for every state regardless of its economic prowess. Security needs compel the states for nuclear option as evidenced from the case of Pakistan: the strategic equilibrium perturbed by India in 1998 after nuclear detonation inevitably needed to be countered, in order to maintain parity.

Pressler has highlighted and berated the presence of a highly powerful decision-making caboodle in the US under the name of Octopus—a blend of different state institutions prime being the Pentagon, State Department and CIA. He has accused the Octopus for creating encumbrances in implementation of Pressler amendment and its successful efforts during the Clinton administration for revoking the same. The book is strewn with Pressler’s criticism for the Octopus but as usual when it comes to India, he has lauded the Octopus for its role in framing the US-India civil nuclear agreement and calls for increasing its efforts for concluding the agreement at the earliest. Pressler has discussed the role of lobbying in the US and utilization of millions of dollars by states on hiring the lobbyists. It goes without saying that Pressler has been working till-date for a strong Indian lobby coupled with the presence of Indian-Americans in his constituency who would also support his election campaigns. Pressler prides himself on being a widely revered personage in India. While sharing his 1992 visit to the subcontinent, he states that he became ebullient on effusive welcome given to him upon his arrival in India; whereas he has expressed deep grudge over the chilly welcome given at airport during his arrival to Pakistan. His meetings with the President and Prime Minister of Pakistan were also cancelled. Generally, Pakistan’s hospitality at state level has always been admired by foreign delegations but that was not the case for Pressler, who recommended aid suspension to Pakistan thereby scaling up its economic woes. After being
so negative against Pakistan, how had he imagined of an India-like welcome in Pakistan?

Pressler thereby, has not only recommended declaration of Pakistan as a rogue and terrorist state but simultaneous creation of US-India super alliance alike that of the US-UK and US-Israel alliances besides enactment of more Pressler amendments in the future. Pakistan has not only facilitated the US-led war in Afghanistan for last four decades but it has given inexplicable sacrifices that no leader, either of the US or Pakistan, had ever thought since the inception of war in 1979 and its relapse in 2001. Pressler’s recommendations for Pakistan, a major non-NATO ally, depict only contempt, disregard and nefarious intentions for a country that has bore the maximum brunt of US policies in the region. In one of the chapters of this book, Pressler glosses the 1979 sting operation carried out by the FBI for bribing the candidates campaigning for President of the United States. Pressler was campaigning that year and he refused a bribe of $50,000 from a FBI agent who introduced him as an Arab sheikh. After few months, the scandal surfaced as “ABSCAM Scandal” and it became evident that Pressler was the only public official who turned down the bribe offer. Eventually the phrase “Pressler Standard” was coined, meaning “turning down the offered bribe.” Pressler Standard refers to the level of honesty and integrity retained by Mr. Pressler in his affairs but for Pakistan “Pressler Standard” is a standard of measuring hypocrisy and malice only.

The chapters and contents of this book are in utter juxtaposition with its name. “Neighbours, Arms, Disarmament and Nuclear Subcontinent” are the prime words in the name and introductory phrase. In contradiction to the phrase “neighbours in arms” the entire book bristles with Pressler’s discussion on possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan; no mention of India’s nuclear program which dates back to early 1960s with first device detonated in 1974. Similarly “nuclear subcontinent” implies both nuclear India and nuclear Pakistan but Pressler’s nuclear disarmament approach is confined to Pakistan only. He has also discussed Glenn and Symington amendments that tied provision of aid to Pakistan’s non-possession of enrichment and reprocessing technology and lauded their architects. In the book, Pressler has blindeyed India’s enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. His entire effort and discussion revolves around a single parameter: “His proposed impediments in Pakistan’s route to becoming nuclear Pakistan.” Even at the end, the appendix entails timeline of Pakistan’s nuclear events only; India has also a nuclear history but Pressler considers India a de jure nuclear power like the five veto-wielding nations.

Reviewed by Mr. Tariq Asad, a Civil Servant in Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and National Heritage.
Title: A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order
Author: Richard Haas

In today’s world, power is broadly diffused and impacts of a state’s actions are no longer contained within its own boundaries. A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order by Richard Haass, is a prudent analysis of the above assertion and what can be done to address it.

The author presides over the Council on Foreign Relations. He has previously served as senior adviser on Middle East to President George H.W. Bush. He has received the Presidential Citizens Medal among other honours. He has also written or edited a dozen books on world affairs and foreign policy.

This book comprises of three parts. The first chronicles the evolution of the international system since the Peace of Westphalia, through the world wars, until the culmination of the Cold War. The idea is that despite the dynamic changes during that period, the overall mechanics of world operations remained the same. It is taken as World order 1.0. The second part analyses the quarter century since the end of Cold War. The proposition is that the era presents a departure from the previous order. The discussion focuses primarily on the chief regions of the world and generally on the world in its entirety. A portion of this part describes existing state of affairs, the reasons that led to the current situation and the future implications of the scenario. The last part of the book emphasizes the need for the United States to contain vicious competition among the major powers in future, along with recommendations for a restructured world order.

Haas highlights the fact that although the concept of state sovereignty reigns supreme in the international system, yet the new global challenges such as climate change, terrorism, and migration call for a new way to look at things. The existing world order is quickly turning defunct given the new dynamics of the global system. Also, states are no longer the sole stakeholders in the world system. Non-state actors are also significant actors; ranging from multinational corporations to terrorist organizations. Power is increasingly becoming diffused thus leading to the decentralization of decision-making. The author underlines the need for a new world order that he calls the World order 2.0. The world order needs to be adjusted according to an increasingly interconnected world.

The author points out that the notion of an “international community” is an ambition rather than a reality. No state would overlook the prospect of pursuing its interest - especially the major powers - merely because the United Nations disapproves of the act. This is particularly true as long as the legitimacy of UN Security Council remains questionable.
given the uneven significance it ascribes to nations. There is a considerable
difference between the aspirations for a globalized world and the existing
reality of the world order. This difference is a major cause behind the
disarray in the present world. No broad agreement exists regarding the
things to do, the actors to carry them out and the method of taking such
decisions.

In today’s world, power is too diffused among too many entities.
Haas reiterates that despite being the strongest power, the United States
cannot act unilaterally. A single state can no longer enforce a world order
on its own. In addition, the drift toward disorder is, time and again,
aggravated by the action or inaction of the United States along with other
powers. Also, the actions of the United States across the world are not acts
of philanthropy; rather they are essential to maintain its national security.
Thus, its foreign policy needs to encompass an effort to discourage violent
encounters between major powers. This is because, firstly, a confrontation
will be costly. Secondly, such rivalries will make collective action against
international challenges very difficult. Contention among major powers is
the natural state of global affairs. Thus, the other major powers need to
know that the United States has the capacity and resolve to counter their
actions. Apart from deterrence, economic and diplomatic interdependence
can also help ward off conflict.

A vital part of World order 2.0 envisioned by the author is
encapsulated in the concept of sovereign obligation. It is a departure from
the theory of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), that entails “sovereignty as a
responsibility”. The latter includes a regime’s responsibility to its people
and if it falls short, the regime loses some of its conventional defences and
benefits of sovereignty. This concept provides room for military
intervention by other states, thereby undermining sovereignty. Sovereign
obligation, on the other hand, is defined as “legitimacy that embraces not
just the rights but also the obligations of sovereign states vis-à-vis other
governments and countries.” In an extensively interconnected world,
boundaries cannot protect a state against the adverse effects of actions
carried out in any other state. Matters falling under the header of
sovereign obligation are diverse, ranging from climate change and cyber
security to the economic realm. However, the idea is different from R2P,
since sovereign obligation does not tend to subjugate state sovereignty.

Furthermore, the notion of sovereignty as responsibility is
grounded in realism while the concept of sovereign obligation emerges
from idealism. While discussing the way forward for American foreign
policy, the author emphasizes that it is crucial to prevent the recurrence of
an international system where entities constantly interfere in the matters
of each other. Still more important is to stay away from attempts of coup
or take-over.

Disarray might lead to crisis. Although some segments believe that
crises provide the incentive for action, yet the cost of any crisis in the
present world, be it an armed conflict or an epidemic, will be immense. Hence, a better scheme will be to begin heading in the direction of an adapted order rather than to wait for a crisis leading to an overhaul. The conditions and potentiality of piecing together a new international operating system are favourable.

The book underscores that United States is still the driving actor in the international order. However, the superpower needs to make informed adjustments in its policies as well as contribute in shaping an international system conducive to meet the present world challenges. *A World in Disarray* is a significant read for everyone attempting to decipher the existing state of international system.

Reviewed by Fareha Iqtidar Khan, M.Phil in International Relations, National Defence University, Islamabad.
Pakistan’s relations with China have always been the most important of its relationships with other countries. It is based on trust, respect, and mutual benefit. Over the past 55 years, since the two countries established their diplomatic relations, this relationship has evolved in a manner to serve the. 1 S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: an Historical Analysis, 2nd ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990). - 213 -. FAZAL-UR-RAHMAN. resistance groups, and extended political support to Pakistan at all international fora. Throughout the 1980s, Pakistan-China relations continued to develop into a comprehensive relationship. China–Pakistan relations began in 1950 when Pakistan was among the first countries to end official diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (or Taiwan) and recognise the People’s Republic of China (PRC) regime on Mainland China. Since then, both countries have placed considerable importance on the maintenance of an extremely close and supportive special relationship and the two countries have regularly exchanged high-level visits resulting in a variety of agreements. The PRC has provided