The dilemmas of ethnic privilege
A comparison of constructions of ‘British’, ‘English’ and ‘Anglo-Celtic’ identity in contemporary British and Australian political discourse

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ABSTRACT There has been considerable political debate regarding the construction of ‘British’ and ‘English’ identity. This article examines the views of British political leaders Blair, Hague and Duncan Smith. It argues that a comparison with Australian political debates over the construction of ‘Anglo-Celtic’ and national identity can be particularly helpful. The Australian experience draws attention to the need to consider diasporic constructions of ‘Britishness’; reinforces the need to address the colonial implications of mainstream British identity; and emphasizes the dangers posed by conservative mobilizations of traditional ethnic identities in response to ‘modernizing’ projects by Labour governments. Both the British and Australian debates reveal the dilemmas posed by powerful ethnic identities whose privilege is under threat.

KEYWORDS Blair ● ethnicity ● Hague ● Howard ● Keating

INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been an explosion of popular journalism and writing discussing ‘Britishness’ and ‘Englishness’ (for example, Alibhai-Brown, 2000a; Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000; Heffer, 1999; Hitchens, 2000; Paxman, 1999; Scruton, 2000a, 2000b). Similarly, in Australia, there has been considerable interest in issues of Anglo-Celtic identity (Dixson, 1999; Hage, 1998; Johnson, 2000; Partington, 1997; Stratton, 1998). An Anglo-Celtic identity is the official characterization of the dominant ethnic group in Australia, reflecting many years of struggle by
Ethnicity in this sense is not confined predominantly to minority groups or the ‘other’ (see, for example, Kellas, 1998: 119), but can be used, for example, to refer to host and immigrant groups alike (Hutchison and Smith, 1996: 5). This article argues that the explosion of interest in issues of British/English/Anglo-Celtic identity reflects a broader disquiet facing previously privileged, often rarely questioned ethnic identities associated with national identities. British identity is having to be reworked in the face of globalization, loss of empire, rapid social, economic and technological change, the European Union (EU), devolution and the increasingly multicultural nature of British society. Meanwhile, Australians of Anglo-Celtic origin are also facing globalization and rapid social, economic and technological change. As well, colonial ties with Britain are being broken: colonial settler and indigenous Australians are dealing with the legacies of invasion and dispossession; Australia is developing close ties with its Asian and Pacific neighbours; and massive levels of postwar migration, far greater than anything Britain has encountered, have made Australia a very multicultural society. As social geographer Doreen Massey has pointed out, inhabitants of first world countries are now facing forms of insecurity and disorientation once predominantly faced by the colonized or by marginalized groups within first world society (Massey, 1994: 167, 146–9, 165–8).

In short, privileged ethnic groups are left with the dilemmas of how to articulate their own identity, and the national identity they helped to shape, in a situation in which their privilege is under threat. Central political dilemmas include whether to reassert privilege; whether to attempt to develop more inclusive forms of ethnic and national identity and, if so, how to minimize the resultant backlash. Since privileged identities have been partly constituted through the subordination of other identities (see, for example, Scott, 1995: 6–7), this article is concerned with analysing what happens to the political articulation of those identities when their privilege is under increasing challenge. This approach can provide some additional insights to those provided by other commentators. Putting the issues in a more global context also draws attention to the need to analyse not just constructions of Britishness in the British Isles, as most of the British literature does, but also to analyse developments in diasporic, colonial settler societies such as Australia. Applying the term ‘diasporic’ to such identities may seem questionable to those used to encountering this term in the contexts of, for example, African or Jewish diasporas involving a process of involuntary displacement and violence (Gilroy, 1997: 328; Yuval-Davis, 1997: 65–6). It is also more common to refer to a Celtic diaspora (for example, Craig and Reid, 1999: 166; Mac An Ghaill, 2001) than to an Anglo one. However, quite apart from the involuntary displacement involved in the original convict settlement of Australia or the economic imperatives underlying later working-class English migration (Hammerton
and Coleborne, 2001), Australian Anglos are ‘diasporic’ in the sense of having an ethnic identity originating in migration, however many generations ago, from a country on the other side of the world. Nonetheless, it needs to be acknowledged that this type of diasporic identity is very different from that studied, for example, by Paul Gilroy (Gilroy, 1997, 2000: 123–7). For this is the diasporic identity of the colonial settlers rather than that of the colonized; of the ethnic group that defined national identity rather than that of a group marginalized within it. Here, as elsewhere, this article should be seen as part of the broader literature on nationalism that sees ethnicity as an ongoing issue for modern nations, rather than as a residual problem destined to be overcome by the assimilation of ethnic groups into nation states (Hutchinson, 2000).

This article focuses on analysing the discourse of major political leaders regarding privileged or ‘mainstream’ constructions of Englishness, Britishness and Australian Anglo-Celtic identity. It does not, therefore, analyse the construction of Scottish or Welsh identities, or black British identities, or the multifarious non-Anglo-Celtic identities that make up contemporary Australian identity. Nor does it analyse specific policy initiatives designed to address the position of ethnic and racialized minorities. The analysis has also had to neglect discussion of a number of other issues, including broader issues of postcolonialism/colonialism and the intersections between national identity and gender and class (see, for example, Edmunds and Turner, 2001; Johnson, 1996; Pieterse and Parekh, 1995).

The article will begin with an outline of key points in British political discourse about British identity – mainly as articulated by the current Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair, former Conservative opposition leader William Hague and Hague’s replacement as opposition leader, Iain Duncan Smith. It will then provide an account of what the Australian experience adds to this story, focusing on the political discourse of the previous Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating and the current Liberal (conservative) Prime Minister John Howard. While an analysis of the discourse of political leaders can offer only limited insights into broader issues of ethnic and national identity, it does reveal how major political parties attempt to both shape and politically mobilize those identities through their public statements. In particular, an analysis of key public speeches reveals that appeals to English, British or Australian Anglo-Celtic identities often played a significant role in party electoral strategies. A crucial insight, as already mentioned, is the need to address issues of diasporic and colonial settler British identity, and related issues of empire. While there are analyses of the impact of empire on British and English identity and nationalism, these studies have tended to neglect issues of diasporic identity in the colonial settler societies (for example, Kumar, 2000). Indeed, even analyses stressing the need to study British imperial history and identity can apparently forget that the colonial settler societies are part of it.
Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000: 24–5). Yet Australian experience throws light on several aspects of British identity that are relevant to the study of British political discourse. For example, studying the Australian experience suggests that the British New Labour Party under Blair’s leadership may have underestimated the extent to which conservative parties can mobilize traditional identities in response to modernizing projects.

THE BLAIRITE PROJECT

Tony Blair began his party’s 1997 election manifesto by promising a new Britain with better services, a modern economy and one able to ‘meet the challenges of a different world’ (Labour Party, 1997: 1; see also Blair, 1996). Reshaping British national character and culture were an explicit part of New Labour’s programme, as debates over ‘cool Britannia’ or ‘rebranding Britain’ reveal (Leonard, 1998). Appeals to a (rejuvenated) ‘Britishness’ were a central part of Labour’s electoral strategy. The Blair narrative on Britishness takes the following form: Britain was once an old country rent with an old economy, old class conflicts, an old left and an old conservative party - ‘the Party of no change’ (Labour Party, 1997: 2–3; Blair, 1996: ix–xiii, 2000). Even worse, Blair acknowledges, ‘many used to think we were “quaint”, a little “old fashioned”’. It is now time to show the world the new, modernized Britain, an imaginative, multiracial, dynamic, innovative society embracing change (Blair, 1998; see also 2000).

Britain had much to be proud of in its history and achievements, but ‘we must learn from our history, not be chained to it’ (Labour Party, 1997: 2–3). The ‘modernizing’ lessons apparently do not involve reconsidering an imperial past: ‘We are never going to be as powerful, certainly in military terms, as we once were. What we can be is a shining example to all of what a modern state should aspire to’ (Blair, 1998). Many of Blair’s speeches reveal a longing for Britain to be great again in different, more modern ways: ‘The 20th century was a century in which . . . Britain’s power declined. But it can be built in a new way for a different age’ (Blair, 1999). He goes on to make the point that while some might argue that, with the loss of empire, Britain would ‘fade away’, ‘swamped’ by countries such as America, Russia or China, in fact ‘the British character is in tune with the times’. The quality and speed of British brain power, combined with the government’s emphasis on education and human capital, make Britain well placed to be a winning society in the new economy (Blair, 1999). Gordon Brown, the Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, argues that, just as British skills and inventiveness brought about the first industrial revolution, so ‘the pioneering work of Babbage and Turing . . . made possible the computer and information revolution’. Britain is therefore ‘well-placed to lead in this
new world’ (Brown, 2000). Blair concludes: ‘I want the next century to be one where Britain’s worth is measured not in how much of the globe it owns or conquers, but measured by the achievements of its citizens . . . the sort of society we choose to create’ (Blair, 1999). The lack of critical reflection in such references to imperial power and conquest is somewhat surprising at the beginning of the 21st century. Indeed, Blair told the 1993 Labour Party conference that the British should be proud that they’d had ‘the largest empire the world has ever known’ (cited in Alibhai-Brown, 2000b: 28). Note that Britain no longer needs to own or conquer large parts of the globe because Labour’s longing is for a virtual commercial empire, one in which Britain has a dominating role in the new information economy.

Academic commentators have also analysed the racialized and ethnocentric discourse underpinning these conceptions of modernization (see, for example, Craig and Reid, 1999: 160–2; Gilroy, 1993).

Transforming Britishness to make it appropriate for the information age is a very obvious part of a modernization project. However, for Blair, modernizing Britishness also involves modernizing relationships between Britons through devolution; modernizing relations between Britain and Europe; and modernizing political institutions such as the House of Lords (historically an hereditary upper chamber). Blair claims that ‘one of our distinguishing characteristics as a people’ is ‘that we have always been willing to adapt our institutions to changing circumstances’ (Blair, 2000). For Blair, Britishness consists of core values ‘of fair play, creativity, tolerance and an outward-looking approach to the world’, not insularity or particular institutional arrangements (Blair, 2000).

Modernizing Britishness also involved recognizing Britain’s multicultural nature: ‘This nation has been formed by a particularly rich complex of experiences: successive waves of invasion and immigration and trading partnerships’ (Blair, 2000). However, such statements skate over more problematic features of the way in which ‘Britishness’ has been traditionally constructed. For example, conceptions of ‘Britishness’ have obscured histories of English domination over the Scottish, Irish and Welsh (Craig and Reid, 1999; Mac An Ghaill, 2001). The Blair government has also been criticized for not addressing issues of race seriously enough. The government’s conception of social inclusion often assumes that the key to ‘inclusion’ primarily involves getting the ‘excluded’ into employment. There is little acknowledgement of broader forms of social exclusion and marginalization such as patterns of racial disadvantage (Levitas, 1998). Consequently, the Parekh Report The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000) complained that, with only a few exceptions, the government had been following a ‘generally colour-blind approach to combating social exclusion’ (2000: 82). Indeed, the ‘colour blind’ approach followed logically from Labour’s 1997 election policy strategy which, as Saggar points out, largely couched ‘Labour’s
appeal to minorities ... in non-race-specific terms', arguing both that Labour's policies for improving employment opportunities and educational achievement were ‘mainstream’ ones, and that disadvantaged minorities would also benefit from them. There was a conscious attempt to avoid ‘any close association between the Party and (electorally unpopular) minority vested interests’ (Saggar, 1997: 153). Yasmin Alibhai-Brown has complained that ‘when you look at New Labour, for all their talk about generating new ideas and ways of seeing, we Black Britons remain barely noticed and on the periphery’ (Alibhai-Brown, 2000a: 102).

Indeed, the Parekh Report has argued that Britishness is not yet an inclusive category because 'The unstated assumption remains that Britishness and whiteness go together, like roast beef and Yorkshire pudding' (Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000: 25). The Report argues that the British national culture still retains traces of ‘an imperial mentality’ that saw ‘the white British as a superior race’ and reveals itself ‘in projected fantasies and fears about difference, and in racialized stereotypes of otherness’. The Report notes that there ‘has been no collective working through of this imperial experience’, for example in a school curriculum that acknowledges Britain’s imperial history (2000: 24–5). In short, the Report argues for the need to come to terms with the imperial experiences, for example, of South Asian and African Caribbean communities in order to forge a more genuinely inclusive conception of Britishness (2000: 103–7). The government has responded angrily to such criticisms. Junior Minister Michael Wills, given special responsibility by Tony Blair for issues of patriotism and national identity prior to the 2001 election, argued that the Parekh Report was ‘profoundly wrong’. Britishness was an inclusive category and there was no need to rework British history, since ‘we have a history and I do not think it is alienating’ (Daily Telegraph, 25 November 2000). Nonetheless, Jack Straw, the then Home Secretary, did announce additional measures to combat racism in the public service in the lead up to the 2001 election (Guardian, 21 February 2001).

Wills’s response should not surprise us given the arguments in this article. The Blairite vision conceives the past only in positive terms, such as a history of technical innovation, not in terms that might involve further reflection on imperial conquest and on the ongoing implications for formerly colonized, ethnic minorities living in Britain today.

THE CONSERVATIVE RESPONSE

Nonetheless, the Blairite project has still faced stiff criticism from conservative critics. Roger Scruton, author of England: An Elegy (2000a), has complained of the Millennium Dome’s celebration of a ““multicultural”
and “multi-faith” community which exists in the Islington imagination but nowhere in England’ (Scrutton, 2000b). It is all part of Blair’s attempt to steal English national identity. Hal Colebatch, author of Blair’s Britain (2000), has accused the Blair government of launching a ‘cultural war’ designed to change ‘the identity of the country and the mental landscape and values of those who inhabit it’, and threatening to undermine British independence and sovereignty (Colebatch: 2000: 7, 56). Peter Hitchens, author of The Abolition of Britain (2000), sees the Blairite project as indicative of a cultural change in Britain that is as fundamental and, he suggests, as destructive as the Chinese cultural revolution (Hitchens, 2000: xxiii).

Conservative politicians do not go as far as Scrutton, Colebatch or Hitchens, although the British Conservative Party does argue that a politically correct and elitist Labour Party has neglected the ‘mainstream majority’ of Britons (Conservative Party, 2000: 3, 5; Hague, 2000d: 28). Mobilizing ‘Britishness’ and ‘Englishness’ was a central part of the Conservative’s electoral strategy (Lynch, 2000: 64). According to the Conservative leadership under former opposition leader Hague, Blair’s project of modernizing Britain relegated Britain to part of the EU and involved Britain giving up its rights to make its own laws, to have its own currency, to set its own interest rates (Portillo, 2000). In William Hague’s words: ‘It sometimes seems as if our opponents believe Britain is finished, all played out, ready to be modernised out of existence’ as part of a regional bloc (Hague, 2000a: 5, 25). Francis Maude, the then shadow Foreign Secretary, argued that Blair ‘would happily take Britain into a European superstate’ but ‘the mainstream majority want to be in Europe, not run by Europe’ (Maude, 2000). National sovereignty is important because the Conservatives, too, want Britain to be ‘one of the most admired and influential countries in the world’ (Hague, 2000b). The Conservatives are drawing on a very long historical tradition of constituting Britishness in opposition to ‘a hostile Continental European power’ (Colley, 1996: 7).

Dismissing the assertions of left-wing academics that British nationalism and the union are dead, Hague asserted that:

The British people I talked to on my campaign... are not going through an identity crisis. But they are uneasy at the current political assault on our institutions, liberties and traditions; and they are alarmed at the rising tide of nationalism in Scotland, Wales and England. (Hague, 2000c: 38–9)

In other words, Hague accused New Labour of undermining British nationalism while introducing measures that foster Scottish, Welsh and English nationalism. It should be noted that the Conservatives have a long history of opposition to increased self-determination for Scotland and Wales (Craig and Reid, 1999: 158–9). Hague argued that the English are politically underrepresented and unable to decide English issues such as education or health in the way that Scottish or Welsh assemblies are able
to vote on local issues. The answer, he argues, is ‘to give English MPs an exclusive say over English laws and English spending’, so that English nationalism has ‘a legitimate political outlet’ (Hague, 2000c: 39, 2000a: 23). Even sympathetic commentators argue that New Labour has neglected issues of English nationalism in their policies on devolution (Tomaney, 1999).

However, it is unclear precisely what the Conservatives see Englishness, or indeed Britishness, as comprising. When Hague threatened to take voters ‘on a journey to a foreign land – to Britain after a second term of Tony Blair’ (Hague, 2001), it was a land in which Brussels controlled the economy, in which people were welfare dependent, in which bureaucracy had increased and competition was a dirty word. These characteristics of dependency, bureaucratization, fear of competition were seen as being un-British. The ‘foreign land’ would no longer be the country that, it was claimed, ‘introduced the world to free trade’ and ‘carried law and freedom to new continents’ (Hague, 2001). The Conservatives do argue for a Britain in which self-reliance and freedom are key national values – freedom from unnecessary government interference whether at EU or national level, freedom to let the British get on with what they do best in terms of individual entrepreneurship, and so on. In those respects, Hague’s arguments were very similar to those of previous Conservative leaders such as Margaret Thatcher and John Major (Parekh, 2000: 10–11). However, beyond that entrepreneurial, self-reliant conception of Britishness, the conservative conception of Britishness is a little vague. William Hague has acknowledged that:

There always used to be something very un-British about trying to define who the British were. Perhaps that is because we were so sure of ourselves that we were mildly embarrassed to spell it out. Were we not the people who could never be conquered, whose empire had brought civilisation to far-off lands, whose navy kept the sea open, and whose Parliament was the mother of all Parliaments? (Hague, 2000c: 38)

Like Labour, such statements reflect an astonishing lack of reflection upon the history of the conquest and subjugation of others that also characterized Britain’s imperial past. The statements also reveal the influence of a version of what Krishan Kumar has termed ‘imperial’ or ‘missionary nationalism’. That is, a form of nationalism in which ‘a single ethnic group, from the inception of the empire to its end, gets its principal identity and sense of belonging in the world from its role as carrier of the imperial mission’, rather than from a sense of ethnic identity (Kumar, 2000: 579–80).

Hague’s arguments are also important because of what they say about the silences in British identity. It is here that the present analysis closely intersects with, but also partially differs from, Kumar’s. Kumar argues that the lack of a clear articulation of British and English identity partly derives
from them seeing themselves as carriers of an imperial, ‘civilizing’ and – in the aftermath of the industrial revolution – modernizing mission (2000: 591). (One could argue that there are still elements of that adherence to the modernizing mission in the Blair government’s discourse on Britain’s special role in the information economy.) As well as the English having ‘an alternative focus of identity in the imperial mission’, expressions of English nationalism tended to be restrained because their ‘commanding position’ made it dangerous to remind groups such as the Scots and the Welsh of their inferior position in case it provoked them ‘to do something about it’ (2000: 590–1). Hague’s comments reinforce Kumar’s emphasis on the importance of the ‘civilizing’ imperial mission, but also suggest a slightly more complex formulation in the case of political discourse. Hague’s comments suggest a sense of British ethnic identity that was clearly present, rather than largely suppressed, in the imperial mission. The British knew who they were; they were the unconquerable, civilizing, seafaring nation that (claimed to have) invented parliamentary democracy. British identity was seen as the most outstanding example of the ‘universal’ identity, of civilization, justice and reason, that colonial ‘others’ (as well as other Europeans) needed to aspire to. It was a fairly typical example of a privileged ethnic identity being produced through the subordination and differentiation of other identities (see further, Scott, 1995: 6). However, it was a sense of identity that rarely needed to be explicitly articulated precisely because it was so sure of its superiority.

In short, it is being suggested here that the imperial identity was a constitutive feature of a British ethnic identity, rather than, as Kumar suggests, something that contributed to the suppression of British ethnic identity within the broader imperial identity (Kumar, 2000: 591). Indeed, a sense of British superiority justified the imperial mission, something on which Kumar touches but does not draw out the full implications (2000: 591). Just as a sense of British intellectual superiority still seems to be driving the Blair government’s view of the modernizing role of Britain in the new economy.) It is for this reason, rather than because of an imperial failure to identify in ethnic terms, that the loss of empire has been so threatening to the sense of British identity. As we shall see later in this article, this imperial identity also poses particular problems for the diasporic descendents of the British in colonial settler societies such as Australia, for they are faced with attempting to create a postcolonial Anglo-Celtic identity in countries founded on the continuing dispossession of indigenous peoples.

If Britishness rarely needed to be spelled out because of its assumed superiority, this, of course, is also why Englishness and English home rule were not articulated. Perversely, and in politically very different ways, English dominance also constrained the articulation of both English nationalism and English identity. If Britishness did not need to be articulated, then even less so the Englishness that, many argue (for example,
Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000: 21; Paxman, 1999: 15), was so often conflated with it. Kumar suggests that the restraint in regard to articulating English nationalism was because of a fear of provoking reaction to English dominance. That may indeed be a cause. However, it seems likely that another reason was that English dominance had already won and spread well beyond England’s national borders, so that conceptions of ‘Britishness’ already privileged senses of Englishness within them (Craig and Reid, 1999; Mac An Ghaill, 2001). Articulating an identity separate from British identity was therefore not as politically necessary for the English as it was for (subordinated) Scottish or Welsh nationalists. It was once that implicit sense of English superiority and certainty began to be challenged by the resurgence of Welsh and Scottish nationalism, and by the resulting devolution, that the English began to feel a greater need to articulate their own identity (see, for example, Heffer, 1999), for one of the constitutive features of their old identity was under threat.

This is not to deny the forging of a historical sense of Britishness that had meaning for the English, Scots and Welsh, particularly against external religious and political threats or in contrast to the imperial ‘other’ (Colley, 1996: 6–7, 396–7). Nor is it to deny that a sense of Britishness still has meaning for so many people within Britain as their primary identification. After all, that is one reason why both the Conservative and Labour discourses analysed here continue to appeal to a sense of British identity and why a British parliament is the national parliament. It is also not to deny that Britishness can be part of more multifarious, fused or hybrid identities (Alibhai-Brown, 2000a: ix). However, it is to suggest that the historical sense of Britishness also presupposed the previous annexation of Wales and the subordination of the Scottish crown and parliament. In the process, English identity was partly constituted by a sense of superiority and the subordination of others, just as later English and British identity were to be partly constituted by the subordination of others in the British empire. That is why so many commentators argue that Britishness now needs to be articulated in more inclusive forms (Alibhai-Brown, 2000a; Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000: 103–7).

The silences in regard to articulating privileged identities only become a problem when the assumed dominance begins to be undermined. Then silence becomes an absence and a lack, and also a grievance, because it becomes evident that there is no clear British or English identity separate from the assertion of privilege over ‘others’ – that was one of its constitutive and defining features. Indeed, if English identity too becomes racially and ethnically inclusive, what is the commonly accepted identity category for those of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ descent? Challenging superiority has indeed robbed the English of their identity. But the dilemma then becomes how to develop a sense of British or English or Anglo identity that is not dependent upon the assertion of ethnic superiority?
The Conservatives seem to be divided on just how inclusive their own conception of British identity is to be, despite moving beyond earlier Thatcherite attacks on immigration (Lynch, 2000: 62). Michael Portillo, who was the former opposition Chancellor and subsequent failed contender for Hague’s replacement as opposition leader, took pride in his Spanish heritage, and claimed that the Conservatives ‘are a party . . . for all Britons: black Britons, British Asians, white Britons. . . . We are for people whatever their sexual orientation’ (Portillo, 2000). According to press reports, Portillo’s comments at the time generated considerable disquiet among more traditional conservative MPs and supporters (Independent, 4 October 2000) (and may well explain why he was not subsequently elected as leader of the Party). Hague merely acknowledged that: ‘Britain is a diverse, multicultural society and must be an open society in which success is possible for every hardworking person, whoever they are and wherever they come from’ (Hague, 2000a: 4). From Hague’s comments, it is unclear whether the Conservatives have thrown off the assimilationist model criticized by Paul Gilroy in the 1980s, when he argued that the price of success for members of ethnic groups was precisely that they lost forms of cultural identity that distinguished them from white Britons (Gilroy, 1987: 43–72; Lynch, 2000: 62). Hague did not see Britishness as being an inherently multicultural identity (Parekh, 2000: 11). Hague’s statements also suggest that he was evoking a more traditional conception of Britishness; when British identity was not part of a European identity; when Britishness substantially suppressed Welsh, Irish and Scottish nationalism; when British confidence (and superiority) were bolstered by imperial power. In the words of the 2001 Conservative election manifesto: ‘A Conservative Government will be optimistic about Britain’s future because we are comfortable with Britain’s past’ (Conservative Party, 2001: 23). As the Australian experience will show, any Conservative Party mobilizing traditional identities against modernizing projects also runs the risk of facilitating the rise of racism.

THE AUSTRALIAN DEBATES

If senses of Britishness and Englishness are fragile in Britain itself, imagine then how much more complex issues of identity are for Australians of diasporic Anglo-Celtic origins or descent. A question in the 1986 census suggests that around 77 percent of Australia’s population then identified themselves as being of Anglo-Celtic descent; according to the 1996 census, 2,562,620 of Australia’s 18 million people are either born in the UK or have at least one parent born in the UK (Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 2000). Australia was originally established as a British colonial settler society and, as debates over native title, saying ‘sorry’ to the
A boriginal Stolen Generations, and reconciliation between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples show, is still coming to terms with the implications of that colonial legacy. Furthermore, the concepts of Australian citizenship and British subjectivity were still entwined in citizenship law as late as the 1980s (Davidson, 1997: 46). The inherent fragility of settler identities in regard to the ‘mother country’ has been noted elsewhere (Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, 1995: 20–1).

Modern Australia has a far larger migrant population than Britain: estimates in 1998 suggested that up to 50 percent of the Australian population were either migrants themselves or had at least one parent born overseas (ABS, 2000a). While, as late as the 1960s, 51 percent of migrants to Australia were born in the UK and Ireland, by the 1990s only 15 percent of migrants were born there. The five largest community languages, other than English, in Australia are now Italian, Greek, Cantonese, Arabic/Lebanese and Vietnamese (ABS, 2000c). By contrast, Britain has a much smaller migrant population. Some estimates suggest that as many as 53 million of the 57 million inhabitants of the British Isles are from a white and predominantly Anglo-Celtic background (note that the category ‘ethnic’ is often used in Britain to refer primarily to non-white groups, which makes exact estimates of those from non-Anglo-Celtic backgrounds difficult; see Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000). The then Home Secretary (now Foreign Secretary) Jack Straw’s most recent ‘best guess’ was that the 2002 census might show that the ‘minority ethnic’ black and Asian communities number about 5 million – or 10 percent – of the British population (Guardian, 23 February 2001).

Just as Britain has increasingly turned to Europe, Deserting its former colonies in the process, so too has Australia increasingly turned to developing links in the Asia Pacific region. Australian nationhood and sovereignty are also, like Britain’s, challenged by the forces of economic globalization (although Australia, unlike Britain, has not joined a regional trading bloc equivalent to the EU). All of these factors have contributed to what Ghassan Hage has characterized as ‘the discourse of anglo decline’ (Hage, 1998: 179–247).

How, then, did Australian politicians respond to these dilemmas of ethnic and national identity, and what, if anything, are the implications for the British debates?

KEATING

Australian Labor had also had a ‘modernizing’ project, years before Blair, although the term was not a predominant feature of Australian political discourse. Indeed, one of Keating’s leading speech writers depicted Labor’s
as a ‘postmodern’ project because of its recognition of cultural diversity (Watson, 1993: 5). Nonetheless, the Keating Labor government (of 1991–96) clearly saw itself as shaping Australian national identity to make it appropriate for late-20th-century conditions. Government policy was ‘a process of national . . . reinvention’ (Keating, 1995a). The Keating government’s attempts to transform national identity have been discussed in detail elsewhere (Johnson, 2000: 24–37), so I will concentrate here on aspects of its policies that had particular implications for Britain and Anglo-Celtic identity.

The Keating government argued that Australian identity should reflect the multicultural nature of Australian society, its independence from Britain, its proximity to Asia and its need to survive and prosper in a globalized economy. In particular, Australia’s multicultural population had language and cultural skills that would assist Australian participation in the global economy and give advantages over more monocultural societies (Johnson, 2000: 24–37; Keating, 1992b: 5; Tickner, 1995). For Keating, Australian identity was indelibly multicultural:

"Today, Australians derive from more than 150 ethnic backgrounds . . . each wave [of immigration] extended the reach of our egalitarianism and tolerance, our understanding of what Australian democracy is . . . multiculturalism is not a threat to Australian identity and ethos – it is inseparable from it. (Keating, 1995b: 31)"

Keating’s arguments are an important variant on those forms of ‘civic’ nationalism that seek to bind all citizens together in a national identity based on their commitment to shared constitutional values and political institutions that stand above ethnic difference (see, for example, Calhoun, 1997: 48–9). For Keating was arguing that Australian democracy had been fundamentally shaped by ethnic diversity. Needless to say, such arguments also had huge implications for the positioning of Anglo-Celtic identity within broader conceptions of Australian identity. Keating was asking those Australians of Anglo-Celtic origin to embrace a more cosmopolitan identity, to embrace ethnic diversity and give up the overwhelming privileging of Anglo-Celtic identity implicit in assimilationist politics. He was also questioning placing too much emphasis on links with Britain. While denying that his own Irish ancestry had influenced his republican beliefs, Keating argued that the monarchy ‘is a hereditary British institution, and in the multicultural post-imperial world in which we live and, with all the regional imperatives now facing us, it no longer constitutes an appropriate Australian head of state’ (Keating, 1993a: 164–5).

Keating wanted to forge an Australian identity that acknowledged the British heritage, but didn’t overstate it:

1 . . . remain a grateful and, in many regards, a passionate advocate of things British - from the parliament and law bequeathed us to the art and architecture
and music. But Australia’s diverse heritage is uniquely our own. So, in many respects, is our democratic heritage: it includes not just the fabled spirit of the ‘fair go’ and the collective egalitarian tradition, but a number of constitutional innovations which were achieved here well in advance of Britain – among them the secret ballot, payment of MPs, universal male suffrage, and votes for women. (Keating, 1993a: 164–5)

In short, Keating was rejecting any conception of Australian identity and ‘core’ political values that privileged British identity. He wanted to break with an Australian attitude that ‘cannot separate our interests, our history, or our future from the British’, and break from the Menzies era that ‘sank a generation of Australians in Anglophilia and stupor’ (Keating, 1992c: 188–9). Australians needed to present themselves ‘as we are’ in our Asian region, not ‘with the ghost of empire about us. Not as a vicar of Europe, or as a US deputy’ (Keating, 1992c: 190).

Keating referred to his project as reflecting a ‘postcolonial’ status (Keating, 1994: 2443). Issues of independence were important because ‘the old imperial supports’ that gave Australia ‘a vicarious identity have been pulled away’ (Keating, 1992a). Australia was postcolonial in terms of still being a white-dominated, former European colony trying to develop a different sort of relationship with diverse Asian cultures (Keating, 1993b: 69). It was postcolonial in terms of becoming a republic and forging a new and more independent relationship with Britain. It was also postcolonial in terms of the relationship with indigenous peoples, hence his emphasis on the importance of reconciliation and acknowledging past injustices. While Blair’s speeches talk uncritically of the imperial period, Keating’s speeches address the moral dilemmas facing colonial settler populations who know their societies have been founded partly on death and dispossession, as well as the positive contributions of diverse racialized/ethnic groups. So, Keating asked colonial settler Australians to recognize that they were the problem: ‘It was we who did the dispossessing. We took the traditional lands and smashed the traditional way of life. We brought the diseases. The alcohol. We committed the murders. We took the children from their mothers’ (Keating, 1992d: 228).

However, the postcolonial and multicultural aspects were only part of the government’s project of creating a 21st-century Australia and Australian identity. The modernizing aspect also involved Australian Labor emphasizing the importance of developing an innovative and imaginative, saleable culture for the information revolution (Keating, 1994: 2447). From the early 1980s, Labor emphasized the need to improve social capital and build a knowledge-based society. Labor did not claim that Australia would lead the world, but otherwise statements regarding the new information economy sounded extraordinarily similar to Blair’s (or indeed Clinton’s) and indicated just how pervasive new economy perspectives have become (Johnson, 2000: 123–44).
It is important to recognize that Keating’s vision was not just about acknowledging the contributions of the multicultural ‘other’ to Australian society and identity. It was also about encouraging forms of Anglo-Celtic identity that were supportive of multiculturalism, the republic, and forging closer links with Asia. Keating no doubt saw himself as fostering an improved, cosmopolitan Anglo-Celtic identity that built on positive aspects of the traditional Australian character, such as a belief in ‘fair go’. Nonetheless, his project was also about marginalizing forms of Anglo-Celtic identity that were resistant to social change, that privileged relations with Britain, and that saw Australian identity as overwhelmingly Anglo-Celtic. As such, it was a project that was likely to prove to be extremely controversial, and Keating probably could have usefully spent more time addressing the anxieties of more traditional Anglo-Celts by reassuring them that a transformed Anglo-Celtic identity had a very positive role to play in Australian society, albeit as one ethnic identity among others.

**HOWARD**

Just as New Labour’s modernizing project is now facing a conservative backlash, so, years before, did Australian Labor’s. Indeed, Hague visited Australia in 1998 specifically to study how to defeat a sitting Labour government (Weekend Australian, 14–15 March 1998). The connections have continued: Australian Liberal (conservative) Prime Minister Howard addressed the 2000 Conservative Party conference by video link, and Australians such as Amanda Platell, Nicole Hughes and Paul Larter contributed to the Conservative’s 2001 campaign strategy (Australian, 14 May 2001). The Conservative Party attack on New Labour for being politically correct, elitist and neglecting ‘the mainstream majority’ mirrors Howard’s much earlier critique of the Keating Labor government (Conservative Party, 2000: 3, 5; Guardian, 18 December 2000; Hague, 2000d; Johnson, 2000: 38–54, 64). Howard was particularly critical of Keating’s attempts to encourage a more cosmopolitan and inclusive identity. His agenda was designed to electorally mobilize traditional Anglo-Celts. Howard argued that the Keating Labor government had hijacked Australian identity and, driven by a ‘politically correct’ agenda, had benefited special interests and neglected ‘mainstream’ Australia (Howard, 1995a, 1995b). It became increasingly clear that ‘special interests’ included various ethnic organizations and the so-called ‘Aboriginal industry’, as well as feminists, gay and lesbian organizations and a host of other groups that have been critiqued and defunded since the 1996 election that saw Howard come to power (Adams, 1997; Johnson, 2000: 38–54). Howard was notoriously loath to even use the term ‘multiculturalism’, although he eventually bowed to...
pressure and endorsed the concept of ‘Australian multiculturalism’, arguing that the term retained a sense of common values (Howard, 1999). Howard’s position therefore marked a break with both the existing bipartisan consensus not to play the race/ethnicity card in elections and with the previous (1975–83) Fraser Liberal government’s strong support for multiculturalism.

While stating his opposition to racial discrimination, Howard has acknowledged that he and populist racist politician Pauline Hanson were both drawing on a similar electoral base, namely one concerned with the rise of political correctness, the Aboriginal and multicultural ‘industries’, and negative, so-called ‘black armband’ views of Australian history (Howard, 1997a; see further, Johnson, 2000: 38–48). A detailed analysis of Hansonism is beyond the scope of this present article (see further, Curthoys and Johnson, 1998; Johnson, 1998). However, it is relevant to note that Hanson targeted Anglos, arguing that government support for ‘special’ interests such as immigrants and the Aboriginal ‘industry’ had made (male) Anglo-Saxons ‘the most disadvantaged group in Australian society’ (Sydney Morning Herald, Good Weekend Magazine, 30 November 1996).

Her electoral support base draws heavily on low-income, predominantly Anglo-Celtic rural and outer urban areas that have a low proportion of voters from a non-English speaking background (Goot and Watson, 2001: 160–1). Hanson and her supporters rail against Anglo ‘race traitors’ – the cosmopolitan urban elites who are accused of selling out ordinary Anglo-Celtic Australians to global capital, ‘foreign’ cultures, the UN and other ‘special interests’. Hanson talks of ‘the chance to stand against those who have betrayed our country, and would destroy our identity by forcing upon us the culture of others’ (Hanson, 1997b [anonymous author]; see also 1997a: 65, 77, 155; Johnson, 1998: 214–15). Consequently, commentators caution against overemphasizing the anti-globalization, anti-elite nature of One Nation rhetoric without noting its ethnocentric and racist underpinnings (Goot and Watson, 2001: 189).

In short, recent Australian politics has been characterized by a very damaging race debate (Stratton, 1998). However, a feature of that debate is not just, as Hage rightly notes, the ‘discourse of anglo decline’, but also a feature Hage tends to neglect, the attempt to resist constructions of Anglo-Celtic identity that are supportive of cultural diversity and undermine Anglo-Celtic privilege. As the attacks on so-called political correctness show, the discourse is just as much about managing Anglo-Celts as about managing the increasingly diverse ‘other’ (see further, Hage, 1998: 179–247; Johnson, 2000: 38–54).

It is not possible to give a detailed analysis of Hage’s broad arguments in White Nation in an article that focuses merely on comparisons between Australian Anglo-Celtic and British/English identity in the discourse of politicians. Hage’s analysis generates major insights regarding ‘white’ dominance, national belonging and who feels they have a right to worry...
about, 'tolerate' and govern the Australian nation (Hage, 2001: 246–7). Hage is also correct that Anglo-Celtic 'whiteness' was historically seen as the definitive whiteness in Australia. However, given that his project is about the dominance of Australian 'whiteness', Hage is naturally interested in analysing 'the discourse of anglo decline' in that context (Hage, 1998: 179–247, 2001: 248–9). He therefore tends to neglect analysing the tensions between 'Anglo-Celtic' and other European identities, other than through issues of 'white' status, for example as forms of white 'Australo-British' status are challenged by more classy forms of cosmopolitan whiteness (1998: 179–208). Hage's analysis of Australian multiculturalism as a governmental strategy largely designed to manage the 'other' (Hage, 1998: 237) has therefore been criticized for neglecting the protracted struggles by diverse ethnic organizations in support of multicultural policy and against previous policies of assimilation into Anglo-Celtic 'values' (Collins, 1999: 390). The most powerful of these ethnic organizations were 'white', for example Greek and Italian. Australian society is still dominated by Anglo-Celts, but assimilation privileged Anglo-Celtic ethnic identity much more than multiculturalism's celebration of ethnic diversity. Hence Conservative politicians' opposition to multiculturalism. As we have seen from a comparative analysis, traditional conceptions of Britishness are similarly threatened by relationships with other 'white' Europeans. Indeed, opposition to Europe still helps to constitute a conservative form of 'Britishness'.

This is also why Howard's support for traditional Anglo-Celtic identity privileges relations with Britain. While Hague argued that Blair was giving up British nationhood to Europe, Howard implied that the Keating government had been subordinating Australia's identity, and its traditional connections with countries such as the UK, to relations with Asia (Howard, 1997b). Howard's emphasis on celebrating and cementing Australia's relationship with Britain was evident not only in his monarchist opposition to republicanism, but also in his attitude to the colonial past, including the treatment of indigenous peoples. Howard's attack on Keating's 'black armband' history means that he merely acknowledges some 'blemishes' in Australian colonial history (Howard, 2000a). Howard argues that Britain gave Australia many of its core values and that 'parliamentary democracy, the rule of law . . . a free press . . . were Britain's great gift to Australia' (Howard, 1997c; see also 2000a). By contrast, Keating stressed that Australia had introduced many democratic innovations long before Britain.

Despite his traditionalism, Howard did argue that Australia's relationship with Britain needed to be 'seen in contemporary and futurist terms', allowing for different regional interests (Howard, 1997b). Indeed, Australia occupied 'a unique intersection' as an 'outpost' of 'western civilization', with strong American links, situated adjacent to the Asia Pacific region, with increasing Asian immigration and 800,000 Australians speaking Asian languages (Howard, 1997d, 2000b). Howard offered a deal – if Britain were
to facilitate Australia’s relationship with Europe, Australia could do the
same with Asia: ‘perhaps one of the features of our modern and future
association is that we can further help each other to understand and to
interpret the respective regions which are our respective destinies in the
future’ (Howard, 1997b; see also 1997e). Perversely, Blair has claimed
equivalent intersections for Britain, but they are intersections that neglect
Australia. He claims that Britain will be a ‘pivotal’ nation, a bridge between
Eastern and Western Europe, between the USA and the EU (Blair, 2000).
I wish to suggest in this article that Australia and Britain also have another
role that they can play, not merely being bridges to the ‘other’, but helping
to understand the developing nature of British identity, including in its
diasporic Anglo-Celtic form.

CONCLUSION

The account given here makes it clear that debates over British identity
cannot be confined to the British Isles – there are other relevant stories in
other places. Both the British and Australian experiences attest to the
fragile and contested nature of British/English/Anglo-Celtic identities.
They also suggest that there tend to be two major political strategies for
dealing with such crises in identity; one that attempts to transform the
identity, to make it more compatible with social, economic and techno-
logical change; and another that seeks to mobilize traditional (more privi-
leged and less inclusive) social identities in response to ‘modernizing’
projects and rapid change. In short, there seem to be both ‘modernizing’
and nostalgic strategies for tackling the dilemmas that changing conditions
pose for privileged ethnic identities.

The Australian experience suggests that New Labour may have initially
underestimated the likelihood that conservative parties would attempt to
mobilize more traditional British or English identities. Blair has expressed
concern that the British Labour Party’s positive message on Britishness has
not been getting across to the electorate. He wrote to cabinet ministers
urging them to make patriotism a priority in the lead up to the 2001
election. He made the point that ‘over the next year, questions of national
identity are going to be important’, and urged ministers to highlight the
ways in which they are ‘standing up for Britain’ (Daily Telegraph, 25
was given the task of ensuring that members of the government paid special
attention to issues of national identity (Daily Telegraph, 25 November 2000;

Conversely, the previous Australian experience also drew attention to
problems for the Conservative Party strategy, in particular the risk that
their mobilization of traditional identities could facilitate an electorally damaging race debate akin to Australian Hansonism, and further fuel racial tension. The raising of the ‘Englishness’ issue is particularly problematic. There is evidence that some electors have been using an identification with ‘Englishness’ to signify ‘whiteness’, given that they now perceive Britishness to be a too racially inclusive term (Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000: 227).  

Hague was repeatedly accused of playing the race card during the 2001 British election campaign, for example through his criticisms of so-called politically correct policing and his promise to make Britain ‘a safe haven, not a soft touch’ for asylum seekers (Conservative Party, 2001: 15; Guardian, 15 December 2000, 18 December 2000; Hague, 2001; Independent, 28 May 2001). After Hague’s failure in the 2001 election to reverse the electoral decline of the Conservatives, the Conservative’s choice of Iain Duncan Smith as the new leader, rather than someone such as Michael Portillo, was also seen to indicate ongoing support for a more conservative agenda. After all, Duncan Smith has a history of support for Euro-scepticism, as well as a history of critical comments about ethnic minorities and asylum seekers (Guardian, 21 August 2001). Since his election as leader, Duncan Smith has tried to reassure critics that he wishes to move the Conservative Party in a more inclusive direction, making public statements to that effect and appointing Shailesh Vara, Mohammed Riaz and Nirj Diva to senior party or advisory positions (Duncan Smith, 2001a, 2001b). He also suspended the Monday Club from the Conservative Party because of its inflammatory views on racial issues. However, his attempts to seem a more ‘inclusive’ leader have been undermined by his appointment of a dozen strong Euro-sceptics to the shadow cabinet, and by his appointment of Laurence Robertson and John Hayes, seen as strong opponents of ethnic minority migration, as party whips (Guardian, 19 September 2001). Furthermore, his continued assertions of inclusive values are also made on the basis of recognizing individual ‘merit’ and opposing the recognition of ‘categories’ (Duncan Smith, 2001b) – a position that can deny the disadvantage of minority groups, and appear close to the assimilationist Tory politics of the past. He has been careful to make it clear that his more inclusive statements are not motivated by a desire to be ‘politically correct’, but simply by a desire to be ‘politically effective’ – a position that still leaves open the possibility of future Hague-style attacks on policies designed to challenge racism.

Meanwhile, Australian politics may well be revealing the influence of British electoral strategies. Like Hague, Prime Minister Howard also mobilized the issue of asylum seekers in the lead up to the 2001 Australian election. Howard used the Tampa crisis, and subsequent boatloads of Afghan and Iraqi refugees sailing to Australia via Indonesia, to once again implicitly evoke the race/ethnicity card. The 11 September terrorist attack and the commitment of Australian troops to the ‘war on terrorism’ were
also used to engender the longstanding ‘mainstream’ Australian fear of the external ‘other’ (McMaster, 2001). Final election advertisements highlighted Howard’s campaign launch slogan: ‘We decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come’, and claimed that a vote for the Liberals ‘protects our borders’ (Advertiser, 9 November 2001). The ‘we’ was ambiguous enough to be understood broadly, but also sufficiently narrow to attract the Hansonite vote. Labor was defeated after struggling throughout the campaign to get its domestic policies heard in a climate dominated by external security issues. However, Labor’s strategy of trying to neutralize the refugee issue by having as little difference as possible between themselves and the government (Beazley, Australian, 8 November 2001) possibly takes a leaf out of British Labour’s book in 1995. Then shadow Home Secretary Jack Straw was reputed to have argued that: ‘We should not allow so much as a cigarette card to come between the Labour Party and the Tory Government over immigration’ (cited in Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000: 226).

In short, both the Australian and British examples continue to draw attention to the need for political analysts to take so-called ‘mainstream’ identities, such as British, English or Anglo-Celtic identities, seriously. There is good reason for many groups of people, including the more powerful, to feel insecure and fragile in the modern world. Even commentators such as Alibhai-Brown write of the English feeling ‘lost’, and talk of the need to construct a more positive English identity (Alibhai-Brown, 2000a: 39). The problem is that, precisely because of their privileged position, mainstream identities did not have to be articulated explicitly. They were often the implicit ‘universal’ that others were meant to aspire to and be assimilated into. They were constituted partly by their assumption of superiority. When that superiority is challenged, so is a large part of their traditional content. In these circumstances, what is intended to be a changing identity can easily be experienced as a loss of identity (particularly if national identities are becoming more inclusive, and if challenges to other forms of identity – for example, class and masculinity – are being experienced as well). Conservative parties in both Australia and Britain have attempted to mobilize that sense of loss in opposition to modernizing projects. The question then arises as to whether politicians can encourage a positive sense of identity for powerful ethnic groups that is not constituted of concepts of racial/ethnic superiority? This is a key dilemma underlying alternative strategies for engaging with issues of ethnic privilege. The analysis here suggests that British political leaders from both major parties have been loath to acknowledge the negative features of Britain’s imperial past, despite claims that conceptions of ‘Britishness’ were traditionally racially exclusive. Indeed, the politicians’ aggrandizing visions of Britain’s future role in the world may well reflect the ghosts of imperial power and subsequent disappointments.
Australian politicians have been forced to engage explicitly with the legacies of a colonial settler society, albeit from opposing perspectives that acknowledge, or attempt to minimize, past injustices. However, the Australian experience suggests no easy solution to the dilemmas of ethnic privilege. Traditional identities were also mobilized in response to the Keating government’s transformative strategies. The question remains as to whether it is possible to give those of Anglo-Celtic origin a sense of pride in the positive contributions that their ethnic group has made – and will continue to make – to Australia, without reinforcing the view that Anglo-Celtic Australians are the privileged ethnic group that determines Australian identity and values (see Johnson, 2001). My analysis therefore differs from that of commentators such as Miriam Dixson, who still tend to see Australian ‘core values’ in Anglo-Celtic terms (Dixson, 1999: 27–8, 42–3, 73, 164–5). On the contrary, it could be argued that, due to the complex situation that Australian society finds itself in at the beginning of the 21st century, Australian Anglo-Celts are facing particularly strong pressures to forge more inclusive concepts of national culture and identity. Their experiences may even offer insights to their British counterparts, and vice versa.

Notes

1 For an indication of the long-term tensions in British identity, see Colley (1996).
2 In case it seems presumptuous for an Australian author to comment on constructions of British identity, I should confess my hybrid identity. While predominantly identifying as Australian, I was born in Britain and retain dual citizenship.
3 Perhaps because statements about ethnic and national identity were central to electoral strategy and therefore widely circulated, there is a surprising consistency between statements that political leaders made in election policy documents and in speeches made on diplomatic occasions and to business or ethnic organizations.
4 Islington, where Blair lived prior to becoming Prime Minister, is an upmarket area of London that has become synonymous with the liberal/left, ‘politically correct’ middle-classes.
5 The forging of an Australian Anglo-Celtic identity was assisted by the diasporic dispersal of Celts throughout the Australian continent, and by the growth of a large non-English-speaking ‘other’.
6 My thanks to Brigid Mahoney for her research assistance on this point.
7 However, note that the earlier 1996 census figures suggest a figure closer to 42 percent (ABS, 2000b).
8 Burchell notes that Hage overlooks the extent to which the focus of multicultural policy was on encouraging the majority culture to be ‘tolerators’, rather than on managing diverse migrant communities (Burchell, 2001: 243). However, Burchell’s own analysis neglects the focus of anti-multicultural discourse on an increasingly threatened majority culture, and the resultant mobilizations of ‘whiteness’ and the ‘discourse of anglo decline’ (see Hage, 2001: 249).
9 These issues include whether Hage’s particular analysis of Australian ‘whiteness’ (a) allows adequately for the influence of the Aboriginal ‘other’ in constituting it, and (b) neglects arguments that non-indigenous, non-‘whites’ are still colonial settlers in relation to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. Hage has acknowledged some of the shortcomings of his book in regard to Aboriginality (Hage, 1998: 24).

10 A National Centre for Social Research survey of social attitudes suggested that some six million adults in England saw themselves as having an English rather than British national identity, and 37 percent of that group admitted to being racially prejudiced, compared with 17 percent who identified with Britishness. 46 percent of those who did not identify with Britishness believed that equal opportunity measures for blacks and Asians had gone too far (Guardian, 28 November 2000: 4).

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I carry with me privilege constructed by the peculiarities of American history, the great possibilities provided for my people in 20th-century America, while also carrying the millennium-old consciousness of marginalization. I could easily hide my Jewishness, but choose not to, as a result visibly presenting my Jewishness while also enjoying the benefits of white privilege. When someone I do not know points out my identity, even simply by calling out, â€œShalom,â€ I immediately tighten up. Will this be another encounter in which I am publicly harassed or screamed at? Last year, a car slowed down