

MAKING A COLONIAL CULTURE?

Empire and the French Public, 1880-1940

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Tony Chafer and Amanda Sackur, eds., *Promoting the Colonial Idea: Propaganda and Visions of Empire in France* (New York: Palgrave, 2002).

Pascal Blanchard and Sandrine Lemaire, *Culture Coloniale: La France conquise par son Empire, 1871-1931* (Paris: Autrement, 2003).

Claude Liauzu and Josette Liauzu, *Quand on chantait les colonies* (Paris: Syllepse, 2002).

Patricia Morton, *Hybrid Modernities: Architecture and Representation at the 1931 Colonial Exposition, Paris* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000).

Did ordinary citizens support empire? Did a broad public respond to the plethora of colonialist propaganda, ideas, and images that circulated during the era of high imperialism (1880-1940)? Historians of French colonialism have joined their British counterparts in a renewed scholarly debate over public attitudes toward overseas expansion. Although a few historians have maintained that empire enjoyed widespread support, until recently the consensus in both the French and British literature has been that imperialism interested elite groups far more than average citizens. Working people, according to most scholars, have been influenced least of all.¹

One reason for this dominant view is that imperial history has traditionally been a branch of diplomatic history, a strand of scholarship focused on the elite individuals involved in diplomacy: elected officials, high-level bureaucrats, selected parliamentarians, ambassadors, business leaders, and journalists who wrote for elite publications like the *Times* of London and the *Journal des Débats* in Paris. This scholarship has also emphasized the official “mind” of imperialism, namely the ideas of those officials, intellectuals, and

publicists who championed overseas expansion. Much of this work is superb, blending careful analysis of documents preserved in the Public Records Office and the Quai d'Orsay with subtle portraits of the political and economic contexts and the psychology and outlooks of the individuals in question. Its main concern was with how imperial policies and ideas were formulated, why conflicts arose, and how those conflicts turned out.²

Like the officials and diplomats of the high imperial period, most historians writing from the 1950s to the early 1980s paid little attention to public attitudes and beliefs (except occasionally to note or lament the people's indifference to empire). Partly this disinterest was a matter of sources; diplomatic documents tended to emphasize the formulation of policy far more than the public response to it, but it was also a question of method. Most diplomatic historians of this era failed to take to heart the new social history that sought to bring ordinary people into the historiographical picture. When they did, the relatively limited array of sources they used told them that the average citizen remained uninvolved in the history of imperial expansion.

Those social historians who concerned themselves with imperialism, and not all that many did, were often eager to absolve working people of complicity with the elites' colonial designs. Thus for Richard Price, imperial conquest may have stirred Britain's lower middle class, but it left the proletariat unmoved. Henry Pelling argued that workers rarely voted for pro-imperial candidates, and M.D. Blanch dismissed the lower-class jingoism evident early in the Boer War as fleeting and superficial.³ The result of this and other work was to join social and diplomatic history in the belief that ordinary people cared little for or about empire.

All this was bound to change. Beginning in the 1980s, historians of the British Empire led the way toward a view of imperialism that included workers and members of the broad middle classes. The leader of this new current was the Lancaster University historian John M. MacKenzie, whose six edited collections on aspects of popular imperialism and the culture of imperialism have done much to reshape the field.⁴ Nothing similar has happened in French historiography, at least not until the late 1990s when the first of the books under review saw print. Two significant, if historiographically isolated, early efforts must, however, be mentioned: William Schneider's *An Empire for the Masses* (1982) and Thomas August's *The Selling of Empire* (1985).⁵ The former is particularly noteworthy since Schneider used sources that had been largely ignored: mass-circulation newspapers like *Le Petit parisien*, cheap illustrated weeklies, and a few other forms of ephemeral popular literature. This book was therefore innovative on two counts—its discussion of a popular imperial culture and its willingness to take France's penny press seriously, something that neither the Frankfurt School tradition nor conventional cultural history had been willing to do.⁶ That it took nearly two decades for other French historians to build on Schneider's work—and appreciate what he did—suggests he made the mistake of being too far ahead of the field.⁷

Given the inattention to Schneider's work, we must turn to MacKenzie's British school to understand the recent spate of books on French imperial culture, many by Anglophone scholars who acknowledge a debt to the Lancaster historian.⁸ It goes without saying that MacKenzie knew the work of Edward Said, as the former's critical study, *Orientalism: History, Theory, and the Arts* (1995), makes clear.⁹ But, in MacKenzie's first significant work, *Imperialism and Popular Culture* (1984), he and his coauthors claimed a theoretical pedigree that antedated Said by nearly a century. Their starting point was not *Orientalism*, but J.A. Hobson's *The Psychology of Jingoism* (1901).

Although Hobson exaggerated the effects of imperial propaganda, his book nonetheless identified a potential connection between pro-imperial sentiment in Great Britain and certain elements of popular culture, especially the music hall. These places of popular entertainment, Hobson wrote, used song, dramatic sketches, melodrama, and dancing girls to transmit a message of virulent nationalism whose ultimate effect was to create a psychology of "jingoism." Hobson defined jingoism, a word made famous in a pro-war song of 1877, as a form of "inverted patriotism" that transformed "the love of one's own nation ... into the hatred of another."¹⁰ Such patriotism, Hobson maintained, led to widespread support for empire and imperial wars.

The relative crudeness of Hobson's account of jingoism, which linked the music hall to moneyed imperial interests, has made his argument a little too easy to dismiss. Social historians, in particular, have used the book's flaws to discount Hobson's claim of a link between popular culture, especially working-class culture, and attachment to empire.¹¹ But the 1970s interest in popular culture and the turn to cultural history in the 1980s moved MacKenzie and his disciples to take a new look at Hobson.¹² Their goal was not to revive his argument that music halls created a nation of jingoes but to take seriously his call to investigate the relationship between popular culture and imperialism. In doing so, these British historians have examined not just the music hall but popular art, juvenile fiction, mass journalism, textbooks, sports, scouting, film, advertising, radio, and several other domains. Their efforts have produced a corpus of compelling work, but not without raising some complex theoretical and methodological questions. "Popular culture," for example, is a notoriously slippery term. Does it refer to literature, music, and art that emerge from lower-class life? Or does it consist of materials manufactured by educated elites for popular consumption? An emerging consensus holds that popular culture is a combination of the two, the product of a give and take between what bubbles up from below and what is created in the publishing houses, newsrooms, geographical societies, and the like.

There is also the issue of propaganda, prominent in the work of MacKenzie as well as the new studies of French imperialism. Does "propaganda" refer exclusively to ideas and materials consciously and deliberately fashioned to shape public opinion, or is it also something more subtle, namely messages consciously or unconsciously embedded in cultural materials and uncon-

sciously received?¹³ This last question evokes perhaps the most difficult issue of all. How do we go from what is presented to what is perceived? What, in other words, is the relationship between the ideas and images historians can find in cultural materials and the ways those materials actually affected the ordinary people who encountered them in the past? Unsurprisingly, historians of popular imperialism are much more successful in discerning the messages presented than the messages received. Indeed, scholars rarely even attempt to discover how individuals, especially those from the popular classes, understood and made use of the cultural materials they experienced. But even those historians who do consider how and what individuals received find their inquiries fraught with ambiguity. Because reception and perception occur at both conscious and unconscious levels, those who attempt to measure reception by too rational a yardstick may misinterpret the effects of propaganda and other cultural products.

The remarkable work of Jonathan Rose is telling in this latter respect.¹⁴ In his justly celebrated account of how British working people perceived literature, art, music, and film, Rose stands as one of the few cultural historians who pays as much attention to reception as to the apparent content of cultural materials. In constructing his intellectual portrait of ordinary British workers, Rose read some 2,000 memoirs, autobiographies, and other first-hand accounts, which he then checked against a variety of other sources—oral histories, educational records, library records, sociological surveys, and opinion polls. This extraordinarily wide reading convinced Rose that there is often a huge difference between the apparent ideological message of a particular literary text, play, image, or radio program and the ideas that members of their audiences actually perceived. Historians and literary scholars may agree that a given text, film or radio program possessed a dominant meaning, but Rose argues that working people commonly perceived these materials through what Irving Goffman calls “frames”—ways of organizing information and experience—different from those of middle-class academics. This, Rose writes, is particularly true for canonical literature, which far from spurring ideological conformity as many contemporary literary critics maintain, contributed to independence of thought and even to subversive ideas.¹⁵

Salutary as Rose’s analysis is, his book has one key shortcoming: it favors evidence of rational, expressible knowledge almost to the exclusion of general, often unconscious attitudes and emotions. Thus, Rose bases his own claim that working people resisted imperialist propaganda on evidence that they could not “mention specific colonies” or “tell the East from the West Indies,” or didn’t know the difference between Mafeking and Timbuktu.¹⁶ Such ignorance of geography may well have been the case, but it does not rule out the adoption of certain imperial attitudes, especially a sense of racial superiority and a belief in Britain’s right, even duty, to rule over other, lesser, peoples of the world. One of Rose’s own quotations suggests as much. Louis Heren, a poor boy who later made good, said that as a student he could not begin to

place the North-West Frontier or the Federated Malay States. But the general ideas that underpinned the failed geography lessons taught him “that I was a freeborn Englishman and the world was my oyster. I developed an expansive and proprietary view of the world which has never quite left me.”¹⁷

To his great credit, MacKenzie does not make Rose’s mistake. MacKenzie cites one working-class memoir after another to show both the pervasiveness of imperial propaganda and its effect on ordinary people. His evidence suggests that workers’ vivid memories of this propaganda and of the “pageantry, publications, advertising and ephemera through which [propaganda was] expressed” means that imperial culture had its influence, even in those who later denied its weight. There is also the question of the ways in which imperial culture resonated with an existing working-class culture. MacKenzie quotes from Stephen Humphries’s oral history of radical workers to show how imperial attitudes sank in even if knowledge about the Empire did not. “The ideology of imperialism,” writes Humphries, “made a direct appeal to working-class youth because it reflected and reinforced a number of its cultural traditions, in particular the street gangs’ concern with territorial rivalry, and the assertion of masculinity.”¹⁸

Unfortunately, few of MacKenzie’s collaborators second his effort to consider the reception of imperial culture. The same is true of the work on the culture of French imperialism under review. Chafer and Sackur’s introduction to *Promoting the Colonial Idea* cites the Lancaster historian as their inspiration, but they and their contributors say, again and again, that it is “difficult to tell exactly what effect colonial propaganda had on its audience” (8), and difficult “to measure public opinion and the effectiveness of propaganda” (98). This, of course, is true, but it’s no reason not to try.

As mentioned, Jonathan Rose has used memoirs and autobiographies to excellent effect, and I have found archival material that suggests newspaper accounts of African exploration were extremely effective in turning certain explorers into popular heroes. The press presented Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza, the French naval officer who explored equatorial Africa, as a “pacific conqueror,” a courageous, selfless man more interested in freeing slaves and befriending Africans than in acquiring territory. Letters Brazza received from people who followed his adventures in the press indicate that the journalistic message took hold. One writer after the other called him a “pacific conqueror,” and many shared an admiration for Brazza’s “generous initiative and ... enormous courage,” congratulating him for his “glorious civilizing exploits in the name of France.”¹⁹ Still, perception is one thing, action another. Most of those who considered Brazza a hero were content merely to follow his exploits in the press. Others felt moved to write him letters, poems, and songs, while still others sought to see him in person, hoping he could do something to improve their lives. Perhaps most interesting, some 1,500 correspondents went so far as to volunteer to accompany him on his next mission.²⁰

Though Chafer and Sackur’s volume largely fails to address the issue of reception, there is one important exception, Owen White’s chapter, “Misce-

generation and the Popular Imagination.” The piece is devoted to race rather than empire, but the two are obviously related. In 1920, the women’s magazine *Eve* asked readers to write short essays answering the question “Would you marry a man of color?” Most writers understood “color” to mean black, and 1,060 said they would not marry a black man, while 980 said they would. That the respondents divided almost equally is interesting in itself, and so too is the nature of the explanations women gave. Most of those opposed to marrying a black man referred to the mixed-race children such unions would produce. Readers worried that Mulatto youngsters would face social rejection later in life and that they themselves would not develop proper maternal feelings. “I like *café au lait*,” wrote one respondent, “But not in a cradle” (136). Other writers said that a black man would repel them physically, while more than a few expressed the belief that blacks were dirty. This view seemed to echo the soap advertisements of the era that suggested not only that black people were unclean but that their product was so effective it could make them white. When dining opposite a black man, wrote an eleven-year-old girl, she wouldn’t let him eat “without putting on white gloves, because he’d always give me the impression that he hadn’t washed his hands, [but] if I loved him ... I would simply wipe my cheeks after he’d kissed me” (137).

Those who said they would marry a black man revealed a somewhat more benign version of the racist imagery evident in those who said they would not. Several women wrote that although mixed-race children would face discrimination, black people’s natural athleticism would give them the strength to prevail. Other women preferred the “special odor” of blacks to the rancid breath of an alcoholic white, and still others observed that all men were savages, so why worry in particular about blacks? The most common response presented marriage to an African as an individual contribution to France’s laudable civilizing mission. In any event, wrote several respondents, women always civilized men, so marrying an African would be an act of charity in line with what women normally do.

Since few of those who responded to the *Eve* survey knew any men of color, their ideas about them came entirely from what they had read or heard. Media and advertisements thus had a powerful influence, though with a range of different results. Even if soap ads convinced most women (or at least those who responded to the *Eve* survey) that blacks were dirty or smelly, some saw that as an obstacle to intimacy and some did not. Readers acquired essentially the same knowledge but evaluated it in different ways. Evidence such as this is enormously helpful in our effort to understand how propaganda and other cultural materials are received. One reasonable conclusion might be that when particular images or discourses are pervasive, individual readers or consumers are likely to internalize them. What the pervasiveness of an image does not tell us is how people will assess the knowledge they have acquired, or precisely how that knowledge will shape their behavior.

Beyond the Owen White chapter, the Chafer and Sackur volume's most useful contribution is the wide array of evidence it provides for the prominence of cultural materials that touted the virtues of empire and the values and attitudes that supported it. Odile Georg's piece documents the extent to which imperial propaganda circulated in the French provinces, especially through colonial exhibits and fairs. By now, virtually everyone interested in French colonialism knows about the Exposition of 1931, but specialists are less aware of the relatively frequent colonial exhibitions held in the provinces.²¹ Between 1934 and 1948, the towns of Tarbes and la Bigorre held annual commercial exhibitions that each featured colonial pavilions. Strasbourg held a major colonial exhibition in 1924, and Georg uncovered similar events in Marseille and Lyon as well. The central attraction of these modern-day fairs was a putative replica of an African village, complete with straw huts, artisan products, exotic plants, and real live Africans. During the years before the First World War, an entrepreneur named Jean-Alfred Vigé sent one of these villages on a "tour de France." Much like a circus, it moved from one French town to the next displaying the exotic people and wares of Africa. Their authenticity was, of course, open to doubt. The dwellings represented an amalgam of different African architectural styles, and the "genuine villagers" came to resemble performers as they repeated their African acts in one French town after the other. For most mainland men and women, this was as close to Africa and Africans as they ever got, and it is reasonable to assume that the stereotypical images reproduced in these "genuine" villages did much to shape what ordinary people knew about Africa. It goes without saying that the village on display never represented colonial strife, resistance, or "pacification." The villagers/performers appeared unambivalently happy to belong to "Greater France."

It may be that these traveling villages helped confirm what provincial people had already learned from advertising. As we have seen, racist images were common in ads for soap and later for toothpaste and other cleaning products. The supposed servility and animality of Africans, Georg writes, was another typical advertising theme, as was the use of stereotypical racist features: bulging eyes, toothy grin, and monkey-like arms. Georg notes the extent to which advertising borrowed from literature and press reports about Africa and vice-versa. She admits that she didn't gauge "the effectiveness of propaganda," but she very skillfully documents the pervasiveness of racist and stereotypical views of Africa and Africans—views that could not but have an effect.

Beyond speech-making, writing, exhibitions, and advertising, colonial imagery and ideas were embodied in the built environment. Architecture was crucial and will be treated below; statuary and war memorials were important as well. In a study of memorials and other representations of military men, William Kidd shows that although considerable numbers of colonial subjects from Africa and Asia fought for France in the Great War, sculptors rarely rep-

resented them in the memorials they designed. When Africans and Asians were included, they tended to be subordinated in side panels and rendered in stereotypical ways. Memorials erected in Algeria and Morocco were more likely to represent the fraternity of French and colonial soldiers, but not without stereotypical “ethnic” images.

The one relatively common, and often positive, colonial image was of *tirailleurs sénégalais*, young West African men who fought in the trenches of the Great War. For internal French consumption, the *tirailleur* appeared as a sweet and happy-go-lucky soldier, his face plastered with an ear-to-ear unthreatening smile. The message seemed to be that this savage African fighter would do no domestic harm, not even to French women—who occasionally formed relationships with them. The *tirailleurs* had such positive standing in France that they were rewarded with the status of honorary whites. “Before I was a Negro,” read the caption of one famous poster, “Now I am French.” In representations broadcast to the Germans, by contrast, the *tirailleur* appeared as a demon warrior who could rip opposing soldiers apart. His reputation among Germans for being “without fear and without pity” worked a little too well, as Hitler’s propaganda machine later turned images of black troops (“*die Barbaren*”) into a partial justification for the invasion of France.

Other chapters on colonial propaganda and imagery include Robert Aldrich’s piece on the prevalence of “colonial names in Paris Streets,” and Pascal Venier’s analysis of an 1899 campaign to promote public acceptance of the French army’s bloody conquest of Madagascar four years earlier. Though most of Chafer and Sackur’s other chapters depart from the announced objective of the volume, namely colonial propaganda and efforts to build popular support for empire, a few are nonetheless very good. Emmanuelle Sibeud, the author of a superb new book on the construction of ethnographic knowledge about Africa, has an important chapter here on the persistence of racist views of Africans at the fin-de-siècle.²² The pseudo science of “colonial sociology,” she writes, depicted Africans as trapped in an early state of evolution and therefore incapable of civilization, much less assimilation to France. Even those who called themselves negrophiles saw Africans as childlike and undisciplined. Some putative negrophiles went so far as to claim that forced labor was the first rung on the ladder of civilization. Most of those who claimed scientific knowledge of Africa around the turn of the century maintained such views even in the face of the new Durkheimian sociology, whose leaders rejected biological reductionism and insisted that there was no such thing as an “uncivilized” people.

One of those influenced by the new sociology, Maurice Delafosse, argued that no writing about Africans could be legitimate unless rigorously scientific and based on a lengthy experience of living among the peoples in question. Researchers, he wrote, “must live the life of the natives ... eating and drinking the same food and drink, sleeping in their huts, listening to their discussions and their family squabbles, watching their games and their dances, listening to

their songs and their legends, taking part in their celebrations, their mourning, their religious or funeral ceremonies.” Such a program, Sibeud points out, elaborated what came to be the “basic rules of ethnography [soon] reorganized on the basis of fieldwork.” But not until much later did such a genuine scientific approach to colonial knowledge displace the existing racist “colonial sociology” that reinforced popular stereotypes and regarded Africans as beyond the pale of civilization. Even the Durkheimian ethnographers, largely immune from prejudice, unwittingly helped maintain negative imagery by claiming to speak for Africans rather than allowing Africans to speak for themselves.

In general, French colonialists spoke for Africans most of the time. Their relatively thick colonial administration often silenced indigenous elites, although according to Véronique Dimier’s chapter, perhaps somewhat less often than historians typically think. As for health care, public hygiene, and natalism, Alice Conklin shows that the voices of individual Africans were hardly heard at all. French administrators wanted to improve the “race” as a whole; the needs of particular people counted for very little. Conklin contrasts such African policies with those of metropolitan France in which public health, concerned as it was with the overall population, nonetheless focused on individuals. Even so, by the 1930s the government was so concerned about depopulation that it began to treat women not unlike the way it treated Africans—as a collective whole rather than as individuals with distinct needs of their own. Conklin’s conclusion is that women, like Africans, became an objectified “other” subordinate to the state.

These chapters by Sibeud, Dimier, and Conklin, excellent as they are, make the Chafer and Sackur volume a hodgepodge rather than a unified portrait of imperial imagery and propaganda. Nonetheless, the quality of many of the contributions makes it a useful introduction to certain aspects of the newly revitalized field of French colonial history. Somewhat more coherent is a newer collection of short essays edited by Pascal Blanchard and Sandrine Lemaire, *Culture coloniale: La France conquise par son Empire*. This volume claims to move beyond colonial propaganda and the propagation of colonial ideas to identify and analyze a colonial culture that the authors believe to have “sunk deeply into French society” after the Great War (7). The basic question, they say, is “extremely simple.” How did the “French become colonialist without even wanting to, without even knowing it, and without even expecting it?” The editors add that their ancestors “did not become colonialists in the sense of active agents of colonization or as fervent supporters of colonialism, but as colonialists as a matter of identity, culture, and instinct (*au sens identitaire, culturel et charnel*).”

To cultural historians, this is an appealing way of looking at colonialism. It seems to identify a bedrock stratum of imperial attitudes and sentiments that existed despite the absence of a popular colonial movement and even of overt public support for France’s empire. Colonial culture was so “omnipresent” (9), as the editors put it, so deeply rooted in people’s cultural environment and

in their identities as French men and women, that neither they nor the perpetually disappointed advocates of colonialism realized how colonialist ordinary people were. Support for empire, in the editors' view, was unconscious, instinctual, and reflexive; it came to the surface during certain "moments clés" like the colonial exhibition of 1931 and the Algerian War, only to recede into latency in normal times.

The problem here is that Blanchard, Lemaire and their collaborators never show that an imperial culture took hold in the way they claim. They assert several times that "L'opinion semble...convaincue par l'entreprise outre-mer" and that the French "ont été pénétrés bien plus en profondeur par cette culture coloniale que leurs voisins" (12-13). But there is virtually no effort to demonstrate that this was indeed the case. To believe that large numbers of French people possessed a colonial culture that attached them emotionally to the empire, it is not enough to recognize that "l'opinion a été traversée de tous côtés par l'omniprésence du colonial." We need to know how individuals processed the colonial images and ideas that surrounded them. It would be equally important to have a working definition of what the authors mean by "colonial culture." Lemaire and Blanchard say that to do so would require an entire theoretical book, and perhaps they're right. They beg off by referring readers to Said's *Culture and Imperialism* and even to Raoul Girardet's *L'Idée coloniale en France*. The latter is still a useful book, but one whose understanding of culture is far more traditional than the one that underlies, however implicitly, Blanchard and Lemaire's collection.

Though the concept of colonial culture remains undefined, the various essays gathered here nonetheless provide examples of what that culture might involve, how it circulated, what institutions and "social spaces" nurtured it, and when and how it received a special boost ("moments clés de sa promotion"). None of the chapters seems deeply researched, but many brim with provocative ideas that could serve as the basis for further investigation.

Giles Manceron's contribution makes clear that any cultural understanding of French imperialism must look closely at public education. Jules Ferry's primary schools introduced all French children to the three Rs and offered France's centralized state an unprecedented opportunity to instill in young people particular interpretations of history, geography, literature and other pivotal subjects. The existence of official textbooks endorsed by the national school administration gives us an excellent idea of what children were taught, although not of course what they actually learned. A handful of books became huge best-sellers. Larive and Fleury's grammar manual and Pierre Foncin's geography text each sold about 12 million copies between 1872 and 1889. By 1920, these numbers had reached 26 million, while Lavisser's history primer hit 13 million.²³ Textbooks were thus a perfect vehicle for diffusing pro-colonial ideas, and Manceron examines those most prominently displayed. One history primer, for example, presented Algeria as a place "autrefois inhospitalier et barbare" that is now "un prolongement de la France, où vous irez peut-être

bientôt vous battre à votre tour pour défendre, contre un peuple cruel et sans foi, la cause de la religion, des lois et de l'humanité" (96).

Although G. Bruno's famous *Le Tour de la France par deux enfants* (6 million copies printed in 1901) did not travel to the colonies, the racial hierarchy derived from them, writes Manceron, figured prominently in the volume. Students learned the value of the world's people in the following order: blanc, jaune, rouge, noir. In addition, much of the iconography of these and other texts showed triumphant scenes of colonial conquest, although by the 1930s the imagery had become much more peaceful. After the 1931 colonial exhibition, textbooks featured scenes of a benevolent Maréchal Lyautey enlightening the Arabs and of Savorgnan de Brazza freeing the slaves.²⁴ In general, Manceron found, textbooks evolved from a warlike view of colonization to one that emphasized its civilizing and humanitarian side.

When it came to opera and the theater, Sylvie Chalaye shows that after 1880 an existing penchant for exoticism took an explicitly colonial form. Scenes of military conquest in Africa became especially popular. In one typical piece, presented on Bastille Day 1891, actors played out a glorious French military victory in the Sudan. Two years later, a popular play set in Dahomey earned the following comment from a top theater critic: "Il y a bien longtemps que nous n'avions eu, hélas, à fêter par une pièce militaire une guerre ... bien franchement glorieuse pour la France. La merveilleuse campagne du colonel Dodds au Dahomey nous l'a fournie, cette occasion tant attendue" (83). After the debacle of 1870 and the colonial reverses at Tonkin and elsewhere in the 1880s, the French were starved for military victories; in the 1890s, the theater, opera, penny press, and café-concert provided a steady diet of brilliant battle-field campaigns led by honorable officers fighting against what the title of one play called "le démon noir." In general, writes Chalaye, the theater presented Africans as "des sauvages à pacifier" (91), and "des bêtes à domestiquer" (85).

Despite her largely negative view of how blacks were represented, Chalaye admits that with the war in Dahomey (1892-93), certain voices in the press began to find heroes among the African warriors. In this conflict, the *tirailleur sénégalais* emerged as a brave soldier who fought for France against fanatical Arab enemies and brutal African kings. As we have seen, the *tirailleur's* image would improve even more during the First World War when these African fighters became known as happy, fearless warriors distinguished by the exclamation, "Y'a bon!" Tens of thousands of posters featured this the upbeat expression under the smiling faces of semi-civilized but still childishly naïve Senegalais, said to demonstrate both what the colonies could do for France and what France had done for them. Although Chalaye claims that these images add up to a pure legitimation of France's colonial enterprise and the racial hierarchy it endorsed, the story may be a little more complicated than she supposes. Viewing African soldiers as heroes potentially disrupts the racial order and makes it possible for nearly half of *Eve's* respondents to say "yes" to the question, "Would you marry a man of color?"

During the Great War, France needed African (and Asian) soldiers not just for their “Y’a bon” reassurance, but to counteract a huge demographic deficit compared with Germany. By Armistice Day, the French army had enrolled 600,000 colonial subjects, sending to the various fronts 175,000 Algerians, 40,000 Moroccans, 80,000 Tunisians, 134,000 West Africans, 41,000 from Madagascar and 49,000 Indochinese. The numbers killed ranged from 1,600 Indochinese to 35,000 Algerians. In his illuminating chapter on the colonial contribution to the First World War, Eric Deroo shows not only how much colonial fighters added to the war effort, but how such involvement changed their image in France. Deroo reproduces a cover from *Le Petit journal, supplément illustré* of 1919, captioned “Le drapeau des tirailleurs sénégalais.” The image shows two black soldiers flanking a white officer. All three strike noble poses, and all three are featured with equal prominence on the page. Surrounding them are four circular portraits—three white men in uniform and a black man in an elegant suit and tie. The suit is clearly the symbol of civilization, which the black soldiers have proved they possess. There is no patronizing of a simple, grinning fighter limited by the “Y’a bon” of his pigeon French.

Another celebrated wartime image shows a *tirailleur* guarding several German prisoners of war. Pointing to the Boches, a father says to his son, “Ti viens voir li sauvages!!!” In this war, the savages came not from darkest Africa but from the European power next door. Deroo makes clear that these indispensable colonial soldiers shed “leur sang sans y gagner le moindre droit.” But their sacrifice was not without an effect, both on those in the colonies who would soon claim something in return, and those at home who would no longer see Africans in quite the same way as before.²⁵

Such a good, relatively “evolved” African never appears, write Oliver Barlet and Pascal Blanchard, in the French cinema, a subject strangely neglected in the Chafer and Sackur volume. On the screen, movie-goers saw nothing but stereotypical images of civilized Europeans and savage blacks and Arabs. The former were always properly attired in hot weather garb (safari suits and the like), while blacks stood mostly naked and Arabs in flowing Bedouin robes. Filmmakers represented black Africans as childlike at best and animalistic at worst. Arabs were brutal, if not always savage, and standard plots required them to be fanatical, traitorous, and incapable of cultivating their lands, which Europeans had to do in their place. If Africans were murderous and violent, colonialists never appeared as conquerors. Colonial wars and “pacification” campaigns, the authors write, almost never materialized on the screen.

A great many colonial films focused on explorers and other colonial heroes, “en parfaite continuité,” the authors write, “avec les récits des explorateurs comme Speke et Stanley, qui ‘pénètrent’ dans la seconde moitié du XIXe le *continent mystérieux*,” itself the title of a film of 1924 (130). Like Stanley’s best-selling books of the late nineteenth century, these colonial films emphasized the exotic and picturesque, the strangeness and savagery of the people, and the stamina, selflessness, and bravery of the European travelers. In

the 1920s, Stanley's writings were still fresh enough in people's minds for André Citroën to refer to them in offering to finance a colonial film by the noted cinéaste Léon Poirier: "Songez au film prodigieux ... que Stanley ou Brazza auraient pu rapporter si les frères Lumière avaient inventé leur cinématographe quinze ans plus tôt."

I haven't seen remotely as many colonial films as Barlet and Blanchard, but one of those I know is less dualistic in its presentation of Europeans and Africans than the authors claim these films to be. Perhaps Poirier's *Brazza ou l'épopée du Congo* (1940) is an exception, but it includes a positive image of a *tirailleur sénégalais* read back onto Brazza's real-life companion and interpreter, the Sénégalais Malamine Kemara.²⁶ Brazza lore had always been favorable to Malamine, the loyal African who showed allegiance to France by standing up to Stanley and "les Anglais." But in Poirier's film, the post-1918 romance with the *tirailleur* made Malamine even more sympathetic, that is civilized, patriotic, and ready to fight again for France. This, too, is a stereotypical image, but it's not the binary opposite to European-ness that defines the nearly monolithic way in which the Blanchard and Lemaire volume characterizes virtually all late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century images of Africans. Even in popular cultural products like the cinema, the dividing lines between Europeans and Africans, civilized and savage, were not as neat as these authors suggest, especially by the 1920s and 1930s.²⁷

One article, "L'invention de l'indigène," does transcend this civilized/savage divide, but only to create another problematic binary opposition: *français* and *indigène*. It is true that writers and political figures did, at times, sharply distinguish French citizens from the indigenous peoples who were subjects of the empire. But such was not always the case. As Alice Conklin points out, the French state viewed white women, disenfranchised until 1944, in ways analogous to African subjects. And when it came to native peoples, unified representations of the "indigène" often dissolved into intricate distinctions between relatively "evolved" inhabitants of the Caribbean and West Africa and less civilized natives of the Congo. The Indochinese, moreover, often appeared as more advanced than the Africans, with Arabs somewhere in-between. There was no "dualité nécessaire entre colons et indigènes," but rather a complex and shifting hierarchy of races, genders, classes, peoples, and cultures that, to be sure, usually placed white men on top. Even so, the racial hierarchy was not so rigid as to rule out depictions of "les Boches" as more savage than black Africans, French workers as more dangerous than ferocious Arabs, and teenage Parisian "apaches" as more murderous than Redskins of the American West.²⁸

Amid all this cultural history stands a lone piece on the economics of colonialism by the doyenne of French Africanists. Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch shows how the "mythe économique colonial" harmed rather than advanced the French economy. Protected by colonial preferences, many French enterprises retained old, inefficient ways whose consequences would be dev-

astating after 1945. Other essays collected in *Culture coloniale* include Lemaire's useful piece on the official agency for disseminating colonial propaganda and two essays on the 1931 Exposition coloniale internationale de Paris. Although Pascal Blanchard provides important details about the "union sacrée" that linked Right and Left in support of the Exposition, neither his chapter nor the one by Steve Ungar adds much to what Raoul Girardet, Charles-Robert Ageron, and Herman Lebovics have already written.²⁹

In an article of 1968, Raoul Girardet referred to the 1931 extravaganza as the "apotheosis" of colonial France.³⁰ Though later writers have made larger claims than did Girardet for the impact of the exhibition, his term "apotheosis" has stuck. Ungar calls the event "une apothéose," and Pierre Nora apparently considered the Expo so important that as *Les Lieux de mémoire's* lone chapter on colonial France, he had it stand in for the entire imperial experience.³¹ As we will see, Patricia Morton also considered the exhibition an apotheosis, as, in a way, did Herman Lebovics.³²

Running from May to November, 1931, the Exposition coloniale internationale de Paris received about 34 million visits by 4 million Parisians, 3 million provincials, and 1 million foreigners, each of whom went on average four times.³³ This was, by any standard, a huge turnout. Afterwards, Maréchal Lyautey, the colonial hero who had headed the organizing committee, wrote that the event had achieved its goal of "making the French conscious of their empire ... and making them proud of being "a citizen of 'la plus grande France.'"³⁴ The exhibition did in fact brilliantly advertise France's empire, with dozens of carefully designed buildings purporting to represent indigenous architecture and hundreds of displays of colonial peoples and production. But it was the Expo's exotic, even wondrous, entertainment value that drew a great many of its visitors.

A short metro ride from anywhere in Paris, the gates of the colonial fair opened onto what organizers advertised as a *Tour du monde en un jour*. Once inside, visitors could imagine themselves far from Europe, as they moved from the Madagascar section, complete with a miniature village, to the Avenue des Colonies Françaises, where they could walk among the palm trees of Martinique and Guadeloupe before transporting themselves to the forests of Guyana, the palaces of French India, and the shaded dwellings of Tahiti and New Caledonia. Strollers could visit a Tonkin village, take in the Muslin architecture of Sudan, inspect the straw huts of Equatorial Africa, and penetrate the "Casbah" of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Along the way, visitors could observe native artisans fashioning their wares and watch Kanak dancers, whose exotic movements and rhythms had attracted French spectators even before the colonial exhibition had begun. Journalists later revealed that these dancers, so popular with the paying public, were abused and exploited first by private entrepreneurs and then by organizers of the colonial exposition.

Beyond the dancing and the zoo-like observation of real live natives, the exhibition offered even lower-brow forms of entertainment: an amusement

park with the latest scary rides; two Islands of Delight in Lake Daumesnil, whose Thousand and One Nights quarter featured restaurants, dance halls, and concession stands; a camel-back excursion through “West Africa;” and a water ride across the lake in vessels piloted by African or Indochinese boatmen. “Lake Daumesnil,” enthused one journalist, had turned into the “soft waters of Asia and Africa combined, [offering] its embarcaderos to those who want to fish cod off Saint-Pierre and Miquelon (*sic*) or, in pirogues dug from the trunks of trees, lose themselves in the foliage of the Amazon” (66).

In case people missed all the newspaper columns, placards, and handbills advertising the Exposition, they could hear about it through song. In *Quand on chantait les colonies*, Claude Liauzu and Josette Liauzu have unearthed hundreds of popular songs about the colonies and French colonialism and provided interesting commentaries on dozens of them.³⁵ A tune entitled *Viens à l'exposition* might have been an advertising jingle, had the genre existed at the time.

Viens ma chérie, veux-tu que nous allions
 A l'Ex, à l'Ex, à l'Exposition
 Paraît qu'on y voit des chos's à sensation
 A l'Ex, à l'Ex, à l'exposition
 Refrain : Toi qui aim's les voyag's, c'est un' affaire
 Je te f'rai fair' tout le tour de la terre
 En allant à Vincennes, à Charenton,
 A l'Ex, à l'Ex, à l'Exposition
 Allons voir le Maroc...
 Tu verras des fatmas qui font la dans' du ventre...
 La, c'est les nègres du Congo,
 Ne les regard' pas trop
 Sinon demain tu peux me croire'
 Ca t'donnerait des idées noir's...
 Te souviens-tu dans le templ' d'Angkor
 Je t'embrassais et tu disais ... encore.

Appealing as these carnivalesque, sexualized attractions were, most commentators agreed that the highlight of the *tour du monde* was the partial reconstruction of Cambodia's famed Angkor Wat. Lyautey had directed the Exposition's architects to design “authentic” colonial buildings, and those who created the replica of Angkor Wat showed such concern for authenticity that they used plaster molds taken from the original. Despite this quest for exactitude, the architects departed in significant ways from their model. As Herman Lebovics has made clear, the French designers refashioned the ancient temple according to contemporary French aesthetic norms and ideological preconceptions.³⁶ They built a temple that would appeal to Western tastes. If Angkor Wat represented a mélange of Western and colonial styles, so did all the Expo's buildings erected in the Bois de Vincennes. So writes the architectural historian Patricia Morton in her own fascinating and beautifully produced contribution to the burgeoning scholarship on the Exposition of 1931.³⁷

On first glance, Morton's volume is worrisome. By page ten, she has already mentioned Mikhail Bakhtin, Benedict Anderson, Homi Bhabha, Walter Benjamin, and the post-colonial theorist Kumkum Sangari. With such an honor role, Morton appears to announce an exercise in cultural studies and post-coloniality that risks being heavy on "theory" and light on historical investigation. Fortunately, this is not at all the case. Except for some confusion over the eminently post-colonial term "hybridity," Morton has provided a sound and extremely well-informed analysis of the architecture that gave the exhibition its outward face while expressing its core ideas, however contradictory they were.

Morton argues that the fundamental intention of the exhibition's organizers was to show that France and the colonies existed in two utterly distinct cultural and intellectual universes, linked only by their common membership in "la plus grande France." The Hexagon was modern, scientific, and sophisticated; the colonies backward, primitive, and naïve. Colonial subjects might one day rise to the level of civilized French men and women, but their cultural atavism was such that they would need a long apprenticeship in the ways of civilized, modern life. The Expo organizers, Morton writes, expressed the sharp division they imagined between metropole and the colonies by isolating their phantasmagoric Afro-Asian world from the City of Light. Rather than locate the Expo in the heart of Paris, at, say, the Eiffel Tower or Trocadero, where earlier world's fairs had taken place, Lyautey and his colleagues took their event outside the city to the still untamed Bois de Vincennes. Not only was Vincennes known as the poor man's park, situated as it was just beyond some of the bleakest neighborhoods of Paris; it existed on the other side of a no man's land known as the Zone. This ring of supposedly vacant land encircling the old Paris fortifications had become a sort of shantytown inhabited by people too poor to live anywhere else. Run-down, ugly, foul-smelling, and unlit, the Zone represented the opposite "other" of Paris. Since the 1931 Expo occupied part of the Zone before extending into the unkempt Bois de Vincennes, it made perfect symbolic sense, Morton says, for Lyautey to situate his simulacrum of France's colonial Other in that doubly marginal space.

Such were the putative intentions of Lyautey and his friends. The actual exhibition, however, expressed something quite different—not a complete separation between metropole and colonies but a mixture of the two. As Lebovics had already noted, the designers of Angkor Wat may have used molds from the original, but they reconfigured the structure in good Beaux-Arts form. In particular, Morton writes, "they altered the scale, massing, construction, details, and internal organization of the indigenous models to create structures of a size and dignity befitting the grandeur of the capital of France" (196-97). The result was a hybrid of colonial and metropolitan architectural forms. Adding to the *mélange* was a gulf between the outside of the structure and its inner spaces. The real Angkor Wat had no inside; the replica featured a well-lit interior fitted out with the standard galleries and display

cases of a modern Western museum. Outside the Parisian Angkor Wat, visitors found not the dense jungle native to the Cambodian original, but an open plaza paved with glass blocks. How else could natural light stream down to the galleries below?

Such hybridization, Morton writes, was nothing new. "Over the decades of contact between France and her colonies, new cultural expressions, neither French nor indigenous, emerged in the colonies and in the *métropole*. Segregation of the two proved impossible on both sides, resulting in hybrid productions. These half-breed manufactures undermined the separation and differentiation of French culture from colonial culture" (197). Some commentators, Morton shows, applauded these mixtures for breathing new life into European culture, while others feared that artistic hybridization, like the mixing of races, would dilute the superior qualities of the West. Though Morton represents this argument very well, she nonetheless concludes that there was a "paradox inherent in French colonialism...[I]ts practices produced hybrids even while repudiating them" (201). The first part of this statement is true, but as her own evidence reveals, the second is not.

Even the Expos' organizers did not consistently reject what Morton calls hybridization. Although she portrays them as intent on keeping the colonial pavilions symbolically and physically separate from the modern reality of Paris, her evidence shows that they originally sought to locate parts of the Expo in central areas of the city. The organizers ultimately decided to build everything in the Bois de Vincennes, not to create a symbolic separation between France and the colonies, but because it became too complicated and too expensive to procure sections of central Paris.

As for the various architects who designed the Expos' structures, Morton characterizes them as making a conscious distinction between the outside and the inside of their buildings; that is, as purposefully creating hybrids. The outsides supposedly represented the primitive, unchanged nature of native society, while the interiors displayed the fruits of Western knowledge—mainly in the form of ethnographic collections. As for the structures themselves, it is difficult to believe that their *mélange* of native architectural forms and modern methods of design and construction were entirely unconscious. With all this in mind, there isn't much left of the notion that the Expo's organizers intended to keep the colonial and the metropolitan insulated from each other. That was never a possibility, and the architects knew it.

The problem here seems to be the intrusion of certain forms of postcolonial theory. Robert Young and others Morton cites seem intent on the idea that colonialists sought to banish the very hybridity their policies inevitably created. According to Young, whom Morton quotes at length, "The principle of opposition, between civilization and barbarism or savagery, was nothing less than the ordering principle of civilization as such." Or as Morton echoes the point, "Segregation between French and native had to be visible and obvious to maintain the authority of the colonizing power" (202-203). Maybe so,

but she herself shows that such segregation was the rule neither in the colonies nor in their simulacrum at Vincennes.

Part of the confusion may stem from a failure to distinguish racial mixing from cultural mixing. As Emmanuelle Saada has shown, racial hybridity, or *métissage*, indeed seemed menacing to most colonial administrators and political commentators. The offspring of unions between French men and indigenous women threatened to blur the boundary between French and native, white and colored, and disrupt the ordered racial hierarchy that formed one of the premises of colonial rule. But worrisome as the *métis* were, Saada shows that rather than banishing them or attempting to consign them to native status, colonial rulers in Indochina defined a great many *métis* as French. Administrators could do so, Saada has found, because they understood race not solely in biological terms, but in cultural terms as well. Thus a child of a French-Indochinese union could be considered French and given French citizenship if he was deemed to have enjoyed a European upbringing and education and to exhibit a European “way of life.” These were, of course, highly subjective judgments, but the fact that colonial administrators regularly resolved the vexing ambiguity of *métissage* by applying a cultural measure of Frenchness suggests that colonialism’s racial hierarchies were not as clear-cut as many scholars believe.³⁸

Thus, if colonialists widely considered racial hybridity a threat, albeit a somewhat ambiguous one, Morton’s own evidence shows that French views of cultural miscegenation were far less uniform. For this reason, the 1931 Exhibition’s architects openly embraced mixtures of European and “native” architecture styles. Not everyone approved of such a *mélange*, but as Morton also makes clear, such mixing rested on centuries of precedent. Indeed, cultural *métissage* was so common and so long-standing that its ubiquity calls into question the very notion of hybridity itself. To refer to a cultural form as a “hybrid” suggests the prior existence of something “pure”—something, that is, untainted by influences from the outside.³⁹ Once again, Morton’s evidence shows the difficulty of discovering unmixed architectural forms. Gabriel Veissière, the architect who designed the structures representing Madagascar at the 1931 Exhibition, found no purely “native” architecture to emulate. The royal residence in Tananarive to which his 1931 pavilion referred had itself been designed by a Frenchman in 1839 and then redesigned thirty years later by the Scottish missionary and architect James Cameron. Even Labord and Cameron’s original conceptions were, as Morton writes “already mixtures, hybrids of Malagasy imperial architecture and imported references to European buildings” (227). If we were to look closely at “Malagasy imperial architecture,” we would doubtless find a mixture of what Morton calls “divergent ethnic traditions.”

Turning to North Africa, we find a “native” architecture even more mixed than the Malagasy one. As the critic Jean Gallotti wrote in 1931, “Moroccan” architecture revealed “the eminent dignity of the Hispano-Moorish art of Fez ... and recalls to us what this art owes to Persia” (232). Most North African

architecture showed the effects of the dense web of cultural exchange that had long defined the Mediterranean world, and the influences that came from the Middle East were themselves the hybrid product of an old and multifaceted imperial culture. As these examples make clear, the notion that the architecture of the 1931 Exposition was somehow distinguished by its “hybridity” does not tell us very much. If essentially all significant buildings are mixtures of different architectural styles, and “colonial” buildings, like their European counterparts, had long exhibited a mixture of African, Asian, and Western influences, it is neither startling nor analytically useful to know that most buildings at the 1931 Exposition were hybrids too. The notion of hybridity rests on a false dichotomy between French and colonial, the same dichotomy that Morton accuses Lyautey of trying to maintain.

Fortunately, we don't need to accept the idea of hybridity to profit from Morton's book. She is extremely good when it comes to analyzing and describing the Expo's buildings themselves, and she provides dozens of beautiful black and white photographs—many occupying a full page—that give readers a powerful visual sense of exposition and its most significant architectural works. Morton also nicely emphasizes the extent to which this event represented a fantasy of French colonialism. The 1931 Exposition depicted as material reality a “Greater France” that existed only in the imaginations of colonial theorists and administrators. In the Bois de Vincennes and only in the Bois de Vincennes did a French empire operate without conflict and repression, without forced labor or untreated disease, and without nationalists and socialists who sought independence from imperial domination. Only on the exhibition grounds were all colonial structures skillfully built and designed by leading architects, and only there did French imperialism make a profit. Although the overwhelming majority of French men and women had no interest in emigrating to the colonies, millions of them eagerly signed on for the Expo's tour of the world in a single day. For the price of a ticket, a nation of newspaper readers and film-goers enamored of the exotic, heroic, and adventurous, could take their own vicarious voyages into “darkest Africa” or into the land of the Arabian Nights. Only in this simulacrum of “La Plus Grande France” could people travel without fear of contracting life-threatening diseases, enduring harsh tropical weather, or simply losing their way.

Despite the extraordinary popularity of the 1931 Exposition, it was not without its opponents. Morton devotes an entire illuminating chapter to the Surrealists' counter-exposition designed to mock and undermine the extravaganza at Vincennes. Whereas Lyautey saw the Expo as one huge advertisement for the virtues of empire, Surrealists and their Communist allies expressed the opposition to imperialism increasingly common in the colonies but virtually unknown in France. Even Socialists, like most other republican politicians, endorsed the civilizing mission. French Communists were essentially alone in rejecting colonialism, and then only in its capitalist variety. At the counter-exposition, held in the former Soviet pavilion of the 1925 Deco-

native Arts Exposition, the Surrealist organizers denounced the violence and robbery at the heart of imperialism while reporting glowingly on conditions in the Soviet Union.

Few Parisians obeyed the counter-exposition's manifesto, *Ne visitez pas l'Exposition Coloniale*, and only a tiny number went to the Surrealist event instead; it counted only 4,226 entries. It's a shame the numbers were so low, because the counter-exposition included some beautiful pieces of African and Asian art and outlined a prescient critique of French colonialism. It also revealed the illusions and fatuousness of what Lyautey had created in the Bois de Vincennes. Though less critical than the Communists of colonialism as a whole, Léon Blum expressed those illusions best: "We must not forget what reality hides behind this décor of art and of joy...At the Exposition, we reconstitute the marvelous stairway of Angkor and make the sacred dancers twirl, but in Indochina we shoot, or deport, or imprison" (98).

Despite their political opposition to empire, Communists and Surrealists shared some of its most fundamental cultural assumptions. For them, as for the Exposition's organizers, native culture was primitive, naïve, and pre-rational, which is precisely what the Surrealists liked about it. As Morton shows, African culture in particular seemed to offer Surrealists an alternative to the excessive rationality and self-defeating sophistication of European civilization. While Surrealists gloried in the "primitiveness" of Africa and Asia, mainstream critics and colonialists represented that very simplicity as proof of Western superiority and the need for a civilizing mission.

Historians are divided over whether the 1931 Exposition represented the high point of popular support for what Girardet called "l'idée coloniale." But there is evidence that attachment to the colonies, and to some sort of colonial culture, continued to grow. An IFOP poll taken in 1939 showed that 55 percent of those surveyed considered it "aussi pénible de devoir céder un morceau de notre empire colonial qu'un morceau du territoire de la France," while 43 percent held the opposite view. Ten years later, an INSEE poll revealed considerably stronger support: 86 percent of people aged 21-35 and 75 percent of those over 50 believed it important for France to possess a colonial empire.⁴⁰ Although the questions asked in the two polls were not exactly the same, the surveys indicate that belief in empire, already strong in 1939, grew even stronger after the war. Such numbers suggest that the colonialist propaganda and discourses so pervasive between 1900 and 1940 had had their effect. These materials moved different people in different ways, and it is a matter not solely of historical concern to understand how colonial beliefs and attitudes sink in and how individuals respond once they do.

Notes

1. For Great Britain, see Stephen Koss, "Wesleyanism and Empire," *Historical Journal* 18 (1975): 105-18; B. Porter, "The Edwardians and their Empire," in *Edwardian England*, ed. Donald Read (London: The Historical Association, 1982); Richard Price, *An Imperial War and the British Working Class* (London: Routledge, 1972); Henry Pelling, *Popular Politics and Society in Late Victorian Britain* (London: Palgrave, 1979); Max Beloff, *Imperial Sunset* (London: Sheridan House, 1969). For France, see A. Sydney Kanya-Forstner, *The Conquest of the Western Sudan: A Study in French Military Imperialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Stuart M. Persell, *The French Colonial Lobby, 1889-1938* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1983); Christopher M. Andrew and A. Sydney Kanya-Forstner, "The French 'Colonial Party': Its Composition, Aims and Influence, 1885-1914," *Historical Journal* 17,1 (1974): 99-128; Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, "The *Groupe colonial* in the French Chamber of Deputies, 1892-1932," *Historical Journal* 17, 4 (1974): 837-66; Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, "Centre and Periphery in the Making of the Second French Colonial Empire, 1815-1920," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 16, 3 (1988): 9-34; L. Abrams and D.J. Miller, "Who were the French Colonialists? A Reassessment of the *parti colonial*, 1890-1914," *Historical Journal* 19, 3 (1976): 685-725; Marc Lagana, *Le Parti colonial français: Éléments d'histoire* (Sillery, Québec: Presses de l'Université de Québec, 1990); Raoul Girardet, *L'Idée coloniale en France, 1871-1962* (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1972).
2. Works that come to mind include: Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1961); Neville Sanderson, *England, Europe, & the Upper Nile, 1882-1899* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1965); Jean Stengers, *Congo, mythes et réalités: 100 ans d'histoire* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Duculot, 1989); Girardet, *L'Idée coloniale*; Henri Brunschwig, *Mythes et réalités de l'impérialisme colonial français, 1871-1914* (Paris: Librairie d'Armand Colin, 1960); Charles Robert Ageron, *France coloniale ou parti colonial?* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1978).
3. Price, *Imperial War*; Pelling, *Popular Politics*; M.D. Blanch, "British Society and the War," in *The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902*, ed. Peter Warwick (London: Longman, 1980): 210-38; Bernard Porter, *The Lion's Share* (London: Longman, 1975). For a recent version of such views, see Jonathan Rose, *The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 335-37.
4. John M. MacKenzie, *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960* (Manchester, UK.: Manchester University Press, 1984); *Imperialism and Popular Culture*, John M. MacKenzie (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1985); *Imperialism and the Natural World*, ed. John M. MacKenzie (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1990); *Popular Imperialism and the Military, 1850-1950*, ed. John M. MacKenzie (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1992); *European Impact and Pacific Influence: British and German Colonial Policy in the Pacific Islands and in the Indigenous Response*, ed. John M. MacKenzie and Germann J. Hiery (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); *The Victorian Vision: Inventing New Britain*, ed. John M. MacKenzie (New York: Abrams, 2001). MacKenzie has also published two book-length studies and written dozen of articles on aspects of the culture of imperialism. He also wrote the chapter "Empire and Metropolitan Cultures" in *Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. 3, ed. William Roger Lewis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998-99).
5. William H. Schneider, *An Empire for the Masses: The French Popular Image of Africa* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982); Thomas G. August, *The Selling of Empire:*

- British and French Imperialist Propaganda, 1890-1940* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985).
6. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1972); Jurgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Bourgeois Public Sphere*, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1989). For excellent critiques of Habermas, see Craig Calhoun, ed., *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996). For recent studies that take mass culture seriously, see Michael Denning, *Mechanic Accents: Dime Novels and Working-Class Culture in America* (New York: Verso Books, 1998); Janice Radway, *Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy and Popular Culture* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984); Robin Walz, *Pulp Surrealism: Insolent Popular Culture in Early Twentieth-Century Paris* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Vanessa Schwartz, *Spectacular Realities: Early Mass Culture in Fin-de-Siècle France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
 7. William Cohen's important work, *The French Encounter with Africans: White Response to Blacks, 1530-1880* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), concerns an earlier period and mostly elite individuals.
 8. The introduction to Chafer and Sackur's *Promoting the Colonial Idea* is a veritable *hommage* to MacKenzie.
 9. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1978); Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1993). Beyond Said's two seminal works, the study of orientalism has practically become a sub-branch of humanistic inquiry.
 10. Quoted in Penny Summerfield, "Patriotism and Empire: Music-Hall Entertainment, 1870-1914," in MacKenzie, *Imperialism and Popular Culture*, 17.
 11. Price, *Imperial War*, p. 176; Price, "Society, Status and Jingoism: The Social Roots of Lower Middle Class Patriotism, 1870-1900," in *The Lower Middle Class in Britain, 1870-1914*, ed. Geoffrey Crossick (London: Croom Helm, 1977); Pelling, *Popular Politics*, 87-88.
 12. The literature on popular culture is vast. For a sample of some of the best writing on the subject, see Chandra Mukerji and Michael Schudson eds., *Rethinking Popular Culture: Contemporary Perspectives in Cultural Studies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). On the turn from social to cultural history, see Lynn Hunt, ed., *The New Cultural History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
 13. On the latter point, see MacKenzie, *Propaganda and Empire*, 3.
 14. Jonathan Rose, *Intellectual Life*.
 15. *Ibid.*, 4-9. Rose is justly critical of literary scholars like Barbara Herrnstein Smith who maintain that classic writers like Homer and Shakespeare "do not have value" for people without an orthodox Western education.
 16. *Ibid.*, 335.
 17. *Ibid.*, 340.
 18. Stephen Humphries, *Hooligans or Rebels?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 41, quoted in MacKenzie, *Imperialism and Popular Culture*, 6.
 19. These letters are collected in the Fonds Brazza at the Centre d'Archives d'Outre-Mer 16/VII, Carton 12.
 20. Richard West, *Brazza of the Congo: European Exploration and Exploitation in French Equatorial Africa* (Newton-Abbot: Victorian Book Club, 1973), 124.
 21. See the discussion of Patricia A. Morton's book below.
 22. Emmanuelle Sibeud, *Une science impériale pour l'Afrique? La construction des savoirs africanistes en France, 1878-1930* (Paris: Éditions de l'EHESS, 2002).
 23. Jean-Yves Mollier, *La Lecture et ses publics à l'époque contemporaine* (Paris: PUF, 2001), 55-56.
 24. My own research suggests an extraordinary revival of interest in Brazza, the "pacific conquerer," after the colonial exposition. Seven biographies of the explorer were

- published in the 1930s, as were several pictorial spreads of Brazza in *L'Illustration*. In addition, a film dramatizing Brazza's peaceful conquests appeared in 1940.
25. On the positive post-1918 image of soldiers from the colonies, see Raoul Girardet, "L'Apothéose de la 'plus grande France': l'Idée coloniale devant l'opinion française (1930-1935)," *Revue française de Science Politique* 18 (1968), 1087.
 26. Léon Poirier, *Brazza. Le Livre film* (Tours: Maison Mame, 1940).
 27. On the problems with dualistic renderings of colonial relationships and imagery, see Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler eds., *Tensions of Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
 28. On representations of urban youths as fierce apaches, see Robert Nye, *Crime, Madness and Politics in Modern France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Dominique Kalifa, *L'Encre et le sang* (Paris: Fayard, 1995).
 29. Girardet, "L'Apothéose"; Charles-Robert Ageron, "L'Exposition coloniale de 1931: Mythe républicain ou mythe impérial?" in *Les Lieux de mémoire*, vol. 1, ed. Pierre Nora (Paris: Gallimard, 1997); Herman Lebovics, *True France: The Wars over Cultural Identity, 1900-1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).
 30. Girardet, "L'Apothéose."
 31. Steve Ungar, "La France impériale exposée en 1931: une apothéose," in Blanchard and Lemaire; Ageron, "L'Exposition coloniale."
 32. Lebovics, *True France*.
 33. Ageron, "L'Exposition coloniale," 505.
 34. Girardet, "L'Apothéose," 1093.
 35. The subtitle is *Colonisation et culture populaire de 1830 à nos jours* (Paris: Éditions Syllepse, 2002).
 36. Lebovics, *True France*, esp. Chapter Two.
 37. Patricia A. Morton, *Hybrid Modernities: Architecture and Representation at the 1931 Colonial Exposition, Paris* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000).
 38. Emmanuelle Saada, "La 'Question des métis' dans les colonies françaises: Socio-histoire d'une catégorie juridique," (Ph.D. diss., École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris, 2001); "Race and Sociological Reason in the Republic: Inquiries on the Métis in the French Empire (1908-37)," *International Sociology* 17, 3 (September 2002): 361-91.
 39. The problems with "hybridity" as a conceptual tool came to me after reading Bernard Yack's brilliant critique of the way postmodernists present the notion of modernity. Postmodernists, Yack writes, can talk about a modern era giving way to a postmodern one only by conceiving of "modern experience as a highly integrated and coherent whole"—that is, by thinking of modernity as precisely the sort of totality or collective condition that their own theoretical perspective otherwise rejects. If postmodernity is plural, fragmented and hybrid in the view of writers like Gianni Vattimo and David Kolb, then modernity must be singular, coherent and pure. Though Morton seldom even mentions the term "modern" in her book, despite the title *Hybrid Modernities*, she appeared to see the 1931 Exposition as marking the beginning—or at least registering the existence—in France of a post-modern, hybrid condition. See Bernard Yack, *The Fetishism of Modernities* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977). The quote above is from p. 4.
 40. Ageron, *Exposition coloniale*, 510.

