The Future of Citizenship

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Crocodiles sharing the same belly: Akans in Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire deem it absurd that two reptiles sharing a belly compete for the first mouthful: but how to reconcile personal and group interests in an inclusive society that values humane unity in cultural diversity?—Ed.


Cover Concept and Design: Jose V. Ciprut
The ongoing expansion of the field of citizenship studies is one of the most important and remarkable recent trends in social science and humanities research. The very institution of national citizenship has drawn increasing scrutiny from a growing number of critical scholars. Some raise questions about citizenship within the framework of a larger critique of liberalism and its institutions. Others point to citizenship’s inherently exclusionary nature, its historical use as a mechanism of social sorting—indeed, of social control—and its role in helping to obscure the relative power of other influences when constructing individual and collective senses of social identity or developing a notion of value in civic affiliation and a discerning appreciation of potential in political empowerment.

In this book, without advocating any particular ideological agenda, we seek to gain a multivalent understanding of the evolving meaning of citizenship. We start from the earliest notions and move quickly from past to present, the better to acquire a sense of the term’s possible future meanings, applications, and implications. We find that many of the misunderstandings that have led to conflict, too many of the misinterpretations that have ended in blood-spilling exclusions and heart-wrenching self-banishments in the past, and most of the asymmetries and injustices that contaminate the present and threaten to affect the future of citizenship adversely in a ‘globally international’ political economy could be addressed more effectively according to the norms of a worldwide ethic of human communication and civil interface. We consequently endeavor to anticipate the need and the requirements for such a voluntary relational or transactional ethic. We gain the insights leading to our conclusions step by step, as follows.
The Political Economy of Citizenship: A Classical Perspective

The title of chapter 2 and its subject were entrusted to a classicist rather than a political economist after we realized that almost all the extant literature addresses the topic empirically, by way of specific exemplifications of micro-aspects, be they the political economy of reconstruction in the Balkans (Schierup 1999), the housing of the urban poor in Africa (Morrison and Gutkind 1982), state-specific (Lentner 2004) or regional integration–oriented approaches (Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001), or social organizational matters, sometimes—and increasingly so—in the context of globalization (Germain and Kenny 2005).

For J. J. Mulhern, ‘citizenship’ is not merely the possession of the franchise; it is also, and especially, one’s eligibility for positions of initiative or command in the very polity where one is a recognized and accepted member. In this unabashedly realistic sense of ‘citizenship’, birth trumps naturalization and age plays a role, as do also residence and the fulfillment of administrative requirements, but wealth does not. In other words, as Mulhern points out, citizenship does not have a reverse means test.

Vestiges of grades of citizenship are noticeable. In the United States, for instance, even though riches may not affect a citizen’s eligibility for positions of initiative or command, wealth remains one of the decisive conditions that affect a citizen’s ability to obtain and discharge positions of high visibility and high public responsibility. At one end of the spectrum, contributors may purchase access and thus put themselves in line for appointments and wealthy candidates may purchase name recognition and succeed to elective office whether or not they are able to help preserve the country from external dangers or are capable of promoting internal stability. And at the other end of the spectrum, advocates may bring pressure to bear on governments at all levels to provide the poor not only with commodities and services but with a means of participation as well, yet without much attention paid to preserving national security or domestic stability.

The exclusion of wealth-associated ability from consideration in defining someone’s eligibility astutely ensures that the influence of wealth will be exercised in unofficial ways, perhaps without regard for the requirements of the position sought. While this situation is quite

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unlikely to change in the United States in the near term, Mulhern, who teaches courses on government, is curious to find out whether it may be useful to see how others have dealt with the political economy of citizenship. In chapter 2 he seeks to discover what lessons can be learned from situations as different as those of the United States and those of less stable nations, say, in Latin America.

In his chapter, he first adopts Mill’s definition of the subject of political economy as wealth. Next, he considers two major systems of political economy that have been thought to be formative for the U.S. polity: that of Athens in the time of Solon and the years close to it and that of England in the seventeenth century. Both these examples illustrate an explicit recognition of the relation of wealth to citizenship and an explicit reflection on this relation as well. Mulhern then reconsiders political economy, citizenship, and the ensuing characterizing traits, both in growing economies and in stabilized economies.

May citizenship be deemed a ‘public good’? Although national and international agencies sometimes do assume there is a distinct class of public goods, and then go on to develop programs with this assumption in mind, even Samuelson (1955) was willing “to deny that most public functions fit into . . . [Samuelson’s own] extreme definition of a public good.” Thus, a considerable volume of extant literature to the contrary notwithstanding, it is conceivable that a political economy of citizenship might be developed more usefully without need to suppose there is a separate class of public goods. But, one may ask, if ‘citizenship’ is not to be considered a ‘club good’ either, on what ethical grounds could one possibly interpret inclusion and exclusion within the bounds of a national political economy?

The Ethics of Exclusion

In the history of human civilization, citizens and noncitizens have had their share of discrimination, and even of exclusion, in many guises. Some scholars have examined specific manifestations and concerns in regard to the ethics of inclusion and exclusion inside a given community, from the perspective of the health care profession (Heginbotham

2. Born in London, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), the author of the System of Logic (1843), was later even better known for his Principles of Political Economy (1848).

3. A wealthy merchant who wrote poetry in his spare time, Solon (??–558/559?) penned a constitution that enhanced democratic rule by mitigating disparities in wealth, thereby attenuating class struggles among the citizens of Athens.
1999) or as relates to nationalism and the exclusion of immigrants in, say, Australia (Carens 1988). Others have sought to understand the motives and links that conduce to group assimilation as a way of latching on to citizenship (Joppke and Morawska 2003). Yet others have trained microeconomic lenses on the subject, the better to develop a day-by-day, almost businesslike grasp of it.

For philosophers of ethics, such as Rahul Kumar and David Silver, any discussion of the ethics of exclusion from recognition as a citizen in good standing needs to be situated within the framework of a broader political philosophy. In chapter 3, the authors adopt a largely classical liberal political philosophy in which the role of the state is to advance the interests of its subjects, more particularly the interests of citizens in their conduct of rationally self-governed and meaningfully led lives.

The specific valuations and interests that this rather abstract commitment leads one to identify as concretely salient Kumar and Silver refer to as ‘liberal values’. In the authors’ view, questions of authoritative (state-initiated) exclusion are to be evaluated with the most direct reference to these liberal values. True, one can also be excluded from citizenship not by the state but by one’s fellow citizens in their guise as the ‘body politic’. The moral character of this kind of exclusion, which they refer to as social exclusion, cannot, however, be accounted for in exactly the same terms as the one neatly administered as legal, authoritative exclusion.

These two scholars therefore examine the moral limits of both authoritative and social exclusion. They do so both through theoretical discussion and by examining ‘applied’ issues. For instance, they take a close look at the compatibility of the Pledge of Allegiance with liberal values in the United States, and more generally they examine the degree to which the liberal state may take sides in favor of some citizens over others on matters of value—for instance, regarding the role of homosexuals in a liberal society. But practices of segregation and integration can sometimes begin with the tenor and tone of the official language utilized in such circumstantial contexts.

**Language, Policy, and Citizenship: Three Views Compared**

With the subject broached in chapter 4, we enter a delicate domain of exclusion and inclusion, one that has proved decisive in both the content and the orientation of citizenship, in theory as in practice, one that encompasses a range of issues, from within-country competitions
among languages, including the very idea of multilingualism and the admissibility of minority languages (Berdichevsky 2004), to the subtle links among democracy, network society, autonomy, identity, and nationalism in the emerging European Union (Smith and Wright 1999), to matters of language and nation building in parts of developing Africa (Asein and Adesanoye 1994), for instance.

Linguist Harold Schiffman’s task is to examine three different polities, the United States, France, and the former USSR, to see how the concept of ‘citizenship’ and its relationship to language (and language policy) play or played out within their purview. Each state has a different notion of how language and citizenship are interconnected. Therefore, each of the three policies is embedded in a specific notion of linguistic culture. These linguistic cultures are not in and of themselves unique in the world, but each does differ in distinct ways from the others. What these polities have in common, however, is that all have undergone revolutions, and after the revolution, their specific ideas about language and citizenship were different. In France and the USSR, the change was deliberate and crucial to the execution of the revolutionary program; in the United States, on the other hand, the nexus between language and citizenship evolved slowly, influenced strongly by immigration from non-English-speaking areas in the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth.

Can anything be said about ideology, in this sociolinguistic domain? Schiffman’s objections to using ‘ideology’ in his arguments were thoroughly explained by him on scholarly grounds during our seminar: “In the last three decades or so, the field of linguistic anthropology has been strongly influenced, if not outright dominated, by a school of thought that stresses the role of ‘ideology’ in the interface between language and culture.” The term ‘ideology’ has replaced a previous focus on what had come to be known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Known more simply as the ‘Whorfian hypothesis’, it held that (1) certain structures in a language influenced the way in which the daily practitioners of that language thought about the world and (2) the Weltanschauung (the worldview) so embodied had practical consequences for the way these user-speakers acted. There typically were stronger and weaker versions of this hypothesis. The weaker ones were supported by a few who felt there was at least some evidence for the hypothesis, if not much proof for it. Proponents of the stronger versions in turn held that the evidence for the hypothesis was most compelling and that eventually more research would therefore ‘prove’ the validity
of this hypothesis. Among linguists, not surprisingly, the hypothesis was more likely to be held strongly by anthropologists and other scholars specializing in the study of the cultures of various groups—of non-Western or non-Indo-European language cultures in particular—whereas formal linguists (those scholars concerned primarily with linguistic theory) remained more in favor of weaker versions or even no version at all of that hypothesis. The acceptance of one or another version of the hypothesis placed theorists along a continuum. The arguments for and against the basic hypothesis seemed to cluster into two camps, situated at the extremities of the continuum, with too few proponents willing to fall in between or attempt to bridge the gap. In formal linguistics, any acceptance at all of the hypothesis opened one to criticism on theoretical grounds: admitting any influence of culture into the ‘formal’ or ‘autonomous’ part of language was, of itself, an outright denial of the primacy of linguistic universals and of ‘deep’ structure, and a person or school affecting such a stance was simply not a linguist, or not sufficiently committed to the true goal of linguistics, which was “to establish a theory that explained everything important about language.” As Schiffman sees it, anything ‘cultural’ would be explained by recourse to ‘performance’ or to some other ‘nontheoretical’ aspects of language.

The tension between the formalists and those more interested in language and culture witnessed an important shift of focus in the late 1970s, accompanied by a switch from the older terminology—Sapir-Whorf or Whorfian hypothesis—to a new emphasis on linguistic ideology as a field of inquiry, a preferable way of thinking about and analyzing the interface between language and culture that, stated in simple terms by Schiffman, looks at “what cultures think or say about (their own) language”—that is, ideas in a particular culture about language, ideas that are not what linguists would call scientific but that nonetheless are widespread in a culture. As Woolard (1998, 4, citing Rumsey 1990, 346) puts it, Schiffman reminds us, a very broad definition of language ideology would be “shared bodies of commonsense knowledge about the nature of language in the world,” whereas a specifically causative or more ‘activist’ definition would be Silverstein’s (1979, 193): “sets of beliefs about language articulated by users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use.”

Schiffman sees two problems with this claim, one factual and the other interpretive. He presented to our seminar his take on the underly-
ing assumptions on what linguistic ideology ‘is’ (‘conceived by its proponents to be definable as’) by referring us to Woolard’s introduction to the compendium of articles republished as Language Ideologies (Schieffelin, Woolard, and Kroskrity 1998), which provides an excellent overview of the basic assumptions and concerns of this field. What emerges from Woolard’s overview (1998, 9) is that there is “no easy consensus on the meaning and use of the term in question, ‘ideology,’” and hence “little point in attempting to legislate a single interpretation of ideology from the range of useful meanings.” In other words, people writing about this issue utilize a number of different definitions of ideology, and these definitions stem from a number of different traditions of usage of the term. This is so not only because of different intellectual and academic traditional uses but also, and more particularly, because the very terms have been used by statesmen, politicians, and political and academic theorists, among them leaders as diverse as Napoleon, Lenin, and Foucault. For Schiffman, Woolard delineates four separate definitional strands, none of which can be sorted out as academic or intellectual on the one hand and political on the other.4

1. The broadest definition is “shared bodies of commonsense notions about the nature of language in the world,” which Woolard attributes to Rumsey (1990, 346).

2. Another definition puts more emphasis on linguistic structure and on the nature of ideology as an active agent: “[S]ets of beliefs about language articulated by users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use,” which Woolard acknowledges as a strand owed to Silverstein (1979, 193).

3. From Heath (1989, 53) comes a third definition: “[S]elf-evident ideas and objectives a group holds concerning roles of language in the social experiences of members as they contribute to the expression of the group.”

4. And from Irvine (1989, 255) comes the definition of the “cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interest” (Woolard 1998, 3–4).

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4. Schiffman cautions that “it may also be the case that age and social position could also influence one’s use of the terms, since people who came of age when the great ‘ideological’ struggles between Marxism/Leninism and fascism were still being acted out may have definitions of ideology as state-sponsored, complex systems of political thought as their overriding idea, whereas younger people may see ideology as something else.”
It is on the second definition, which as Woolard (1998, 4) suggests “originates in linguistic anthropology and concentrates on the relation of ‘linguistic ideology’ to linguistic structures,” that Schiffman focuses his challenge, though he also finds problematical some of the other claims made in the name of linguistic ideology. He indicated to us that, as Woolard has also pointed out, there are other issues in linguistic anthropology (as also in sociolinguistics and in the sociology of language) that, while related to ‘ideological considerations’, do not explicitly refer to ‘ideology’, among them various cultural conceptions of language and questions having to do with attitudes, prestige, and language standards and standardization—topics that Woolard, for one, thinks would benefit from being brought into a more explicit ‘framework’ of ‘ideology’. In other words, as Schiffman understands it, Woolard represents a point of view that sees ideology as underpinning large parts of language in society and of the attendant sociolinguistic issues, and this notion Schiffman would explicitly and forcefully challenge, primarily because the indeterminable open-endedness of this framework becomes in his view methodologically suspect: the broader the intellectual umbrella, the more difficult it becomes to evaluate, to retain or to refute, any and all such claims. Put differently, if we are to understand whether ‘ideology’ is at work in a particular context, there needs to be a way to falsify such claims, or to offer counterexamples, yet the broader the embrace, the more varied and complex the phenomena subsumed under it and the more difficult it becomes to dismiss false claims. Indeed, as Schiffman’s discerning comparisons of language policy in France, the Soviet Union, and the United States in chapter 4 clearly demonstrate, questions of ideology, language, and public policy in a given society are complicated even more by the complex links among personhood, peoplehood, and polity.

Personhood, Peoplehood, and Polity

In earlier times, scholarship’s concerns with persons, peoples, and polities dealt with individual psychology from citizenship status perspectives in content-specific ways—for instance, the acquisition and loss of the right to belong (Maxson 1930), the evolving concept of nationality (Moheymen 1938), or the impact of education on a sense of world citizenship (Garnett 1921)—but rarely with the psychology of citizenship per se (Weeks 1917). Contemporary writings understandably have exhibited scholarly interest in more practical questions, such as the
effects on one another of social trust and e-commerce (Mutz 2005), if, surprisingly, not for the social psychology of citizenship.

In an encompassing direct approach, psychologist David Williams in chapter 5 explores the possibility that the future of the intersubjectively objective notion of citizenship will depend on the contextualized view that people take of themselves and of each other in evolving relational milieus across dynamical transactional environments. He examines whether emancipated personhood is an essential constituent of peoplehood and reflects on the sheer necessity for demands of a universal peoplehood to place reasonable requirements on the polity supposed to sustain that pursuit as such.

Personhood is approached from the psychological standpoint of personal consciousness, which includes not only sentience and self-reflection but also volition, understood as awareness of the capacity to initiate action. In that perspective, identity, both personal and social, relates personhood to peoplehood. Personal identity reflects the operation of the highest levels of conscious agency and is manifest in the way individuals resolve the sometimes conflicting demands of available roles and affordable opportunities. By contrast, social identity is a matter of identification, as it is also a sense—indeed, a feeling—of membership inside or outside groups, often a sensation (mis)construed on the basis of religion, politics, tongue, and ethnicity or family, among many other value-laden guiding grounds in good currency at any given time, and as such perceivable as being either of essential or circumstantial import if most of the time of time-sensitive, pivotal significance in the shaping of belongingness.

The possibility of and for universal peoplehood Williams addresses as a question of the elasticity of the boundaries of social identity. After briefly reviewing the more pertinent items in the extant social science literature and supplementing this overview with observations from the instructional use of a ‘learning module’ that engages the principles of existential humanistic psychology in experiential ways, Williams draws on understandings acquired empirically through a series of structured asynchronous conversations between anonymous Internet partners, according to principles developed by Carl Rogers, to illustrate his insightful conclusions in a convincing way.

The sheer possibility of an emerging polity that would sustain a universal peoplehood Williams elects to approach from Robert Wright’s evolutionary perspective, arguing that sufficient threat is available to motivate the development of a new level of social complexity, and with
it a new social identity: the demands on a ‘sustaining polity’ do not seem excessive under the attenuating circumstances considered.

Williams suggests that a peoplehood, and a polity to support it, can emerge from the full expression of individual identity and have a significant impact on an evolving social identity. Thus, the future of citizenship may emerge from, and require high regard for, personal identity, and not least for the individual consciousness behind it.

But in what sociopolitical circumstances and according to what accompanying worldviews have the makings and implications of citizenship differed across time and space, and what prospects might they henceforth augur? This is what the next chapter proposes to reexamine more thoroughly.

Citizen: Past Practices, Prospective Patterns

The links between politics, ideology, and citizenship, much written about in the past, have recently witnessed a sudden jump in the scholarly interest continuing to be invested in this direction. Among the aspects covered in this gush of ideas one finds analyses of various problems of belonging: in postwar Britain as a prime destination for immigrants from the defunct British Empire and also from some other economically depressed regions of the world (Hampshire 2005), in region- or nation-linked studies (Birtek and Dragonas 2005; İdris 2005; Kernerman and Resnick 2005; Penninx et al. 2004; Quiroz 2005; Yashar 2005), and in studies on diasporic ethnic experiences in Europe (Keyman and İçgduygu 2005), the Europeanization of citizenship (Dell’Olio 2005), and good governance (Bogart 2005) and citizenship at a time of globalization. Many works also examine the idea of and the possibility of a global civilian society (Germain and Kenny 2005). And the volumes written on problems of homelessness, exclusion in democracies (Feldman 2004), or the mounting doubts entertained on citizenship and democracy in progressive thought (Taylor 2004) add up to a mere fraction of the broad and growing variety of coverage being generated by greater attention to the multiple aspects of alienation.

The mentalities that color the political environments in which democratic citizenship is exercised also determine its functions, its limits, and its latitudes, usually by imparting to a society’s agenda its content, its priorities, and its new directions. Thus, practices and patterns of citizenship can vary according to ‘who governs’. No wonder, then, that a massive policy-related scholarly literature also weighs the value of
democratic citizenship in terms of how public issues are dealt with, whether they pertain to the social politics of reproduction (Smyth 2005), the politics of governance (Tewes and Wright 2001), military service and gender issues (Snyder 1999), republican liberalism (Dagger 1997), or the métier of being a citizen in republican Rome (Nicolet 1980). Simply put, models abound.

As modern technological progress and geopolitical developments render more complex the status and role of citizens across the globe, questions are being raised over the makings of, and implications for, citizenship. Mark Gaige in chapter 6 examines whether, in light of these developments, it is possible, even desirable—and if so, what would be required—to systematize the disparate notions of citizenship into a single model aimed at informing academic discourse, public debate, and research. This task Gaige takes to be prompted by the need to clarify the relationship between globalization and nationalism—two principal and seemingly contradictory frameworks of reference for the individual person qua citizen in the contemporary world. Gaige believes it helpful to apply comparative scrutiny to three discrete models of citizenship: liberal, republican, and social.

Liberalism puts primacy on the autonomy of the individual within the context of the self-governing community, republicanism stresses the cohesion of the self-governing community as grounded in laws and in duties, and social citizenship enlarges the ambit of individual rights vouchsafed by liberalism in a manner that includes social welfare and economic protections. Gaige evaluates each of these models for their applicability and relevance to a number of operational manifestations of globalization: the ubiquity of the Internet, the emergence of the euro, the relative ‘dollarization’ of the world economy, the easing of trade strictures, the upsurge in legal and illegal immigration, and the formal presence of alien workers in many countries. Gaige’s thesis comprises three parts: first, globalization may attenuate, but not eradicate, the concept of nation-state citizenship as loyalties come to be increasingly shared by individual nation-states. Second, globalization could foster the universalization of many or most components of liberal, republican, and social citiizenships. Third, notwithstanding the preceding, world (or global) citizenship in any guise is unlikely to be realized within any meaningful time frame.

Gaige therefore examines closely whether the economic, social, and cultural forces driving globalization will have an effect on citizenship in general and more specifically on extant political theories about
citizenship. He argues that the attempt to isolate positions on, and to assign approaches to, the topic of citizenship from opposing camps and models such as liberal versus republican is a largely uncreative exercise, for at least two main reasons: first, the degree of overlap among the three models, liberalism, republicanism, and communitarianism, often invalidates the claim that differences between models are consequential, and second, and ironically perhaps more to the point, there is no single authoritative version of liberalism, republicanism, or communitarianism to begin with.

The chapter examines the traditional models of citizenship—that is, as manifested in liberalism, republicanism, and communitarianism—by enumerating key components and summarizing the criticisms of each model. Gaige then describes and critiques new models of citizenship: cosmopolitan or ‘global’ citizenship and multicultural or ‘group’ citizenship. He argues that although these patterns seem to have a number of normative and descriptive advantages that could add to the explanatory power of each of the three traditional models, each proves to be unsatisfactory as a replacement for any of the traditional models. He concludes that nation-states will likely remain the principal locus of citizenship for the foreseeable future, although probably with a number of internal reformulations. He argues that it is the neo-Kantian mode of citizenship that offers the most promise for a newer understanding and even fresher-minded practice of citizenship.

With these contextualizing analytical syntheses as backdrop, we can now examine four increasingly salient categories of citizenship, each with its own distinctions, upheld by its own logic, and propelled for its very own raisons d’être and each displaying a different evolutionary propensity and promise for the future of citizenship in one of four major modes—differentiated, divided, dispersed, or deterritorialized.

**Differentiated Citizenship: Compound Complexities in Evolution**

*Differentiated citizenship* refers to disparities in the legal status and in ethnic, gender, class, age, or other characterizing features of membership that together greatly affect the qualitative texture of a society. Differentiations sometimes allow one to foresee the longer-term implications and consequences of the idiosyncratic categorical inconsistencies that exacerbate societal fissures, they may ultimately foster the materialization of newer visions and novel designs, and they may help
introduce legally more egalitarian civic circumstances for the citizenry as a whole. Inconsistent actions, based on divergent interpretations of the limits of extant civic rights and responsibilities, however, may raise critical questions of equality and justice at local, state, and global levels. Nevertheless, historical examples remind us that relations of differentiated citizenship continually evolve. Even when the state codifies membership privileges and obligations in distinct categories, minoritized agents in their varied responses—including assimilation, hybridization, and resistance—may challenge privilege and obligations, and even defy definitions of difference. In addition, differences take on divergent meanings in terms of everyday interactions, representations of self and other, territorial implications of civic spaces, and transnational flows.

The literature in this broad field is vast and offers myriad vantage points, from mutual recognition (Kymlicka and Norman 2000) to social differentiation and political inclusion (Holz 2000) across the changing terrain of race and ethnicity (Krysan and Lewis 2004) to the complex politics of identity and the dilemmas of difference (Kenny 2004).

The complex dynamic nature of civic relations demands closest attention to history, to agents, and place. Taking the city as an especially important crucible of citizenship, therefore, Gary McDonogh in chapter 7 analyzes data on changing patterns of difference in two world cities, Barcelona and Hong Kong. As a national capital absorbed into the Spanish state, greater Barcelona raises serious questions of autochthonous identity, both as a site of difference and as a point of intersection for ethnonationalism, economic class, and the state. Contemporary citizenship in Barcelona and Catalonia entails multiple placements within the state, inside an emerging European community, and vis-à-vis global flows of non-European migrants, all of which makes concern over differentiation a key theme for civic debates.

Hong Kong was created by the clash of empires that generated a clear divide between colonizer and colonized. Political boundaries became the stuff of diplomatic negotiation between the British and Chinese states in the late nineteenth century. Britain merely reigned over an expanding Chinese population that it could not assimilate. Post-World War II demographic shifts and development booms since the 1960s have been such that the economic power, the social demands, and the cultural explorations of Hong Kong Chinese have challenged overly dichotomic definitions of ‘minority’ citizenship. Meshing with and across compounding changes in colonial governance, this evolution
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has led to the recognition of Hong Kong Chinese citizenship as a status involving new rights as well as new responsibilities, and since its reversion to China in 1997, Hong Kong has continued to offer novel perspectives for civic futures inside continental China as well.

Both cases underscore the critical importance of place, time, power, and culture for understanding differentiation among citizens and for learning from the processes by which differences are created, valued, fostered, or resisted. The examples underscore how even those in subordinate or delimited positions can deeply redefine the content of citizenship in statal and global frameworks, thereby suggesting how others may do so even more conclusively elsewhere in the world.

Citizenship Divided: Muslim Subjects, Arab Citizens, Democratic Dilemmas

In the last few years, the literature on citizenship has come to include an enormous amount of writing by Turkish scholars focusing on this topic, which lies at the intersection of newer questions of identity and issues of Europeanization in a secular Muslim state. Some of these writings we refer to in relevant places throughout this book. There have also appeared many works on Islam in the Arab world and in Europe (Al Sayyad and Castells 2002; Nielsen 1992, 1999); on democracy, Islam, and women’s status (Arat 2005; Rizzo 2005); and on race, Islam, and citizenship (Modood 1992), as well as on a number of other closely related topics.

For Algerian-American scholar Hocine Fetni, who links expertise in law with sociology and international relations, citizenship is the embodiment of individual rights and obligations vis-à-vis the state. According to him, among most of the peoples in the Arab-Muslim world—varied external perceptions to the contrary notwithstanding—allegiance seems to be shifting in the masses, which increasingly come to view themselves more as the subjects of Allah (their God) than as the subjects of Dawla (the state). This phenomenon is often largely a result of the state’s failure to honor basic individual rights and of its thereby casting doubt on nationalism’s ability to elicit and to preserve the religious individual’s and family’s civic loyalties to the state.

It is in this light that Fetni in chapter 8 explains why citizenship in the Arab-Muslim world is coming full circle. In the early days of the Islamic state, citizenship based itself on the individual’s belief and faith in, and loyalty to, the umma (the Muslim community of believers). After
centuries of vacuous secularism devoid of palpable results, many of the subjects in the various Arab-Muslim states now exclusively or predominantly feel they are Allah’s subjects once again. What internal and external dynamics led to the failure of the secularist state to cement its civic relations with the individual and unwittingly to alienate the Muslim individual (shakhs), thereby promoting in him or her a sense of belonging to the larger community, the umma, the collectivity of believers, instead?

To answer this question, Fetni discusses four observations that shed light on the causes of this unmistakable alienation of the individual and the consequent rejection of secularist citizenship in favor of belonging to a physically nonexistent (if fervently yearned for) Muslim state worthy of its name. Thus evaluated are the various secularist policies adopted across the Arab-Muslim world through a closer examination of how, when combined with certain external and global conditions, they have above all ignited peoples’ sense of their Muslim subjecthood. Through the use of appropriate theoretical concepts, a discussion of relevant history, and firsthand sensitivity to the current socioeconomic and political conditions, Fetni carefully examines the notion of citizenship and its relevance to today’s democratic dilemmas in the Arab-Muslim world through comparisons with Algeria, in ways pivotal to understanding the broader dilemma in the East-West confrontation of two ethnocultural universes at large.

Citizenship Dispersed: A Third Space Looking for Its Proper Place

The explosion of investigations in this field of specialized research is noteworthy, stretching from the boundaries of Germanness (O’Donnell, Bridenthal, and Reagin 2005) to Kurdish (Wahlbeck 1999), Asian (Chuh and Shimakawa 2001; Ghosh and Chatterjee 2004; Goh and Wong 2004; Jayaram 2004; Ma Mung 2000), African (Copeland-Carson 2004; Falola and Childs 2004), Greek (Laliotou 2004), Italian (Verdicchio 1997), and Haitian (Catanese 1999) diasporas, to issues of globalization, migration, and security (Friedman and Shalini 2004), to countless other, not less pertinent perspectives.

In chapter 9, political historian David Gutiérrez draws from the more critical tradition of scholarship to explore the important role noncitizens have played in shaping the evolving debate over citizenship at a critical juncture in U.S. history, the period of mass migration that unfolded between the 1880s and the 1920s. He argues that although
this specific period is correctly identified as an epoch in which the modern nation-state and its institution of national citizenship became the normative forms of political organization in the United States and elsewhere in the developed world, the same time period also witnessed the largest transnational migrations in recorded history. As a result of the massive uprooting forces unleashed by the expansion of capitalism around the world, the movement of millions of people into the United States and into other receiving societies threatened the notions of sovereign territory and bounded citizenries by introducing huge numbers of individuals who occupied an ambiguous social location, one that by definition situated itself outside the enfranchised “national community.” The massive mixing of citizen and noncitizen populations that unfolded over this period created a highly volatile social milieu and a situation in which the language of debate (see Schiffman, chap. 4) over the substance (see Mulhern, chap. 2, and McDonogh, chap. 7) and the meaning (see Williams, chap. 5, and Gaige, chap. 6) of the institution of national citizenship became a defining feature of that period’s popular politics.

Millions of people eventually were compacted or integrated under the umbrella of citizenship during those years. But Gutiérrez argues that the constant collision between the centripetal forces of national consolidation and the centrifugal forces of capitalist development inevitably created antinomies in the migrant populations set in motion by that collision. Hence, forced by circumstance, first to migrate and then to operate in a large and expanding gray zone that remained squeezed inside the interstices of the systems of national citizenship being consolidated at both extremities of their sojourns, these noncitizen residents of the United States often came to develop diverse senses of affiliation and collective association that were very much at odds with the emerging state-sanctioned forms and categories of national membership. Noncitizen residents of the United States who lived in these conditions therefore often explored pathways to achieving human rights and modes of democratization that remained outside conventional forms of national citizenship.

Gutiérrez’s chapter demonstrates how, although the diasporic noncitizen populations could never completely escape the forces of coercion and the many constraints imposed on them by agents of the state, they could and did, as ‘noncitizen denizens’ in the United States, create, occupy, and utilize alternative social spaces as communal bases in which they established (and from which they experimented with)
parallel social and cultural institutions, so as to formulate grievances, advance claims against the state, and ultimately even to challenge conventional notions of political community. During the process, they began to develop an increasingly cosmopolitan political and social vocabulary that would help set the terms of future debate, not only over the specific content and tone and broader social meaning of citizenship but also, by extension, over the larger questions of social justice raised by the permanent presence of huge numbers of noncitizens in a society that very much remains organized on principles of territorial sovereignty and on a bounded ideation of citizenry.

Considerations of dispersed citizenship thus automatically raise issues of territoriality with regard to citizenship. This purview of sacred cows sets at loggerheads cosmopolitan and nationalist tempers on some complex issues that remain difficult to resolve on partisan premises because they lead to dichotomous inferences predicated on sincere reactive impulses for reasons not too difficult to discern, a source of concern elaborated on in Henry Teune’s chapter 10.

**Citizenship Deterritorialized: Global Citizenships**

Citizenship is a bundle of rights and obligations that define a person’s societal role. The Westphalian concept of citizenship was based on sovereign claims over territory and on the exclusive loyalty of those recognized by the sovereign as belonging to his estate. Limits applied, some of which arose and evolved in the context of constitutional government, primarily in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There were sovereigns in many spaces: the manor, the town, the bishopric. The multiple political communities recognized in federalism made the claims of state sovereigns always amount to less than those conferred under ‘international’ law.

Globalization as a force of change as well has created a mosaic of social, economic, and political spaces that transcend and weaken the political boundaries of physical space. That very force of change goes up against today’s idea of citizenship based on the moral and legal claims of the Westphalian territorial state. In addition to all else it may have wrought in the past few decades, globalization has revolutionized the meaning of physical space. In its simplest of manifestations, in the form of world economic growth, globalization also leads to migration, and to the commingling of peoples for vital purposes, including the need to work, as discussed with trenchant insight by Gutiérrez in this

Scholarly literature on citizenship and globalization has grown to encompass an impressive repertoire. It places focus on social aspects of internationalism (Dower and Williams 2002), on the global city (İşın 2000), and on the respective and joint challenges to identity (Tan 2005). It gives voice to concerns over inclusion and empowerment (Anderson and Siim 2004), over belonging (Brysk and Shafir 2004; Croucher 2004), and over demands about citizenship education for a global society (Banks 2004). It also engenders growing consideration for a cosmopolitan environmental ethic (Hayden 2005), for citizenship within an ethic for a worldwide civil society (Eade and O’Byrne 2004; Germain and Kenny 2005), and for global democracy (Olssen et al. 2004).

The agents of globalization recognize the rights and obligations of organizations, but with little or no regard for control by state or via arrangements among sovereigns. Individual members of, say, economic organizations, religions, universities, political movements—and today professional associations and even affinity groups—may claim basic rights, which their organization can then seek to ensure and expand. A person’s rights today fall under the purview of human rather than merely civil rights. This is an understanding that has emerged with the evolution of global political institutions over the last few decades. After Westphalia, it became possible for a person to be a citizen without having to belong to a particular church. Today, with the advent of globalization, it is becoming possible for a person to be a ‘citizen’ without therefore having to depend exclusively on a single country.

True, at the moment these bundles of rights remain ambiguous and tentative; also, some are being given ad hoc meaning by organizations still evolving: while professional organizations now challenge states for the rights of their members to exercise their profession, ethnic formations seek support for their members, sometimes against states, toward gaining expression as groups. Some of these organizations are devoted to human rights; they include the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, and the World Court. All these—and even the European Union—render homage to the ‘state-as-pope’, first by claiming the authority accorded them by treaty among sovereign states and then by pursuing their own way.

If globalization is to yield a new world order that is different from the balance of threat of harm among nation-states, it will have to be based on a legal and moral system that goes beyond that of the state.
That vision was shared centuries ago by those who believed that any and all authority should be exercised always for the benefit of people, and not to promote the self-perpetuating interests of the very mechanisms purportedly put in place to dutifully serve them.

**Democratizations in Fissured Societies:**

**The Makings of Citizenship**

The question of how democracy can stably operate in culturally plural, fissured, fragmented, segmented, or deeply divided societies continues to be an important aspect of the study of citizenship.

Democratizations are endless, dynamic, and, even in contexts of relatively homogeneous citizenship, not necessarily unidirectional or linear processes. Seen through myriad cultural prisms, their utopian goals are never fully achieved nor ever wholly attainable. Social scientists unanimously agree that deep and extensive fissures within society present a serious challenge to developing a stable and viable democracy and hence a free and vibrant democratic citizenry.

Two key methods of achieving democratization in fissured human societies, wherein the citizenship finds itself segmented, are through the *accommodation* and *control* of competing segments of society. In the literature, the social fissures and the political differences that characterize a citizenry are often related to party politics, which can both reflect and affect them. In this respect, party politics in Japan (Kuroda 2005; Scheiner 2006), in Russia (Golosov 2004), in Christian Europe (Eatwell and Mudde 2004; Gehler and Kaiser 2004; Knapp 2004; Mainwaring and Scully 2003), in Iraqi Kurdistan (Stansfield 2003), and in Mexico (Borja 2003), for instance, have been the object of extensive comparative scrutiny.

An important question in this area is how fissures affect and in turn are affected by processes of democratization that have an impact on the notion of citizenship. The constructionist approach\(^5\) that is used in

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5. “Social constructionism is a school of thought introduced into sociology by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s 1966 book, *The Social Construction of Reality*. The focus of social constructionism is to uncover the ways in which individuals and groups participate in the creation of their perceived reality. As an approach, it involves looking at the ways social phenomena are created, institutionalized, and made into tradition by humans. Socially constructed reality is seen as an ongoing, dynamic process; reality is re-produced by people acting on their interpretations and their knowledge of it. Social constructionism is dialectically opposed to essentialism, the belief that there are defining transhistorical essences independent of conscious beings that determine the categorical
political anthropologist Myron Aronoff’s analysis in chapter 11 is grounded in the assumption that human sociability is both expressed and facilitated through the cultural construction, among the citizens, of bonds of collective identity. Hence the central question for democracy and for democratic citizenship is whether the process must necessarily be discriminatory. Collective identities are cultural products of political processes. And social identity becomes most important when it is threatened (see Williams, chap. 5 in this book). Paradoxically, it would appear that, in Aronoff’s words, “to save a culture, one must first lose it.”

Frequently, the process of nation formation appears to involve high tensions between citizens’ exclusive loyalty to their ethnicity and citizens’ inclusive solidarity (unmitigated pluralistic attachment) to the(state) (see Fetni, chap. 8 in this book). Competing forms of gradated nationalisms among the citizenry constitute salient political divisions in most states. And these divisions must be either accommodated through conciliatory mechanisms or controlled through far stronger cultural and political devices, which include, of course, political parties.

The bridging nature of consociational arrangements and dominant party systems becomes more apparent when viewed historically from a constructionist perspective. It is important to investigate the role these arrangements play in transitions to other forms, which can be either more or less democratic. For accommodation to work, a degree of control of each segment by its leaders and control of the polity as a whole by the collective leadership is necessary. In the absence of successful accommodation, the degree of control of the citizenry by the elite is generally much stronger. Mechanisms of control by elites range from coercion through intermediary forms of manipulation to weaker forms of consensus building and power sharing. The latter forms are more compatible with democracy and democratic citizenship.

structure of reality. Within social constructionist thought, a social construction, or social construct, is an idea which may appear to be natural and obvious to those who accept it, but in reality is an invention or artifact of a particular culture or society. The implication is that social constructs are in some sense human choices rather than laws resulting from divine will or nature. This is not usually taken to imply a radical anti-determinism, however. Some ideas which have been famously described as social constructs include: race, class, gender, sexuality, morality, mental illness and even reality. Less controversial but equally important social construct are languages, games, money, shares, nations, governments, universities, corporations, and other institutions” (Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_constructionism).
Citizenship: Mere Contract, or Construct for Conduct? 21

Most studies focus on the presence of only one mechanism in a given society or political system. Aronoff suggests, however, that different mechanisms may be applied by different actors, depending on the type of fissures in a polity and on the nature of the particular historical context, and that this helps explain the relative success or failure of democratization processes in at least three states and their citizenries, one Asian, one European, and one Middle Eastern, each representing a different type of ‘fissured society’. Aronoff applies these concepts in combination to explain the cultural and political mechanisms employed to accommodate and control societal divisions in the citizenries of the Netherlands, India, and Israel. His analysis focuses on consociational arrangements in Israel and in the Netherlands, as well as on the advantages and disadvantages for democratization of dominant party systems in Israel and India. With the decline of the dominant parties, the emerging parties of power sponsored Hindu nationalism in India and militant forms of ethnonationalist Zionism in Israel. Aronoff reexamines them as “revitalization movements” reacting to processes of globalization and to domestic forces. These formats of nationalism are contrasted to populist anti-immigrant (anti-Muslim) nationalism in the Netherlands. In all cases, the mobilization of larger segments of the citizenry and the greater representation and influence of previously peripheral groups of citizens are shown to release intolerant and undemocratic forces. This illustrates the fact that processes of democratization in general, and those that encompass differently coopted groups of citizens in fissured societies in particular, are not linear and need not be unidirectional.

The Dangers of Citizenship

According to present-day conceptions, citizenship is a form of membership in a polity and attaches to particular persons. In history, the world’s nations have been accustomed to dividing their peoples into two basic categories, citizens and noncitizens. The literature has long dealt with both categories extensively, whether the matter under scrutiny is “foreigners” in the days of the Romans (Noy 2000), the standing in law of noncitizens in Great Britain and Germany between the French Revolution in 1789 and German Unification in 1870 (Fahrmeir 2000), the status of newcomers in nineteenth-century United States (Wadlin 1889), the “unnatural Frenchness of foreign citizens” during France’s ancient regime (Sahlins 2004), Stalin’s outcasts in the USSR (Alexopoulos
Every nation, no matter how oppressive, treats its citizens as persons with certain rights or privileges that are not available to noncitizens. A democratic nation grants its citizens extensive rights and privileges; it allows, and perhaps also expects, that citizens will participate in government. Noncitizens are generally regarded by such nations as having no rights or privileges and do not have an opportunity for participation. Yet virtually all nations recognize an intermediate category of noncitizen residents who are granted some reduced measure of rights and privileges. Political theory has had a great deal to say about a nation’s obligations to its citizens but very little about its obligations to noncitizens, including those persons who are temporary or permanent residents. The problem with this essentially binary conception is that it allows for a great deal of injustice. To begin with, it provides nations with a powerful tool of legitimated oppression, namely, ‘denaturalization’: by redefining citizens as noncitizens, typically on grounds of disloyalty, a nation can justify denial of rights and privileges to former citizens, and even generally consign them to political perdition. Second, it also strongly implies that a nation has few if any moral obligations to noncitizens, and even more particularly to those who are not residents. This may not be problematic with respect to Paraguay or Chad, but it becomes highly problematic with respect to a nation such as the United States, which exercises an immense power over noncitizens throughout the world.

As a jurist with an anthropological formation, Edward Rubin in fact is asking in chapter 12 whether it might not be better to modify the dichotomous idea of citizenship with the idea that states have a continuously varying range of moral responsibilities to all people in the world, clearly greatest for its residents, and less but still significant for those whom it widely affects. Perhaps the opportunity to participate in the governance of a nation could vary continuously as well. Surely, if we are serious about the idea of globalization, would we not need to reevaluate a concept that is much too strongly tied to the idea of the self-contained nation-state? This brings us to the ultimate question: Might there be a particular mode of citizenship worth (re)visiting, with an eye to the future of humankind in a globalizing international socio-
political economy, across fast-cross-linking reorganizational settings and even faster-reconfiguring cultural-political contexts?

**Citizenship as a Mode of Belonging by Choice**

With respect to other forms of belonging, the associational form of citizenship as a concept derives its distinctiveness from the idea of volition or choice. Citizens in the modern sense are those who willingly belong to, and participate in, the collectivity of the nation. Cultural linguistic anthropologist Greg Urban in chapter 13 hence examines the implications of volitional belonging for the circulation of citizenship primarily as a cultural concept. Specifically, Urban contrasts citizenship to other historically widespread forms of social grouping in each of which membership is based on ascription, that is, on inherited attributes rather than on free choice. The central argument in Urban’s concluding chapter is that volitional belonging results in a concept of voluntary group association that affords remarkable properties of self-propulsion. In Urban’s opinion, it is for this reason that elective association tends to supplant all other forms of belonging based on exclusive membership by ascription.

Urban compares citizenship specifically to two other widespread forms of social grouping, clans and classes. The idea of the clan has proven historically to be an effective way to unite a community, and it has staying power within that community. However, Urban reminds us that it contains no motive force that would impel it anywhere beyond the boundaries of the community. In contrast, the idea of class—so very similar to the idea of clans insofar as ascriptive membership is concerned—contains a motive force that impels its movement beyond the local community. That motive force arises from the idea of “better than” built into the class conception: the relativist idea motivates conquest and expansion. However, expansion is limited to the social sphere in which administrative control is possible. In contrast to both of these ideas, citizenship—in a form grounded in free choice of group association—is truly globalizing. People who subscribe to the concept of volitional citizenship are motivated to get others to subscribe to it as well. And those who do not are seen as ‘unfree’ and in need of liberation.

Because of its powerful globalizing properties, the idea of ‘volitional citizenship’ finds itself on a collision course with all other forms of ‘belonging’ grounded in ascription. And chances are that the very idea
may emerge largely unscathed (ultimately, perhaps reinforced, even
enshrined) from frontal crashes, ongoing worldwide struggles, and
related revolutionary reconfigurations likely to ensue.

The future of citizenship will be nothing like its self-seeking present,
let alone its in places still lingering self-effacing past.

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The future is not certain, but whatever difficulties we face, we must seek to increase social justice. Social services, at their best, are a powerful means to build a fairer society. This means a society where the unique talents and abilities of each citizen can flourish. The idea of citizenship has been used by disabled people since the 1960s to articulate its aspirations and it is still powerful today (Shapiro, 1993). For example a recent report published by Independent Living in Scotland explores the weakness of new terminology like ‘personalisation’ and instead states clearly: It was clear that the shared goal of professionals and users of social care is that of citizenship and human rights. [ILiS, 2013].